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Chapter One
Introduction
One of the central results of economics is that incentives matter. Contract theory,
the branch of economics that is concerned with the optimal design of incentives,
has seen a considerable growth in the last decades. In the most simple model,
a principal wants to delegate a task he cannot conduct himself to an agent who
incurs a disutility from working. Hence, the incentives of principal and agent
are not aligned, and the principal has to design an appropriate incentive scheme
which motivates the agent to perform the task at the lowest cost. Contracting
frictions arise when the effort of the agent is not observable by the principal or
when she does not know whether the agent is highly skilled or lacking ability.
Early studies on incentive provision have covered problems where the prin-
cipal delegates one task to one agent.1 However, most real-world contracting
problems consist of more than one task to be carried out, and principals typically
hire more than one agent. In such situations, the interactions between the agents
and between the incentives for the individual tasks have to be taken into account.
Since the seminal paper by Holmström and Milgrom (1991), such problems have
become of great interest to the theory of incentives.2
This thesis consists of four self-contained chapters concerning problems
where there are multiple tasks to be delegated. One study is theoretical, two com-
bine theory and evidence from the laboratory, and one is experimental. Testing
the predictions of contract-theoretical models empirically is subject to difficulties
1See, for example, Spence and Zeckhauser (1971), Ross (1973), Mirrlees (1976), Holmström
(1979), Grossman and Hart (1983).
2For overviews of the multi-tasking literature, see Dewatripont et al. (2000), Laffont and
Martimort (2002, Chapter 5), and Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, Chapter 6).
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due to the non-observability of the agents’ efforts or their types.3 Hence, the
controlled environment of laboratory experiments is very useful as a first step for
testing the empirical relevance of the theoretical models.
In Chapter 2, we analyze a theoretical model where an uninformed decision-
maker has to make a decision based on evidence in favor and against a proposal.
The information is gathered by two biased groups, one of which searches for
favorable evidence while the other searches for evidence against the proposal.
Chapter 3 theoretically and experimentally considers a problem where a principal
has to delegate two tasks that are in direct conflict with each other. In the
theoretical and experimental study presented in Chapter 4, a government wants to
provide a public service. It can delegate the two tasks of building and subsequently
operating the facility either to a public-private partnership or to two independent
private contractors. In our experimental studies, social preferences in the form
of fairness and reciprocity influence our results. While social preferences have
received considerable attention in experimental economics, there are only a few
studies on the effect of cognitive abilities. We report on a short experimental
study in Chapter 5 on the relationship between cognitive abilities and behavioral
biases.
In Chapter 2,4 we study a problem of multi-dimensional information trans-
mission where an uninformed decision-maker receives information relevant to
the decision from two biased experts. We show that reducing the dimensions
on which information can be gathered—and hence reducing complexity—can
increase welfare. Suppose two firms want to merge, and a judge has to decide
whether to accept or to reject the merger proposal based on information provided
to her by the merging firms and an antitrust authority (regulator). We assume that
there is information about the effects of the merger on welfare in three dimensions.
In each of the dimensions, there exists either only information in favor of the
proposal, only information against the proposal, conflicting information both in
3See Prendergast (1999) and Chiappori and Salanié (2003) for an overview of empirical
studies on the provision of incentives.
4This chapter is joint work with Achim Wambach and Florian Gössl. Achim Wambach
suggested the idea and wrote a first draft. Florian Gössl and I extended and generalized the model,
conducted the analysis, and wrote the current draft.
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favor and against the proposal, or no information.5 The firms only search for
information in favor of the proposal, and the regulator only searches for evidence
against it. The firms and the regulator are asymmetric in the sense that the benefit
of a cleared merger for the firms exceeds the benefits of the bureaucrats of the
antitrust authority in case of a blocked merger. Due to the large expected profits of
a successful merger, the firms always search on all admissible dimensions. When
the firms and the regulator are sufficiently asymmetric, there is an equilibrium
where the regulator does not search at all. The information provided to the judge
hence is biased, and she has to make her decision based on information in favor
of the proposal and on the expected value of information against the proposal. In
this situation, it is possible that decision errors occur, which reduce welfare. We
show in a first step that in such an asymmetric situation, simplifying the decision
process in that the judge only accepts evidence from two of the three dimensions
enables the regulator to equal the search efforts by the firms. In a second step, we
show that in this situation, the judge is able to make better decisions because the
information available to her is more balanced. Compared to the situation where
only the firms search, welfare can be larger.6 This model can also be applied
to the case of lobbying where, for example, big tobacco and small consumer
protection groups provide politicians working on new legislation on the ban of
tobacco advertising with information about the health effects of smoking, or to
white collar crime trials, where big firms with large resources and understaffed
prosecutors battle in court.
In the study presented in Chapter 3,7 a principal wants to delegate two
tasks that are in direct conflict with each other, i.e., providing effort in one
task may have a negative side effect on the success probability of the other
5This information structure is an extension of Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) to multiple
dimensions.
6Results where restrictions can be beneficial have also been shown in the lobbying literature
where a cap on political contributions can make voters better off or lead to better policy decisions
(see Prat, 2002b; Cotton, 2012), and in the literature on optimal delegation, where a restriction of
the action space of the agent can increase his search incentives (see Szalay, 2005; Alonso and
Matouschek, 2008).
7This chapter is based on Hoppe and Kusterer (2011b). Eva Hoppe suggested the idea for
the paper and Eva Hoppe and I carried out the theoretical analysis. Eva Hoppe designed the
experiment, while I programmed and conducted it (the data collection was part of my diploma
thesis). Together, we analyzed the data and wrote the draft.
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and vice versa.8 In such situations, job design becomes a major issue and
we show that implementing two efforts can be facilitated by hiring two agents
instead of one agent. Consider a merchant (principal) who wants to sell two
products which may be imperfect substitutes. She can either hire one or two sales
representatives (agents) in order to promote the products. If the products are
imperfect substitutes, then promoting one product increases its sales probability,
while it reduces the sales probability of the other. If the merchant hires only one
sales representative, the sales representative is reluctant to promote both products
as he hurts his own efforts on the respective other product, which makes inducing
two efforts very expensive for the merchant. However, if the merchant hires two
sales representatives, the competition between them makes inducing two efforts
cheaper for her. In case of conflict between the tasks, it depends on the parameter
constellation whether hiring one or two sales representatives is better for the
merchant. However, when there is no conflict, it is unambiguously better for the
merchant to hire one sales representative as the rent that the merchant leaves to
the sales representative to motivate him to work on one task can also be used to
motivate him to work on the other task.
In order to find an answer to our research question whether the theoretical
incentive problem of inducing a single agent to simultaneously exert efforts in
conflicting tasks is empirically relevant, we conducted a laboratory experiment
with 474 subjects. There are four treatments with a 2× 2 design between the
number of agents (one or two) and whether there is conflict between the tasks
or not. One central finding of our experiment is that in the one-agent treatment
with conflict, two efforts are chosen significantly less often than in the other
three treatments. Hence, our experimental data provides strong support for the
empirical relevance of the theoretically predicted incentive problem to motivate a
single agent to provide efforts in conflicting tasks. However, even in the presence
of conflict, a relevant fraction of agents still exerts two efforts (to reciprocate the
principals’ generous wage offers). This contributes to our finding that, in contrast
to the theoretical prediction, in the presence of conflict, the principals’ average
profit is slightly larger in the one-agent treatment than in the two-agent treatment.
8We extend the model by Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, Section 6.2.2), which is based on
the idea of agents as advocates of Dewatripont and Tirole (1999).
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Chapter 49 contributes to the growing literature on public-private partnerships.
We consider a model where a government agency wants an infrastructure-based
public service to be provided.10 The government has to decide whether to bundle
the two tasks of building the infrastructure and subsequently operating it and
delegate them to a public-private partnership, or to use traditional procurement
and delegate each task to a single private contractor. Two kinds of cost-reducing
investments can be made when building the facility, one that improves the quality
of service and another that reduces service quality. The two forms of contracting
differ in the investment incentives. In theory, a public-private partnership pro-
vides larger investment incentives in the building stage as the consortium reaps
the benefits of the cost-reducing investments when running the facility. Under
traditional procurement, the builder has no incentive to invest in cost-reducing
technologies as only the operator profits from lower running costs. Hence, a
public-private partnership chooses the first-best level of the quality-enhancing
investment, but there is overinvestment regarding the quality-reducing investment,
while under traditional procurement, the first-best level of the quality-reducing
investment is taken, but there is underinvestment in the quality-enhancing invest-
ment. Which mode of service provision is desirable depends on the relative effects
of both investments. Furthermore, we also open the black box of public-private
partnerships and take different modes of subcontracting within the consortium
into account. We consider two situations, where either the builder is the main
contractor and subcontracts service provision, or where the operator is the main
contractor who subcontracts the construction of the facility. Theoretically, the first
situation provides the same investment incentives as a public-private partnership,
whereas the incentives are as under traditional procurement in the latter situation.
In our experiment with 400 subjects, where we use a parameter constellation
such that a public-private partnership is more attractive than traditional procure-
ment, we test whether the trade-off between strong investment incentives in a
public-private partnership and weak investment incentives under traditional pro-
9This chapter is based on Hoppe, Kusterer, and Schmitz (2013). Eva Hoppe and Patrick
Schmitz provided the theory and designed the experiment. I programmed and conducted the
experiment and carried out most of the statistical analyses. Eva Hoppe, Patrick Schmitz and I
wrote the draft.
10The model is based on Hart (2003).
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curement is of empirical relevance. We conducted four treatments for all different
modes of public-service provision: public-private partnership, traditional procure-
ment, subcontracting with the builder as main contractor, and subcontracting with
the operator as main contractor. Our results mostly corroborate the theoretical
predictions. Both investments are taken more often in the public-private partner-
ship and in the builder-as-main-contractor treatments than in the treatments with
traditional procurement and operator-as-main-contractor, which in turn creates a
higher total surplus when the two tasks are bundled.
Only recently, researchers have started to investigate the impact of cognitive
ability on judgment and decision making.11 In Chapter 5,12 we investigate
whether the susceptibility to behavioral biases is related to cognitive ability.13
Frederick (2005) introduced the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) to measure a
person’s mode of reasoning and cognitive ability. The CRT consists of questions
that have an intuitive but wrong answer which comes to mind quickly, and a
correct one which requires more deliberation. We use this test to categorize
subjects into more intuitive and more deliberate decision makers in order to test
whether more deliberate thinking lowers the probability of falling for a behavioral
bias. In our experiment, we study the base rate fallacy (to underweight the
base rate), the conservatism bias (to overweight the base rate), overconfidence,
and the endowment effect. Our results show that subjects with lower cognitive
abilities are more likely to fall for the base rate fallacy and for the conservatism
bias. Higher cognitive ability is related to a more precise self-assessment in the
overconfidence task, whereas cognitive ability does not affect the occurrence of
the endowment effect which is striking in both, low and high CRT groups.
11The literature on heuristics and biases has shown that individuals sometimes use simple
decision heuristics instead of deliberate rational thinking (see Kahneman et al., 1982).
12This chapter is based on Hoppe and Kusterer (2011a). Eva Hoppe and I designed the
experiment. I programmed and conducted the experiment. Together, we analyzed the data and
wrote the draft.
13For a related study, see Oechssler et al. (2009).
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Chapter Two
Searching for evidence: less can be
more
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Regulation and antitrust has become more complex. For example, in financial
regulation in the United States, the Dodd-Frank Act which was signed into law in
2010 is “23 times longer than Glass-Steagall” (Economist, 2012), the legislation
passed in the 1930s as a response to the 1929 crash of Wall Street. In the European
Union, the European Commission (EC) observes increased complexity in merger
cases. The EC states: “The recent trend that transactions become more complex
has continued in 2013. Second phase investigations in particular generally require
sophisticated quantitative and qualitative analyses involving large amounts of
data.” (European Commission, 2014, p. 25).
Complexity itself may not be problematic, but it becomes an issue if the
firms and government agencies involved in regulation and antitrust cases cannot
adjust to it in a similar fashion. While firms can presumably more easily increase
their budget for legal and/or economic advice if deemed necessary, government
agencies face binding budget constraints and may be unable to increase their
workforce or keep enough competent staff on their payroll. This asymmetry may
lead to biased decisions and welfare losses, or, as Rogoff (2012) puts it for the
case of financial regulation: “The problem, at least, is simple: As finance has
become more complicated, regulators have tried to keep up by adopting ever
more complicated rules. It is an arms race that underfunded government agencies
have no chance to win.”
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In a setting where a decision-maker has to decide on an issue but is uninformed
and has to rely on two biased groups that may search for multiple pieces of
information and submit it to her, we find that reducing complexity may increase
search activity and welfare if the two groups are asymmetric in the utility they
derive from a favorable decision.
We assume that the two groups derive positive utility only if the decision is
made in their favor. Applied to our initial example, one group may be interpreted
as a firm filing for a merger with one of its competitors while the other group is
the antitrust authority attempting to prevent a potential reduction of consumer
surplus due to the merger. In this situation, we argue that it is natural to assume
that both groups benefit from a favorable decision only and that the (monetary)
benefit of a cleared merger to the involved firm(s) by far outweighs the (potentially
non-monetary) benefit of the (bureaucrats of the) antitrust authority in case of a
blocked merger.
Both groups can search simultaneously for information on multiple dimen-
sions. We interpret the number of dimensions as the complexity of a case. If
the utility of the disadvantaged group is too low to engage in any search for
information initially, we show in a first step that a reduction of complexity, that is,
a reduction of the number of dimension available for investigation, may increase
search incentives of this group holding constant full search by the other group.
The reduction of complexity reduces the advantage of the privileged group which
makes search more attractive to the disadvantaged group.
The decision-maker aims to maximize welfare but is neither informed about
the state nor is she able to observe the search activity by the two groups. In
a first-best world, the decision-maker is fully informed and does not generate
welfare losses by wrong decisions. This could be reached in equilibrium if both
parties search on all dimensions. In an equilibrium where one of the groups does
not search on all dimensions, however, the decision-maker is not fully informed
and cannot avoid decision errors. A reduction of complexity has in principle two
effects: it makes it impossible to reach the first-best but it can at the same time
lead to increased search activity by the disadvantaged group which translates
into more and more balanced information available to the decision-maker. For
8
2.1. Introduction
an initially large enough number of dimensions, this can lead to an increase of
welfare.
Our results suggest that it may be beneficial for welfare to simplify proce-
dures in competition and regulation cases if the involved agents are asymmetric.
This finding is consistent with the Regulatory Fitness and Performance program
(REFIT) initiated by the EU which, regarding merger review, aims “to make the
EU merger review procedures simpler and lighter for stakeholders and to save
costs.” (European Commission, 2014, p. 24)
The decision-maker in our model could correspond to a judge deciding on
an antitrust or regulation case in the US or to a judge presiding over a white-
collar-crime case. In the EU, the EC has the hybrid role of a biased group and the
decision-maker. On the one hand, its goal is to protect consumer interests, on the
other hand, it decides on whether to allow or block a merger. But because ‘wrong’
decisions can be reviewed and overturned by the European Court of Justice, our
model also applies to the European case.
Another prominent application of our model is informational lobbying with
competing interest groups.1 Policy-makers who have to decide on whether to
vote in favor of or against new legislation are potentially uninformed about the
implications of the new legislation but can rely on lobby groups to feed them
with (possibly biased) information. Lobby groups benefit from a policy change
in their favor and can invest resources to search for arguments and information
supporting their preferred outcome. If such information is discovered, the group
has an incentive to inform the policy-maker about it. Examples where the benefit
of a favorable decision may differ significantly between interest groups include
tobacco companies competing with consumer protection groups in order to avoid
sales and/or marketing restrictions or oil companies lobbying for drilling rights
or the legalization of fracking against environmental protection interest groups.
1In informational lobbying, interest groups submit information supporting their cause to a
decision-maker. A second important instrument in lobbyist activities are financial contributions.
It has been argued that informational lobbying is more prevalent, especially in the EU (Chalmers,
2013; New York Times, 2013), and more important compared to contributions (Potters and van
Winden, 1992; Bennedsen and Feldmann, 2002).
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Our model is related to the literature on strategic information transmission
started by Crawford and Sobel (1982).2 In these models, an uninformed decision
maker (receiver) makes a decision based on information presented by one or more
informed expert(s) (sender). The messages in these games typically are cheap
talk while in our model, messages are verifiable, and senders can only send hard
information they have gathered at a cost beforehand.
In the economic literature on lobbying3 there are two different channels
through which interest groups can influence the political decision process: cam-
paign contributions and informational lobbying.4 Interest groups can either
supply politicians with information pertinent to the policy decision (Milgrom and
Roberts, 1986; Austen-Smith and Wright, 1992; Potters and van Winden, 1992)
or donate money to swing policy in their favor or help the preferred candidate to
get elected (Prat, 2002a,b; Coate, 2004a,b), or both (Bennedsen and Feldmann,
2006; Dahm and Porteiro, 2008; Cotton, 2012). Generally, the literature on
informational lobbying shows that decision-makers can learn something about
the state of the world even from biased experts and improve policy by taking
their information into account. We show in this chapter that with asymmetric
lobby groups and multiple searches, the decision-maker may only receive infor-
mation from the stronger group and welfare-reducing decision errors can occur.
Simplifying the decision process by restricting the number of dimensions where
information is taken into account for the decision results in more balanced in-
formation provision and increased welfare. A similar result has been found in
the literature on contribution limits. Exertion of political influence by means
of contributions is seen critical by the general public which fears that wealthy
groups can simply buy political favors (Prat, 2002b). In response, many countries
use some form of contribution limits or try to reform campaign finance. In a
model with politicians, lobbies, and voters, Prat (2002b) shows that while voters
might learn valuable information from political advertising, the median voter can
be better off when contributions are banned. Cotton (2012) analyzes a situation
where a rich and a poor lobby group can pay contributions in order to get access
2A more recent overview of this literature is provided by Sobel (2013).
3There is also a large political science literature on this topic, for an overview see Woll
(2006).
4For an overview, see Grossman and Helpman (2001).
10
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to a decision-maker which is assumed to be essential for the transmission of
information. Without caps on contributions, the poor group has less access but is
not necessarily disadvantaged because the politician can extract a rent from the
rich group. Contribution limits then make the richer group better off as they limit
the rent-extraction ability of the decision-maker. In his model, limits can be bene-
ficial and yield more information transmission and better policy when interest
groups can decide whether to form a lobby or not. Our model is complementary
to that literature in that it shows that welfare can be improved by simplifying the
decision process when two asymmetric interest groups compete.
In our model, the interest groups are only interested in finding evidence in
favor of their cause and hence are advocates in the sense of Dewatripont and
Tirole (1999) who have shown that when agents receive decision-based rewards,
competition between opposed agents can increase information gathering or render
it cheaper for the principal (see also Austen-Smith and Wright, 1992). Similarly,
Krishna and Morgan (2001) show that a decision-maker benefits from consulting
two experts, but only when the experts’ preferences are opposed. Bennedsen and
Feldmann (2006) look at the interplay of informational lobbying and contributions
and find that if contributions are available, less information is transmitted in
equilibrium and competition between the groups cannot fully alleviate this result
because search creates an information externality if it is unsuccessful which
benefits the weaker group and thus decreases the incentives to search by the
stronger group.
The positive effect of reducing the action space of the agents has also been
shown in the literature on optimal delegation (e.g. Szalay, 2005; Alonso and
Matouschek, 2008; Armstrong and Vickers, 2010). In these models, a principal
delegates decision making authority to a self-interested agent. The principal
has to decide how much liberty he wants to give to the agent. In a model of
interval delegation, Szalay (2005) for example shows that removing intermediate
decisions from the agent’s action set can improve his incentives for information
gathering. This is similar to our model where the quality of decisions can be
improved by restricting the information space through deliberate exclusion of one
of the dimensions.
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we
present the model. The analysis of the game in Section 2.3 starts in Subsec-
tion 2.3.1 with the case where search is unrestricted and proceeds with the case
where search on one dimension is prohibited in Subsection 2.3.2. We then com-
pare the search activity and the effects on welfare of the reduction in the number
of dimensions in Subsection 2.3.3. A discussion follows in Section 2.4, and we
conclude and provide an outlook in Section 2.5.
2.2 THE MODEL
A judge (she) has to make a decision on a case based on information available
on multiple dimensions. The information is collected by two interested parties,
the firm and the regulator. Information on all dimensions is weighted equally for
the decision. More specifically, the judge can either accept or reject a proposal
brought forward by the firm, denoted by d f and dr, respectively. The firm prefers
decision d f , while the regulator prefers dr. The information on each dimension
i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n} consists of the realization of two i.i.d. random variables θi, j,
j ∈ { f ,r}. Each θi, j takes value 1 with probability p and value 0 with probability
1− p where 0 < p < 1. θi, f = 1 can be interpreted as information in favor of the
proposal while θi,r = 1 can be interpreted as information against the proposal
in dimension i. θi, j = 0, j ∈ { f ,r} means that there is no information available
either in favor or against the proposal in dimension i. The state of the world is
defined as Θ= {∑iθi, f ,∑iθi,r}.5
The two parties receive benefit w j ≥ 0 in case d = d j and zero otherwise.6
Both parties maximize expected profits u(w j,d,c) = Pr(d = d j|E f ,Er)w j−E jc
where c > 0 are the marginal search costs and E j, j ∈ { f ,r} is the number of
searches by each party. To account for asymmetry between the two parties, we
assume w f > wr. Furthermore we assume that the benefit accruing to the firm if
5Qualitatively, our information structure can be interpreted as an extension of the information
structure of Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) to multiple dimensions.
6The subscript j is dropped later in the analysis whenever it is clear to which party w refers.
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the proposal is accepted is large enough such that full information collection on
all dimensions always overcompensates the cost of doing so.7
The judge’s aim is to maximize expected welfare based on the information
available to her.8 The welfare of a decision is given by ∑iθi, f −∑iθi,r if the
proposal is accepted and ∑iθi,r−∑iθi, f if the proposal is rejected.9
Thus, in case of full information, if there is (weakly) more information in
favor of the proposal, i.e., ∑iθi, f ≥∑iθi,r, it is optimal to accept the proposal and
reject it otherwise. Observe that in case of a tie, the proposal is accepted.10
In the situation we analyze there is incomplete information such that the state
of the world is ex ante unknown. Without any information, the expected value of
pro and contra information is the same in all dimensions and the judge accepts the
proposal. In this situation, that decision reduces welfare whenever∑iθi,r >∑iθi, f .
Hence, the judge is interested in gathering information. She cannot search for
information herself but has to rely on information made available to her by the
firm and the regulator. At the beginning of the game, the judge chooses the
number of dimensions which are relevant for the decision. The firm is interested
in searching information in favor of the proposal only, i.e., θi, f . The regulator
only searches for information against the proposal θi,r. Both firm and regulator
simultaneously search in each dimension at cost c. If a party searches in a given
dimension i and there exists evidence in this dimension, it learns θi, j with certainty.
If a party does not search, it learns nothing, which we denote by 0. Hence, finding
no information and not searching for information yield the same result.
After searching, both parties send a message m j ∈ {∑k θk, j,0} to the judge,
where k denotes the number of dimensions where the respective party searched
for information. We assume that parties cannot withhold information. This is
7It is easy to verify that there are values of w f and c such that the firm wants to search n times
as long as Pr(d = d f |E f ,Er)w f is increasing in E f .
8We assume that the decision-maker has no leeway and has to take the ex post optimal decision
given the evidence presented to her. We believe that a judge or the legislature politically cannot
implement a decision rule that is not welfare-optimal (for a similar argument, see Bennedsen and
Feldmann, 2006).
9We assume that the benefits w j as well as the search costs c are insignificant relative to the
welfare effects of each dimension and hence omit them from our welfare definition.
10We argue that in case of a tie, there is no conclusive evidence against the proposal and thus,
there is no obvious reason to decide against it. Our results do not change qualitatively if we use a
tie breaking rule where the judge rejects the proposal or where she flips a fair coin.
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Nature draws 
the state Θ.
Number of 
allowed dimen-
sions is set.
Firm and regulator 
collect information 
and send messa-
ges to the judge.
Judge decides 
based on the 
information 
available.
Payoffs and 
welfare are 
realized.
1 2 3 4
Figure 2.1: Sequence of events.
natural in our case as parties only search for information that is beneficial to them
and hence have no interest in holding it back. The message either consists of the
number of pieces of evidence that were found or 0. The information available to
the judge therefore is M = {m f ,mr}, which we also call outcome.
The judge holds two types of beliefs. First, the judge has an expectation
µ j ∈ {0,1,2, . . . ,n} about the number of searches of each party.11,12 Second, she
has a belief about the state of the world. Updating this belief not only depends
on the messages received by the two parties but also on the expectation about
the number of searches. Two cases are of particular interest to us. When the
judge expects the regulator not to search (µr = 0) and receives mr = 0, she learns
nothing about the evidence against the proposal and hence she cannot update her
belief about the state. In contrast, when the judge expects a full search by the
regulator on all dimensions, i.e. µr = n, she updates her belief about the state
such that the probability of the state contained in the message she receives is
equal to 1. The sequence of events is summarized in Figure 2.1.
2.3 ANALYSIS
We derive perfect Bayesian equilibria of the specified game. Each of these
equilibria consists of the number of searches by firm and regulator, the best
response (or decision rule) by the judge, and her beliefs µ f and µr about the
11Technically, the judge holds n+ 1 beliefs Pr(E j = X) that a party’s number of searches
equals X ∈ {0,1,2, . . . ,n}. In pure-strategy equilibria, the judge expects the parties to search a
specific number of times such that one of these beliefs equals 1 and all other equal zero.
12In what follows, we assume the judge’s expectation about the number of searches by the
firm µ f to be equal to the number of admissible dimensions.
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number of searches performed by the firm and regulator, respectively. In what
follows, we fix the number of dimensions n = 3. We first analyze Situation 1,
where searching in all three dimensions is allowed (the case of full complexity),
and Situation 2, where the judge only accepts evidence from two of the three
dimensions (reduced complexity). All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2.3.1 SITUATION 1: SEARCH IS POSSIBLE IN ALL THREE DIMENSIONS
It is a natural starting point to first determine the benefit such that it is in the
regulator’s interest to acquire information on all possible dimensions as well.
Observe that in case both parties search three times, the information available
to the judge M is equal to the state Θ. If the judge believes that both firm and
regulator search three times (µ f = µr = 3), she decides as in the case with full
information according to the first-best decision rule.
The probability Pr(dr|Er) of a decision against the proposal when the regulator
performs Er ∈ {0,1,2,3} searches is given by13
Pr(dr|0) = 0
Pr(dr|1) = (1− p)3 p
Pr(dr|2) = (1− p)3(2p(1− p)+ p2)+3p(1− p)2 p2
Pr(dr|3) = (1− p)3(1− (1− p)3)+3p(1− p)2(3p2(1− p)+ p3)
+3p2(1− p)p3.
For example, if the regulator searches three times, the decision is made in
his favor in case he finds more information than the firm. Specifically, if the
firm finds no information, the regulator wins if he finds any positive amount of
information. If the firm reports one piece of information, the proposal is rejected
if the regulator finds two or three pieces of evidence. Finally, the regulator needs
to find three pieces of information if the firm has found two.
It is optimal for the regulator to search three times if the expected profit of
searching three times is larger than the expected profit of searching twice (2.1),
13As E f = 3 we omit the reference to the number of the searches by the firm.
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of searching once (2.2), and of not searching (2.3).
Pr(dr|3)w−3c≥ Pr(dr|2)w−2c (2.1)
Pr(dr|3)w−3c≥ Pr(dr|1)w− c (2.2)
Pr(dr|3)w−3c≥ Pr(dr|0)w (2.3)
The following lemma gives a condition under which these constraints hold such
that the regulator matches the search efforts by the firm.
Lemma 2.1. There exists a critical value p˜ ∈ [0,1] such that if and only if w≥ w,
where
w =
c/
(
p−5p2+16p3−28p4+26p5−10p6) for 0 < p≤ p˜
c/
(
p−4p2+ 283 p3−13p4+10p5− 103 p6
)
for p˜ < p≤ 1,
there exists an equilibrium in which the regulator and the firm search three times
and the judge has beliefs µ f = µr = 3.
Constraint (2.1) can be written as w∆3,2≥ c, where ∆k,l refers to the difference
in success probability when searching k instead of l times. Similarly, (2.3) can
be written as w(∆3,2 +∆2,1 +∆1,0)/3 ≥ c. The binding incentive constraint is
determined by the comparison of the increase in the probability of a decision
against the proposal when searching three times instead of two times, ∆3,2, with
the average probability increase for the first two efforts, (∆2,1+∆1,0)/2, i.e. by
comparing constraints (2.1) and (2.3). Constraint (2.2) is never relevant. For low
values of p, the third search has a relatively small effect on the probability of a
decision against the proposal. The reason is that the additional cases in which the
decision is made in favor of the regulator due to the third search are unlikely to
occur if p is small. It follows it is harder to motivate the regulator to conduct the
third search than it is to conduct the first two, i.e. (2.1) is binding. For large p,
the additional cases due to the third search become more relevant and increase
the probability of a favorable decision. Hence, the first two searches are relatively
harder to motivate and (2.3) is binding.
As a next step, we first show that there also exists an equilibrium where
the regulator does not search, and second, that no search is an equilibrium for
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{0,0} {1,0} {2,0} {3,0}
0 < p≤ 1/3 Regulator Firm Firm Firm
1/3 < p≤ 2/3 Regulator Regulator Firm Firm
2/3 < p < 1 Regulator Regulator Regulator Firm
Exp. welfare if accepted 0−3p 1−3p 2−3p 3−3p
Table 2.1: Decision rule for µ f = 3, µr = 0.
benefits below w. In order to determine the no-search equilibrium (µr = 0), it
is sufficient to count the amount of evidence found by the firm. There are four
possible outcomes M after the firm has searched for information: {3,0}, {2,0},
{1,0}, and {0,0}. In case the firm finds three pieces of evidence, the decision
is made in favor of the firm, while the proposal is rejected if the firm finds no
evidence.
We assume that if the judge receives a message other than 0 when expecting
the regulator not to search, then she updates her (out-of-equilibrium) belief
concerning the number of searches of the regulator to µr = 3.14 She thus updates
her belief regarding the state such that the probability that it is equal to the
message is equal to 1. It follows that the decision rule under full information
applies out of equilibrium.
The optimal decision rule for the two intermediate cases depends on p. Note
that the expected value of information against the proposal is given by 3× p3+
2×3(p2(1− p))+1×3p(1− p2) = 3p. For example, if the firm finds one piece
of evidence and the proposal is accepted, expected welfare is given by 1− 3p
which is positive only for p < 1/3 and hence the judge will reject the proposal
for values of p larger than 1/3. The judge decides according to the decision rule
in Table 2.1.
With increasing probability of information existing, there are more cases in
which the decision is made against the proposal, e.g. for p > 2/3, the firm has to
find three pieces of evidence to offset the expected value of contra information.
14Bayes’ rule does not apply in situations that occur with probability zero. We choose the
out-of-equilibrium belief that is least favorable for the regulator.
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It is optimal for the regulator not to search if the following constraints hold.
Pr(dr|0)w≥ Pr(dr|3)w−3c (2.4)
Pr(dr|0)w≥ Pr(dr|2)w−2c (2.5)
Pr(dr|0)w≥ Pr(dr|1)w− c (2.6)
The incentive compatibility constraints (2.4), (2.5), and (2.6) ensure that the
change in winning probability when not searching instead of searching three, two,
or one time(s) is larger than the change in cost. These constraints can easily be
satisfied by setting w = 0. The following lemma states a threshold on w below
which it is not in the regulator’s interest to search for information.
Lemma 2.2. There exists a critical value pˆ ∈ [0,1] such that if and only if w < wˆ,
where
wˆ =

c/
(
3p3−8p4+8p5−3p6) for 0 < p≤ 13
∞ for 13 < p≤ pˆ
−3c/(9p2−36p3+54p4−39p5+12p6) for pˆ < p≤ 23
∞ for 23 < p≤ 1,
there exists an equilibrium where the regulator does not search, the firm searches
in all three dimensions, and the judge has beliefs µ f = 3 and µr = 0.
For values of p ∈ [0,1/3], if the regulator does not search, he wins only in
case the firm does not find information. Searching in one dimension does not
improve the chances of the regulator. This is the case because if the regulator
searches in one dimension, the best he can do is find one piece of evidence. Given
the decision rule, this leads to a decision in favor of the regulator only if the
firm finds no evidence. In this case, however, the decision is always made in
favor of the regulator. Hence, one search by the regulator can never be optimal.
Searching twice leads to a decision in favor of the regulator provided that the firm
does not find any information or if it finds one piece and the regulator finds two
pieces and thus increases the chances of winning for the regulator compared to
not searching. Finally, searching in all three dimensions leads to a decision in
favor of the regulator in two additional cases (when compared to searching twice):
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he also wins in case the firm finds one piece of information and the regulator
finds three pieces, and in case the firm finds two pieces while the regulator finds
three. This implies that either the incentive constraint preventing the regulator
from searching twice instead of zero, or the incentive constraint preventing the
regulator from three searches instead of zero, or both are binding. As the average
increase in winning probability per search is larger with three searches compared
to two, constraint (2.4) is binding and yields the relevant upper bound wˆ for the
regulator’s benefit.
For p ∈ [1/3,2/3], when not searching, the regulator now also wins if the
firm has found one piece of evidence. Searching once strictly reduces his chances
of winning compared to not searching because if both he and the firm find one
piece of evidence (out of equilibrium), he does not win. For the same reason,
two searches also lower the winning probability. Without searching, the regulator
certainly wins when the firm finds one piece of evidence, but when searching
twice he only wins in this case when he finds zero or two pieces of evidence.
Therefore, both conditions (2.6) and (2.5) are always satisfied. A full search on
all three dimensions has an ambiguous effect on the winning probability. On
the one hand it lowers the chances of winning in case the firm finds one piece
of evidence for the reason outlined above, but on the other hand the regulator
now also wins if he finds three pieces of evidence and the firm finds two. It turns
out that for smaller values of p, Pr(dr|3) is smaller than Pr(dr|0) and hence (2.4)
always holds for arbitrary positive values of w, while for pˆ < p < 2/3, constraint
(2.4) becomes binding and determines wˆ.
When p ∈ [2/3,1] and the regulator does not search, the decision is also made
against the proposal if the firm finds two pieces of evidence. Searching once
strictly decreases the regulator’s chances of winning because in case the firm
finds one or two pieces of evidence, he only wins if he finds nothing. This also
is the case when he searches twice. If the firm finds one piece of evidence the
proposal is rejected only when the regulator finds zero or two pieces of evidence
but not when he finds one, and if the firm finds two pieces, the regulator must not
find anything in order to win. Finally, a similar argument establishes that when
searching three times, the winning probability is also strictly lower compared to
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not searching. It is then obvious that there exists no positive wage inducing the
regulator to search for information in this range of p.
As we are interested in a situation where the benefit of the regulator is not
sufficient to make three search efforts optimal for him, we next compare the
two critical values of w—w and wˆ—to show that the equilibrium in which the
regulator does not search exists for benefits below w, i.e. the lowest possible
benefit inducing three searches by the regulator.
Lemma 2.3. Suppose that w < w. No search by the regulator is an equilibrium
given three searches by the firm.
The lemma says that the necessary benefit for three efforts by the regulator
when the judge expects him to search three times (µr = 3) is always smaller than
the upper bound for the benefit such that searching is not profitable when the
judge expects him not to search (µr = 0). The reason for this lies in the different
beliefs. When the judge holds the belief that the regulator does not search, then
the chances of winning are comparatively high for the regulator, especially for
large p. This is because the judge takes into account the expected value of
information against the proposal, which can be quite high depending on p. In
turn, the benefit necessary to motivate him to search is relatively large compared
to the benefit needed in the situation where the judge expects the regulator to
search. When µr = 3, the decision will never be made against the proposal if
the regulator does not search, and hence his intrinsic motivation to search for
information is larger.
For benefits below w, equilibria where the regulator searches one or two times
also exist (see Appendix 2.6.1). In Lemma 2.4 we define constraints on w such
that no search by the regulator is the unique equilibrium in pure strategies in
Situation 1.
Lemma 2.4. There exist critical values w2 and p¨ such that if and only if either
(a) w < w˜ or (b) w2 < w < w and 1/2 < p < p¨, no search by the regulator is the
unique equilibrium given three searches by the firm.
To sum up, in the situation where search is unrestricted and the judge accepts
evidence from all three available dimensions, we have looked at the case where
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firm and regulator are asymmetric in that the benefit w for the regulator is bounded
from above such that the equilibrium in which both firm and regulator conduct
a full search does not exist. This leads to a situation in which search activity is
one-sided: the firm gathers evidence on all dimensions whereas the regulator does
not search. In consequence, the judge only learns the arguments in favor of the
decision.
2.3.2 SITUATION 2: SCOPE OF SEARCH IS RESTRICTED
In this section, we analyze the situation where the scope of search is restricted
in the sense that the judge accepts evidence from two dimensions only. We
describe an equilibrium in which both parties search in all allowed dimensions
and the reported amount of evidence is equal to the true values of the investigated
dimensions. The probability that information exists in the third dimension is
equal for both parties (and cases) and thus not relevant for the decision.
We proceed by specifying the decision rule by the judge given the belief
that both parties search twice, µ f = µr = 2. In this case, there are nine possible
outcomes M: {2,2}, {2,1}, {1,2}, {2,0}, {0,2}, {1,1}, {1,0}, {0,1}, {0,0}. The
judge then takes the welfare-maximizing decision where the proposal is accepted
if the firm has found (weakly) more information and rejected otherwise. The
regulator’s chances of winning contingent on the number of searches is given by
Pr(dr|0) = 0
Pr(dr|1) = (1− p)2 p
Pr(dr|2) = 2p(1− p)p2+(1− p)2
(
2p(1− p)+ p2)
Given the decision rule the regulator will never win if he does not search. Search-
ing once leads to a decision in favor of the regulator only if he finds one piece
of evidence while the firm does not find any information. With two searches,
the regulator wins if he finds two (one or two) piece(s) of evidence and the firm
one (zero). It is in the interest of the regulator to search twice if the following
conditions hold.
Pr(dr|2)w−2c≥ Pr(dr|1)w− c (2.7)
Pr(dr|2)w−2c≥ Pr(dr|0)w (2.8)
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The following lemma gives a condition under which an equilibrium where
the regulator and the firm search two times exists.
Lemma 2.5. Suppose that search on one dimension is prohibited. If and only if
w≥ w, where
w =
c/
(
p−3p2+5p3−3p4) for 0 < p < 1/3
c/
(
p− 52 p2+3p3− 32 p4
)
for 1/3≤ p < 1,
there exists an equilibrium in which the regulator and the firm search on all two
admissible dimensions and the judge has beliefs µ f = µr = 2.
The regulator compares the increase in winning probability for the first and
for the second effort. For small p, the first increase is large because he never
wins if he does not search, but he wins if M = {0,1} when searching once. The
second increase is small as the cases in which he additionally wins require a larger
amount of information, which is unlikely for small p. Hence, in this range, the
necessary benefit is determined by the incentive constraint for the second effort,
while for large p, the constraint for the first effort is the relevant one.
2.3.3 COMPARISON OF SITUATIONS 1 AND 2
Search activity
After solving the game separately in Situation 1, where search is unrestricted, and
in Situation 2, where evidence on one dimensions is not accepted by the judge,
we now combine and summarize our previous results regarding the regulator’s
search activity in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1. The minimum benefit w necessary to render three efforts opti-
mal for the regulator when three dimensions are allowed is always larger than
the minimum benefit w necessary to make two efforts optimal when only two
dimensions are allowed.
The proposition says that a range of benefits w exists where it is not in
the regulator’s interest to keep up with the firm’s search activity when search
is unrestricted, while it is in his interest to do so when the scope of search is
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restricted to two dimensions. The range of benefits where this is the case is
depicted by the gray area in Figure 2.2.
The reason is that the net increase in winning probability relative to the cost of
searching c of the regulator in Situation 2 turns out to be larger than in Situation 1.
Therefore, the benefit making search worthwhile for the regulator is smaller in
Situation 2. If it is unlikely that information exists (small p), in both situations the
regulator compares the expected profit from full search with the expected profit of
one less search. The absolute probability of winning when the regulator matches
the firm’s search efforts is larger in Situation 1 than in Situation 2. However, the
probability of winning with two efforts is relatively large in Situation 1 while
it is relatively small in Situation 2 such that the net increase in the probability
of winning caused by the “catch-up” search is larger in Situation 2 and hence a
smaller benefit is required.
For large probabilities that information exists, the relevant comparison is
between full search and no search. In both situations, the regulator will never
win when he does not search. He thus compares the average increase in winning
probability per c in Situations 1 and 2 when searching fully. While again the
absolute probability of winning is larger in Situation 1, the increase per search
cost c is higher in Situation 2, leading to a smaller necessary benefit.15
The corollary follows immediately from Proposition 2.1 and Lemma 2.3.
Corollary 2.1. If w < w < w, in Situation 1 there exists an equilibrium where the
regulator does not search while the firm conducts a full search on all dimensions,
whereas in Situation 2 the regulator matches the search efforts by the firm.
Figure 2.2 shows the range of benefits described in Corollary 2.1. For benefits
located in the gray area, the regulator has no incentive to search under full
complexity but searches on all allowed dimensions under reduced complexity.
Observe that the upper bound for the benefit wˆ such that no search is optimal is
not shown in the figure as the upper bound either does not exist or is very large.
Under the conditions of Proposition 2.1 there are two other equilibria in
Situation 1 where the regulator searches once and twice, respectively. The
15For the small range p˜< p< 1/3, the regulator compares the average increase when searching
fully in Situation 1 with the increase of the “catch-up” search in Situation 2 and again finds the
latter increase to be larger than the former.
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Figure 2.2: The gray area defines the range of benefits defined in Corollary 2.1
where reduced complexity increases search activity. For this figure, the value of c
is set to 1 for both benefits.
following proposition shows that the main effect of Proposition 2.1 is still present
also if we restrict w and p such that not searching is the unique equilibrium in
Situation 1.
Proposition 2.2. There exist critical values w2 and p¨ such that if and only if either
(a) w ≤ w < w˜ and 0 < p < 1/3 or (b) max{w2,w} < w < w and 1/2 < p < p¨,
the regulator searches in two dimensions if the scope of search is limited to
two dimensions while he does not search if searching on all three dimension is
allowed.
Taken together, if the benefits of the regulator are bounded from above,
particularly if the benefits are below w˜, he will not search if the scope of search is
unrestricted. Prohibiting search for information on one of the three dimensions
lowers the benefit that is necessary to make the regulator willing to search on all
available dimensions. This levels the playing field such that the regulator is able
to search on as many dimensions as the firm. Next we show that a reduction of
the number of admissible dimensions can also be welfare-enhancing.
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Welfare
We now determine the expected welfare losses Li, where i ∈ {1,2} refers to
Situation 1 or 2, due to decision errors under incomplete information. These
errors occur when the decision taken by the judge given M does not match the
optimal decision given Θ. In order to facilitate the intuition, we decompose the
expected welfare losses Li in each situation into two terms: on the one hand the
probability of messages in which a decision error can occur (henceforth error-
prone messages or Me) and on the other hand the expected losses conditional
on having received messages in which errors can occur (henceforth conditional
expected losses).
In Situation 1, where we focus on the equilibrium where the regulator does
not search, welfare losses can occur in the two intermediate outcomes, that
is, if the firm has found evidence in one or two dimensions.16 Hence, the
probability of error-prone messages {1,0} and {2,0} in Situation 1 is Pr(M1e )=
3p2(1− p)+3p(1− p)2. The cases in which welfare is reduced depend on the
level of p as the judge’s decision rule is different for different values of p. In case
of 0 < p < 1/3, a wrong decision is made by the judge when the firm has found
one piece of evidence but two or three pieces of evidence exist for the regulator,
or when the firm has found two pieces but there are three pieces of evidence
favoring the regulator’s case. The conditional expected losses in this range of p
are
3p(1− p)2×3p2(1− p)(2−1)
Pr(M1e )
+
3p(1− p)2× p3(3−1)
Pr(M1e )
+
3p2(1− p)× p3(3−2)
Pr(M1e )
When 1/3 < p < 2/3, the judge rejects the firm’s proposal also when it has found
one piece of evidence. This decision rule results in a welfare loss if the firm has
found one piece and there exist no pieces of evidence for the regulator. Welfare
is also reduced as before when the firm has found two pieces and there exist
three pieces of evidence on the side of the regulator. In this case, the conditional
16Observe that losses do not occur in case of ties. While the actual decision might violate the
specified tie-breaking rule, the value of information is the same regardless of the decision and
thus cancels out so that the welfare loss is equal to zero.
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expected losses are
3p(1− p)2× (1− p)3(1−0)
Pr(M1e )
+
3p2(1− p)× p3(3−2)
Pr(M1e )
For 2/3 < p < 1, the decision is additionally made in favor of the regulator
when the firm has found two pieces of evidence. In this case, ex post erroneous
decisions are made again in case of {1,0}, and when the firm has found two
pieces but there exist zero or only one piece for the regulator. The conditional
expected losses are
3p(1− p)2× (1− p)3(1−0)
Pr(M1e )
+
3p2(1− p)× (1− p)3(2−0)
Pr(M1e )
+
3p2(1− p)×3p(1− p)2(2−1)
Pr(M1e )
The total expected welfare loss in Situation 1 is given by
L1 =

9p3−21p4+18p5−6p6 for 0 < p < 1/3
3p−15p2+30p3−30p4+18p5−6p6 for 1/3 < p < 2/3
3p−9p2+15p3−21p4+18p5−6p6 for 2/3 < p < 1.
In Situation 2, welfare losses can occur in all outcomes in which both parties
have found the same amount of evidence, that is, {0,0}, {1,1}, and {2,2}. The
probability of error-prone messages hence is Pr
(
M2e
)
= (1− p)4+4p2(1− p)2+
p4. In these cases, it is possible that additional evidence in favor of the regulator
but not in favor of the firm exists in the additional dimension but is not discovered.
The expected conditional losses in this situation are
(1− p)4× (1− p)p(1−0)
Pr(M2e )
+
4p2(1− p)2× (1− p)p(2−1)
Pr(M2e )
+
p4× (1− p)p(3−2)
Pr(M2e )
which reduces to (1− p)p as all losses have value 1 and occur with equal proba-
bility. The expected welfare loss in Situation 2 is given by
L2 =−5p2+ p+14p3−22p4+18p5−6p6.
A comparison of the losses gives the following result.
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Proposition 2.3. Under the conditions of Proposition 2.2 and for 2−√3 <
p <
√
3− 1, the reduction of the number of dimensions from three to two is
welfare-enhancing.
For values of p close to zero, error-prone messages are very unlikely to
occur in Situation 1 because they involve at least one piece of information.
Conversely, in Situation 2, errors can occur if neither party finds any information
(M = {0,0}), which is very likely for small p. This makes the possibility of
errors more prevalent in Situation 2.
The conditional expected loss in Situation 1 is relatively small as an erroneous
decision requires more information against the proposal than in favor of it, which
is unlikely for small p. Conversely, in Situation 2 errors occur when there
is information against the proposal but not in favor of it in the omitted third
dimension, which is relatively likely. Hence, as both the likelihood of an error-
prone message and the conditional expected loss are larger in Situation 2, the
welfare losses are smaller in Situation 1. For large values of p, the reasoning is
analogous to the case of small p.
As p increases, cases in which errors might occur become more probable
in Situation 1 and less probable in Situation 2. Error-prone messages become
less likely in Situation 2 because for intermediate values of p, the probability
of messages that allow for clear-cut decisions, i.e. where no decision errors are
possible, increases. Thus, for values of p > 2−√3, expected welfare losses
are larger in Situation 1. For intermediate values of p, the probability of error-
prone messages {1,0} and {2,0} in Situation 1 is close to its maximum while in
Situation 2, the probability of error-prone messages is close to its minimum and
hence the difference in the two probabilities is largest. In contrast, the conditional
expected losses are smaller in Situation 1 than in Situation 2 because in Situation 1
erroneous decisions require zero or three pieces of evidence against the proposal
while in Situation 2, the likelihood that the omitted dimension contains clear-cut
evidence against the proposal is largest. However, the former effect (weakly)
dominates the latter and the expected losses are higher in Situation 1 where it
is not in the regulator’s interest to keep up with the firm’s search effort. For
intermediate probabilities that information exists, welfare can be enhanced by
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reducing the scope of search. The expected losses in Situations 1 and 2 are
displayed in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3: Expected losses in Situations 1 and 2.
Taken together, it can be beneficial from a welfare perspective to reduce the
complexity of the case and deliberately ignore evidence from one dimension
when (i) one of the two parties who can search for information is disadvantaged
in the sense that its benefit from the decision is smaller than the other party’s,
and (ii) the probability that evidence exists in a given dimension and in a given
direction is intermediate.
2.4 DISCUSSION
In the following section we examine the robustness of our results. In particular,
we discuss varying the number of initial dimensions as well as allowing for
asymmetry in the probabilities that information exists for either cause.
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Number of dimensions
Our analysis is based on initially three dimensions. We argue that this is the
smallest number of dimensions where restricting search can increase welfare.
The main difference between the two situations is that if the regulator does not
search, the judge learns all arguments in favor of the proposal but none against
it, while if search is restricted, she learns all pro and contra arguments on all
but one dimensions. When there are two or less initial dimensions, knowing all
evidence in one direction is better from a welfare perspective than not knowing
any evidence from the excluded dimension. This is obvious if there is only one
dimension. If there are more dimensions, the judge adjusts the decision rule in
case of asymmetric search according to the expected value of information in the
unsearched direction which dampens welfare losses. If search is symmetric but
restricted the expected value concerning the unavailable dimension is irrelevant
for the decision and thus losses cannot be avoided. For two initial dimensions,
the first effect dominates and welfare cannot be improved by restricting search.17
As the number of dimensions increases, however, making the correct decision
without information from the regulator becomes more and more problematic as
the number of the intermediate outcomes where errors can occur and the size of
the errors increase. In contrast, the losses when being fully informed about all but
one dimensions decrease because the single omitted dimension’s impact on the
decision becomes increasingly smaller. Thus it is plausible that the effect exists
and may be even stronger for a larger number of dimensions. We leave the formal
proof of this claim as an open question for future research.
Asymmetric probabilities
The probability p that information exists is equal for both evidence in favor and
against the proposal in the sense that (i) the expected sum of evidence in favor
and against the proposal is equal across dimensions and (ii) within one dimension,
neither pro nor contra evidence is more likely. One single dimension is most
relevant for the decision when p = 0.5 such that the most likely outcome is either
information in favor or against the proposal. If p→ 0 or p→ 1, the probability
17Reducing complexity also does not increase overall search activity and thus does not improve
welfare.
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of a tie tends to one. Then there are no (or negligible) losses in welfare regardless
of the decision. Across all dimensions, for intermediate values of p, states of
the world implying a clear decision for one of the causes occur with the highest
probability.
We now give an intuition about the effect of asymmetric probabilities in the
sense that either pro or contra evidence is more likely to exist on our results.
Suppose that q (p) is the probability that evidence in favor of (against) the
proposal exists. In general, the initial disadvantage of the regulator is increased
when the probabilities for evidence in favor of the proposal are higher and vice
versa. The best response of the judge only depends on the probability of evidence
against the proposal in the case of one-sided search an hence remains unaffected.
The thresholds for the benefit in the cases of symmetric and asymmetric search
change as expected.
When q > p, asymmetry between the two parties increases. We argue that
this does not change our qualitative results. In both equilibria where firm and
regulator search equally, the disadvantage of the regulator tends to be more
pronounced because the decision is made in his favor less often. This leads
to an increased benefit necessary to make search worthwhile. Furthermore,
the minimum benefit in the equilibrium where both parties search twice still
remains below the minimum benefit when search is unrestricted.18 In the no-
search equilibrium, the regulator wins less often without search, which makes not
searching less attractive and hence decreases the upper limit wˆ.
Welfare losses with restricted search decrease if q> p, the main driver appears
to be that in case there is an error-prone message, the probability of a wrong
decision decreases unambiguously. Tentative calculations show that the effect
of asymmetric probabilities on losses in Situation 1 is ambiguous but our result
tends to hold.
Assuming q < p leads to a more symmetric situation in that the regulator’s
disadvantage due to the lower benefit is compensated by a larger probability of
existing evidence in his favor. Intuitively, our results tend to vanish as asymmetry
decreases. As we have stressed before, we find the asymmetry between the two
18Note that in this equilibrium, deciding for the firm in case of a tie is now strictly optimal
from a welfare perspective.
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groups to be one of the defining characteristic of our model. We thus do not
discuss this case any further.
2.5 CONCLUSION
In merger cases, information about the potential effects on consumer surplus is
essential for the decision-making ability of the competition authority. Similarly,
in lobbying cases, policy-makers need access to information in order to draft
sensible legislation. We analyze a model where a decision-maker has to decide on
a proposal based on information imparted to her by two interested parties, the firm
and the regulator. The firm prefers the proposal to be accepted while the regulator
benefits from a rejection. Information is multidimensional in the sense that there
is information in favor and against the proposal in several dimensions. The basis
of our analysis is the assumption that the regulator receives a smaller benefit
from winning than the firm. This assumption captures that the regulator typically
consists of bureaucrats with fixed wages, while the firm employs consultants
and lawyers with incentive contracts to defend their case. The firm (regulator)
only searches for information in favor (against) the proposal. We find that this
asymmetry between the two parties can lead to biased information search where
the firm searches on all dimensions and the regulator on none. We suggest to
reduce complexity of the decision-making process by reducing the number of
dimensions that are relevant for the decision. This allows the disadvantaged
regulator to catch up with the firm’s search efforts which in turn provides the
decision-maker with more and more balanced information. This can result in
better decisions and increased welfare.
At a first glance it is sensible to include as much relevant aspects as possible
in merger cases or when new legislation is drafted. However, this aim might not
be achievable when the parties who provide the decision-maker with information
are very asymmetric, for example when small citizens’ initiatives compete with
large energy companies lobbying for fracking rights, or when an understaffed
competition authority examines a proposed merger by companies who are able
to pay what is necessary for legal advice. In such cases it can be beneficial to
reduce the complexity of the procedure in order to level the playing field. Our
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findings are in line with recent efforts by the EU as part of the REFIT programme
which, regarding merger review, aims “to make the EU merger review procedures
simpler and lighter for stakeholders and to save costs.” (European Commission,
2014, p. 24)
More research on the topic of asymmetric interested parties is needed. A
natural next step would be generalize the present model to a setting including a
variable number of initial dimensions. This makes it possible to study the optimal
reduction of complexity depending on the number of initial dimensions and the
degree of asymmetry. In a similar vein, allowing the firm to strategically choose
the number of relevant dimensions could lead to interesting new results explaining
the observation of asymmetric search effort.
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2.6 APPENDIX
2.6.1 OTHER EQUILIBRIA IN PURE STRATEGIES
We also show that equilibria in pure strategies exist where the regulator searches
once or twice given three searches by the firm.
We begin with the equilibrium where the regulator searches once. In this
case, the rational judge decides according to the decision rule given in Table 2.2.
If the expected value of information against the proposal on the two remaining
dimensions where the regulator did not search, 2× p2 + 1× p(1− p) = 2p, is
larger than the value of evidence on favor of the proposal, then the decision
is made against the proposal. In the two cases where the firm has one more
piece of information than the firm ({1,0} and {2,1}), the expected value of
contra information is large enough to tip the decision towards the regulator for
p > 1/2. We again assume that when the regulator presents more than one piece
of information out of equilibrium, the judge believes that the regulator did search
in all other dimensions as well and did not discover any evidence. Hence, the
decision rule under full information applies out of equilibrium.
The following conditions must hold such that searching once is optimal for
the regulator, given three searches by the firm and the corresponding belief by the
judge, µ f = 3, µr = 1.
Pr(dr|1)w− c≥ Pr(dr|3)w−3c (2.9)
Pr(dr|1)w− c≥ Pr(dr|2)w−2c (2.10)
Pr(dr|1)w− c≥ Pr(dr|0)w (2.11)
Lemma 2.6. If and only if w1 ≤ w≤ w1 and 0 < p < 1/2, where w1 = c/(3p2−
6p3 + 3p4) and w1 = c/(3p2− 9p3 + 9p4− 3p5), there exists an equilibrium
{0,0} {1,0} {2,0} {3,0} {0,1} {1,1} {2,1} {3,1}
0 < p≤ 1/2 R F F F R R F F
1/2 < p≤ 1 R R F F R R R F
Table 2.2: Decision rule for µ f = 3 and µr = 1.
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where the regulator searches once, the firm searches three times, and the judge
has beliefs µ f = 3 and µr = 1. For 1/2≤ p < 1, only one search by the regulator
never is optimal.
Proof. First, for 0 < p < 1/2, the winning probabilities for the regulator are
Pr(dr|0) = (1− p)3
Pr(dr|1) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2 p
Pr(dr|2) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2
(
2p(1− p)+ p2)
Pr(dr|3) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2
(
1− (1− p)3)+3p2(1− p)p3.
The incentive constraint (2.11), which ensures that one search is better than
no search, gives the lower bound for the wage w1 = c/(3p
2−6p3+3p4). For
the moment, ignore (2.9). Condition (2.10), which ensures that one search is
more profitable than two searches, gives the upper bound for the wage, w1 =
c/(3p2−9p3+9p4−3p5). The upper bound w1 is above the lower bound w1 if
c
3p2−6p3+3p4 <
c
3p2−9p3+9p4−3p5
or p3(3− (6p−3p2))> 0. The term 6p−3p2 has its global maximum at p = 1
with value 3 and is strictly concave, hence the condition is satisfied for the relevant
range of p, 0 < p < 1/2. It remains to check that (2.9) is slack. Plugging w1 into
(2.9) yields
−6p2+21p3−27p4+12p5
3p2−9p3+9p4−3p5 c≥−2c
or p3
(
1− (3p−2p2)) ≥ 0. The term 3p− 2p2 is strictly concave and has its
maximum at p = 3/4. It is strictly increasing in the relevant range 0 < p < 1/2
and takes on value 1 at p = 1/2. Hence, the condition is satisfied for that range
and (2.9) is slack.
For 1/2≤ p < 1, the winning probabilities for the regulator are
Pr(dr|0) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2
Pr(dr|1) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2
Pr(dr|2) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2+3p2(1− p)2p(1− p)
Pr(dr|3) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2+3p2(1− p)(3p(1− p)2+ p3).
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It is obvious that for any positive value of search cost c and non-negative benefit
w, the constraint (2.11) can never hold. Hence, an equilibrium with one search
effort by the regulator does not exist for 1/2≤ p < 1.
As the next step, we characterize an equilibrium where the regulator searches
twice. The judge decides in favor of the party that delivers more pieces of
information. In case of a tie ({0,0}, {1,1}, {2,2}) the decision is made in favor of
the regulator as the expected value of contra information on the third dimension
where no search has taken place is positive.19 We again assume that when the
regulator presents more than two pieces of information out of equilibrium, the
judge believes that the regulator did search in the third dimension as well and
did not discover any evidence. Hence, the decision rule under full information
applies out of equilibrium.
The following conditions must hold such that two searches are optimal for
the regulator, given three searches by the firm and the corresponding belief by the
judge, µ f = 3, µr = 2.
Pr(dr|2)w−2c≥ Pr(dr|3)w−3c (2.12)
Pr(dr|2)w−2c≥ Pr(dr|1)w− c (2.13)
Pr(dr|2)w−2c≥ Pr(dr|0)w (2.14)
The three conditions guarantee that the regulator prefers two searches to three,
one, and zero searches.
Lemma 2.7. If and only if w2 ≤ w≤ w2, where
w2 =
c/
(
3p2−9p3+12p4−6p5) for 0 < p < 1/2
c/
(
3p2− (15/2)p3+(15/2)p4−3p5) for 1/2≤ p < 1,
and w2 = c/
(
3p2−12p3+24p4−24p5+9p6), there exists an equilibrium where
the regulator searches twice, the firm searches in all three dimensions and the
judge has beliefs µ f = 3 and µr = 2.
19Note that when the judge receives the information {3,3} out of equilibrium, the decision is
made for the firm.
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Proof. The winning probabilities for the regulator are
Pr(dr|0) = (1− p)3
Pr(dr|1) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2 p
Pr(dr|2) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2(2p(1− p)+ p2)+3p2(1− p)p2
Pr(dr|3) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2(1− (1− p)3)+3p2(1− p)(3p2(1− p)+ p3).
The upper bound for the wage w2 = c/
(
3p2−12p3+24p4−24p5+9p6) is
given by condition (2.12).
Conditions (2.13) and (2.14) can be written as
w≥ c
3p2−9p3+12p4−6p5
and
w≥ c
3p2− (15/2)p3+(15/2)p4−3p5 ,
respectively. (2.13) is binding if
c
3p2−9p3+12p4−6p5 <
c
3p2− (15/2)p3+(15/2)p4−3p5 (2.15)
or p3
(−32 + 92 p−3p2)> 0. The polynomial in parentheses is negative at p = 1
and equal to zero at p = 1. It can easily be verified that it has another root at
p = 1/2 and hence is negative for values of p below 1/2 and positive for values
of p above. Taken together with the root at p = 0 from the term p3, the condition
(2.15) does not hold for 0< p≤ 1/2 and holds for 1/2< p< 1. Hence, constraint
(2.14) is binding for smaller p and (2.13) for larger p.
It remains to show that the upper bound w2 lies above the lower bound w2.
For 0 < p≤ 1/2, we need to check whether
c
3p2−9p3+12p4−6p5 <
c
3p2−12p3+24p4−24p5+9p6 ,
which is equivalent to p3(3−12p+18p2−9p3)> 0. Define the term in paren-
theses as g(p) = 3−12p+18p2−9p3. The second derivative g′′(p) = 36−54p
is positive for p = 0 and negative for p = 1 and has one root at p = 2/3. Hence,
g′(p) =−12+36p−27p2 is strictly concave and takes on value 0 at its global
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maximum. The original function g(p) is positive for p = 0 and zero for p = 1. It
is non-increasing throughout [0,1], convex up to the root of g′(p) and concave
thereafter. Hence it cannot have another root in the relevant range. Taken to-
gether, the condition is above satisfied and w2 lies above w2 for 0 < p≤ 1/2. For
1/2 < p < 1, the comparison is
c
3p2− (15/2)p3+(15/2)p4−3p5 <
c
3p2−12p3+24p4−24p5+9p6
or p3(3− 11p+ 14p2− 6p3) > 0. Let g(p) = 3− 11p+ 14p2− 6p3. The sec-
ond derivative g′′(p) = 36−54p crosses the abscissa once from above. Hence,
g′(p) = −12+36p−27p2 is concave and has its global maximum at p = 7/9
with a value of −1/3. Thus, the original function g(p) is falling in the interval
[0,1], is positive at p = 0 and equal to 0 at p = 1, and therefore cannot have
another root in that interval. Taken together, the condition above is also satisfied
for values of p between 1/2 and 1 and the proof concludes.
2.6.2 PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 2.1. For the moment, ignore (2.2). Rearranging (2.1) and (2.3)
gives
c
w
≤ p−5p2+16p3−28p4+26p5−10p6 (2.16)
and
c
w
≤ p−4p2+ 28
3
p3−13p4+10p5− 10
3
p6, (2.17)
respectively. The binding constraint is the stricter one, i.e., the one with the
smaller RHS. Constraint (2.16) is the binding one if the RHS of (2.17) minus
the RHS of (2.16) is positive, or 3− 20p+ 45p2− 48p3 + 20p4 ≥ 0. Define
the LHS as g(p). The third derivative g′′′(p) =−288+480p is increasing and
crosses the abscissa once from below. Hence, g′′(p) = 90− 288p+ 240p2 is
convex and has a local minimum at p = 288/480. As its value is positive at
this local minimum, it is positive throughout the range of p. This implies that
g′(p)=−20+90p−144p2+80p3 has a positive slope, and it crosses the abscissa
once from below as g′(0)< 0 and g′(1)> 0. Therefore, g(p) is convex and has
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a local minimum, and because g(0) > 0 but g(1) = 0 and g′(1) > 0, its local
minimum must be negative. Hence, g(p) has a root, and it can be shown that it
lies at
p˜ =− 1
30
(586+45
√
271)1/3+
59
30(586+45
√
271)1/3
+
7
15
≈ 0.2794.
Hence, for 0 < p < p˜, the condition above is satisfied and (2.1) is binding. For
p˜ < p < 1, (2.3) is the relevant constraint.
It remains to be shown that (2.2) is slack. Rearranging gives
c
w
≤ p− 9
2
p2+
25
2
p3−19p4+15p5−5p6 (2.18)
It suffices to show that the RHS of (2.18) is larger than the RHS (2.16), which
is equivalent to ga(p) := 1− 7p+ 18p2− 22p3 + 10p4 ≥ 0 for 0 < p ≤ p˜ and
larger than the RHS of (2.17) for p˜ < p < 1, which is equivalent to gb(p) :=
−3+19p−36p2+30p3−10p4 ≥ 0.
The third derivative g′′′a (p) =−132+240p is increasing and negative in the
relevant range as g′′′a (p˜) < 0. It follows that g′′a(p) = 36− 132p+ 120p2 has
a negative slope and is positive as g′′a(p˜) > 0. Therefore, g′a(p) = −7+ 36p−
66p2+40p3 is increasing and negative because g′a(p˜)< 0. The original function
ga(p) is decreasing but positive, as ga(p˜)> 0. Hence, the condition above holds
and (2.2) is slack for 0 < p < p˜.
For p˜ < p < 1, the third derivative g′′′b (p) = 180− 240p is decreasing and
crosses the abscissa once from above because g′′′b (p˜) > 0 and g
′′′
b (1) < 0. The
second derivative g′′b(p) =−72+180p−120p2 hence is concave and has a local
maximum at p = 3/4. As it is negative at its local maximum it is negative
throughout the relevant range of p and therefore g′b(p) = 19−72p+90p2−40p3
has a negative slope. From g′b(p˜)> 0 and g
′
b(1)< 0 follows that it crosses the
abscissa once from above and that gb(p) is concave and has a local maximum in
the range of interest. As gb(p˜)> 0 and gb(1) = 0 (and g′b(1)< 0) we can infer
that it is positive in the range of interest, the condition above holds and (2.2) is
also slack for p˜ < p < 1.
Proof of Lemma 2.2. The proof is divided in three parts according to the three
ranges of p which differ in the decision rule—and hence in the Pr(dr|Er)s—as
outlined in Table 2.1.
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For p≤ 1/3,
Pr(dr|0) = (1− p)3
Pr(dr|1) = (1− p)3
Pr(dr|2) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2 p2
Pr(dr|3) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2(3p2(1− p)+ p3)+3p2(1− p)p3.
Observe that (2.6) holds as long as c≥ 0, which is given by definition. Plug-
ging in the relevant probabilities Pr(dr|Er) in (2.4) and (2.5) and rearranging
gives
c
w
≥ 3p3−8p4+8p5−3p6 (2.19)
and
c
w
≥ 3
2
p3−3p4+ 3
2
p5, (2.20)
respectively. (2.4) is the binding constraint if the RHS of (2.19) is larger than
the RHS of (2.20), which is equivalent to 32 −5p+ 132 p2−3p3 > 0. Define the
LHS of this inequality as g(p) where g′(p) =−5+13p−9p2. g′(p) is strictly
concave and takes a global maximum of −11/36 at p = 13/18. Hence g(p) is
decreasing, and with g(0)> 0 and g(1) = 0 we have shown that the sign of g(p)
is nonnegative in the relevant range of p. The wage in that range of p hence is
given by (2.4), the incentive constraint preventing the regulator to conduct three
instead of zero searches.
For 1/3 < p≤ 2/3,
Pr(dr|0) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2
Pr(dr|1) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2(1− p)
Pr(dr|2) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2((1− p)2+ p2)
Pr(dr|3) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2((1− p)3+3p2(1− p)+ p3)+3p2(1− p)p3.
We show that both incentive constraints (2.5) and (2.6) are always slack as
the probability difference on the LHS is positive for all values of p. Observe
that compared to zero searches, searching twice strictly reduces the winning
probability and the regulator has to incur effort costs of 2c. Searching twice
hence can never be optimal. The same holds for searching once, which also
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never is optimal. It remains to be shown that (2.4) is slack for values of p below
pˆ and binding otherwise. Using the relevant winning probabilities in (2.4) and
rearranging yields
c
w
≥−3p2+12p3−18p4+13p5−4p6. (2.21)
Define as g(p) =−3+12p−18p2+13p3−4p4, which is the RHS of (2.21) with
p2 factored out. The value of g(0) is negative and the value of g(1) is zero, so there
can be at most three real roots in the range of p. We determine the actual number
of roots between 0 and 1 by analyzing the derivatives of g(p). g′′′(p) = 78−96p
is a linear decreasing function with a positive value at p = 0 and a negative value
at p= 1 and one root in between. Hence, g′′(p) =−36+78p−48p2 is a concave
function with one maximum in the relevant range. As g′′(p) is negative at the root
of g′′′(p), its maximum, the second derivative of g(p) is strictly negative in the
domain from 0 to 1. Therefore, the first derivative g′(p)= 12−36p+39p2−16p3
is decreasing in this range and has one root as g′(0) is positive and g′(1) is
negative. Finally, this implies that g(p) is concave and has a maximum in the
domain from 0 to 1. Accordingly, there is one root at p = pˆ where
pˆ =
1
4
3
1
3 − 1
4
3
2
3 +
3
4
≈ 0.5905
in that interval as the value of g(1) is zero. Taken together, the RHS of (2.21) has
roots at 0, pˆ, and 1, is negative for 0 < p < pˆ and positive for pˆ < p < 1. Since
both c and w are positive numbers, (2.21) is slack for 0 < p < pˆ and no positive
wage induces the regulator to search three times. For pˆ < p < 1, this constraint is
binding and yields the upper bound for the wage in the lemma.
For p > 2/3,
Pr(dr|0) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2+3p2(1− p)
Pr(dr|1) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2(1− p)+3p2(1− p)(1− p)
Pr(dr|2) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2((1− p)2+ p2)+3p2(1− p)(1− p)2
Pr(dr|3) = (1− p)3+3p(1− p)2((1− p)3+3p2(1− p)+ p3)
+3p2(1− p)((1− p)3+ p3).
The probability of winning when not exerting effort Pr(dr|0) consists of the prob-
abilities that the firm finds zero, one, or two pieces of information. Searching
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once reduces the chances of winning because given one or two pieces of infor-
mation found by the firm, the decision is now made against the proposal only
if the regulator does not find information. A similar argument establishes that
Pr(dr|2) and Pr(dr|3) are also smaller than Pr(dr|0). Hence, all constraints (2.4),
(2.5), and (2.6) are slack and no positive wage induces the regulator to search for
evidence. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2.3. We need to show that wˆ ≥ w. There are several cases
along the range of p. For 0 < p≤ p˜, wˆ≥ w is equivalent to
c
3p3−8p4+8p5−3p6 ≥
c
p−5p2+16p3−28p4+26p5−10p6
⇔ 1−5p+13p2−20p3+18p4−7p5 ≥ 0 (2.22)
Define the LHS of (2.22) as g(p). The fourth derivative g′′′′(p) = 432− 840p
is decreasing and positive in the relevant range as g′′′′(p˜)> 0. Hence, g′′′(p) =
−120+ 432p− 420p2 is increasing and negative as g′′′(p˜) < 0. It follows
that g′′(p) = 26− 120p+ 216p2− 140p3 has a negative slope and is positive
throughout the range of interest as g′′(p˜) > 0. The first derivative g′(p) =
−5+26p−60p2+72p3−35p4 therefore increases but is negative as g′(p˜)< 0.
From this we know that the original function g(p) is decreasing and positive as
g(p˜)> 0 and the LHS of (2.22) is positive in the relevant range.
For p > p˜, the relevant comparison is
c
3p3−8p4+8p5−3p6 ≥
c
p−4p2+ 283 p3−13p4+10p5− 103 p6
⇔ 1−4p+(19/3)p2−5p3+2p4− (1/3)p5 ≥ 0 (2.23)
Define the LHS of (2.23) as g(p). The fourth derivative g′′′′(p) = 48− 40p
is decreasing and positive. Hence, g′′′(p) = −30+ 48p− 20p2 is increasing
and negative as g′′′(1)< 0. Therefore, g′′(p) = 38/3−30p+24p2− (20/3)p3 is
decreasing and positive as g′′(1) = 0. The first derivative g′(p) =−4+(38/3)p−
15p2+8p3− (5/3)p4 hence is increasing and negative as g′(1) = 0. It follows
that the original function g(p) is decreasing and positive as g(1) = 0, which
implies that the LHS of (2.23) is positive in the relevant range.
For 1/3 < p≤ pˆ, the regulator will not search for information for any positive
value of w and hence, wˆ≥ w is satisfied trivially. For pˆ < p≤ 2/3, the relevant
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comparison is
−3c
9p2−36p3+54p4−39p5+12p6 ≥
c
p−4p2+ 283 p3−13p4+10p5− 103 p6
⇔ 1− p− (8/3)p2+5p3−3p4+(2/3)p5 ≥ 0. (2.24)
Define as g(p) the LHS of (2.24). The fourth derivative g′′′′(p) =−72+80p is
increasing and negative in the relevant range as g′′′′(2/3)< 0. Hence, g′′′(p) =
30−72p+40p2 has a negative slope and crosses the abscissa once as g′′′(pˆ)> 0
and g′′′(2/3) < 0. It follows that g′′(p) = −16/3+ 30p− 36p2 +(40/3)p3 is
concave with a local maximum. As both g′′(pˆ) and g′′(2/3) are positive, the
second derivative is positive throughout the range of interest. The first derivative
g′(p) = −1− (16/3)p+ 15p2− 12p3 + (10/3)p4 therefore is increasing and
negative because g′(2/3) < 0. From this we know that the original function
g(p) is decreasing and positive as g(2/3)> 0. This implies that inequality (2.24)
strictly holds.
In the remaining interval 2/3 < p < 1, the regulator will not search for any
positive value of w and hence wˆ≥ w is satisfied.
Proof of Lemma 2.4. We show that w is either smaller than the lower bound or
larger than the upper bound of the wage necessary for the other two equilibria
where the regulator searches once or twice.
We start by showing that for 0 < p < 1/2, where there are equilibria in which
the regulator searches once or twice, w1 is smaller than w2 and hence is the
relevant wage to be compared with w in order to determine min{w,w1,w2}. The
comparison
w1 =
c
3p2−6p3+3p4 ≤
c
3p2−9p3+12p4−6p5 = w2
can be simplified to 1−3p+2p2 ≥ 0. The LHS is falling in the relevant range as
the derivative −3+4p is negative for 0 < p < 1/2. At 1/2, the LHS is zero, and
hence, the condition above holds.
The relevant upper bound is given by w2 if
w2 =
c
3p2−12p3+24p4−24p5+9p6 ≥
c
3p2−9p3+9p4−3p5 = w1
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or 3p3(1− 5p+ 7p2− 3p3) ≥ 0. Define the term in parentheses as g(p). The
second derivative g′′(p) = 14− 18p is positive and decreasing in the relevant
range as g′′(0.5) is positive. Hence, g′(p) =−5+14p−9p2 is increasing in the
negative domain because g′(0.5) is negative. This implies that g(p) is falling, and
we know further that it must have one root as g(0) is positive but g(0.5) is negative.
It can be shown that g(p) crosses the abscissa at p= 1/3. Hence, for 0< p< 1/3,
the relevant upper bound is given by w2 and by w1 for 1/3 < p < 1/2.
For 0 < p≤ p˜, we start by determining the relevant lower bound below which
no search by the regulator is the unique equilibrium. The relevant comparison is
w =
c
p−5p2+16p3−28p4+26p5−10p6 ≤
c
3p2−6p3+3p4 = w1
or p(1−8p+22p2−31p3+26p4−10p5)≥ 0. Define the term in parentheses as
g(p). The fourth derivative g′′′′(p) = 624−1200p is positive in the relevant range
[0, p˜]. Therefore, g′′′(p) =−186+624p−600p2 is increasing in this range and
negative for both p = 0 and p = p˜ and hence has no root. The second derivative
g′′(p) = 44−186p+312p2−200p3 is strictly falling in that interval and takes
on a positive value both at p= 0 and at p= p˜, and thus has no root in the relevant
interval. The first derivative g′(p) =−8+44p−93p2+104p3−50p4 is negative
for both p = 0 and p = p˜ and thus has no root as it is strictly increasing in that
range of p. Hence, g(p) is strictly falling in that interval and has one root as g(0)
is positive and g(p˜) is negative. It can be shown that the root lies at
p˙ =
2
5
+
1
10
√
6
−54+5(486−27
√
323)
1/3
+15(18+
√
323)
1/3
− 1
2
[
− 18
25
− 1
30
(
486−27
√
323
)1/3− 1
10
(
18+
√
323
)1/3
+
3
25
√
6
−54+5(486−27√323)1/3+15(18+√323)1/3
]1/2
≈ 0.23802.
It follows that w is smaller than w1 up to that root. This implies that the
relevant lower bound is given by w from p = 0 up to the root and then by w1 until
p = p˜.
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Next, we show that w lies below the relevant upper bound in this range given
by w2. The comparison
w =
c
p−5p2+16p3−28p4+26p5−10p6
≤ c
3p2−12p3+24p4−24p5+9p6 = w2
can be simplified to 1−8p+28p2−52p3+50p4−19p5 ≥ 0. Define the LHS
of the last inequality as g(p). The fourth derivative g′′′′(p) = 1200− 1140p
is positive throughout the relevant range and hence, g′′′(p) =−312+1200p−
1140p2 is increasing. Observe that g′′′(p˜) is negative which implies that the
third derivative is negative throughout the range. Therefore, g′′(p) = 56−312p+
600p2− 380p3 is decreasing and positive, as g′′(p˜) is positive. This indicates
that g′(p) =−8+56p−156p2+200p3−95p4 increases in that range of p, and
as g′(p˜) is negative, the first derivative is negative throughout. Taken together,
we now know that g(p) is decreasing, and as g(p˜) is positive, that it has no root
in that range. The condition above holds.
For p˜ < p < 1/2 we show first that
w1 =
c
3p2−6p3+3p4 ≤
c
p−4p2+ 283 p3−13p4+10p5− 103 p6
= w
or −3+ 21p− 46p2 + 48p3− 30p4 + 10p5 ≥ 0. Define the LHS as g(p). The
fourth derivative g′′′′(p) =−720+1200p is increasing and negative in the rele-
vant range as g′′′′(1/2)< 0, implying a negative slope of g′′′(p) = 288−720p+
600p2. The positive value of g′′′(1/2) shows that the third derivative is positive
throughout. Hence, g′′(p) =−92+288p−360p2+200p3 increases and is nega-
tive as g′′(1/2)< 0, also implying that g′(p) = 21−92p+144p2−120p3+50p4
is decreasing. As g′(p˜)> 0 but g′(1/2)< 0 the first derivative has one root in the
range of interest. The function g(p) hence first is increasing and then decreasing,
and because both g(p˜) and g(1/2) are positive, it is positive throughout the range
of interest and hence the condition above holds. Therefore, w1 is the relevant
lower bound for this range.
Second, for the same range of p we show that
w =
c
p−4p2+ 283 p3−13p4+10p5− 103 p6
≤ c
3p2−9p3+9p4−3p5 = w1
44
2.6. Appendix
or 3− 21p+ 55p2− 66p3 + 39p4− 10p5 ≥ 0. Define the LHS as g(p). The
fourth derivative g′′′′(p) = 936−1200p is decreasing in the positive domain, and
hence g′′′(p) =−396+936p+−600p2 is increasing. Because g′′′(1/2)< 0 the
third derivative is negative throughout, implying a negative slope of g′′(p) =
110− 396p+ 468p2− 200p3. Observe that the second derivative is positive
throughout as g′′(1/2) > 0, and thus g′(p) = −21+ 110p− 198p2 + 156p3−
50p4 is increasing. Since g′(p˜)< 0 and g′(1/2)> 0, the first derivative has one
root, and hence g(p) is decreasing first and then increasing. It can be easily
verified that g(p) is positive at this root of g′(p) and hence is positive throughout,
satisfying the condition above. Therefore, there is no range of p and w below w
where not searching is the unique equilibrium.
Taken together, we can now define
w˜ =

w for 0 < p < p˙
w1 for p˙ < p < 1/2
w2 for 1/2 < p < 1
as used in the statement of the proposition.
For 1/2 < p < 1, where the equilibrium in which the regulator searches twice
also exists, we now show that the lower bound is given by w2 and that there
also exists an area below w and above w2 where not searching is the unique
equilibrium. The first condition is
w2 =
c
3p2− (15/2)p3+(15/2)p4−3p5
≤ c
p−4p2+ 283 p3−13p4+10p5− 103 p6
= w
or −12+ 84p− 202p2 + 246p3− 156p4 + 40p5 ≥ 0. Define the LHS as g(p).
The fourth derivative g′′′′(p) = −3744+ 4800p is increasing and crosses the
abscissa once from below. This implies that g′′′(p) = 1476− 3744p+ 2400p2
first has a decreasing and then an increasing slope, and as it is positive at the root
of g′′′′(p), it is positive throughout the relevant range. From this fact we know that
g′′(p) =−404+1476p−1872p2+800p3 is increasing, and it is negative and has
no root in the relevant range as g′′(1) = 0. Hence, g′(p) = 84−404p+738p2−
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624p3+200p4 is decreasing, and has one zero as g′(1/2)> 0 but g′(1)< 0. The
original function g′(p) thus has a local maximum at this root and is positive
throughout as both g(1/2) and g(1) are positive, and the condition above is
satisfied.
Lastly, we show that
w2 =
c
3p2−12p3+24p4−24p5+9p6
≤ c
p−4p2+ 283 p3−13p4+10p5− 103 p6
= w
or−3+21p−64p2+111p3−102p4+37p5≥ 0 for some values of p. Define the
LHS as g(p). The fourth derivative g′′′′(p) =−2448+4440p crosses the abscissa
once from below, implying a local minimum of g′′′(p) = 666−2448p+2220p2.
As g′′′(1/2) < 0 and g′′′(1) > 0, the third derivative has one root in the range
of interest. Hence, g′′(p) = −128+ 666p− 1224p2 + 740p3 also has a local
minimum in the relevant range. Similarly, g′′(1/2)< 0 and g′′(1)> 0, such that
g′′(p) also crosses the abscissa once from below, implying one local minimum
of g′(p) = 21−128p+333p2−408p3+185p4. As both g′(1/2) and g′(1) are
positive but there are negative values of g′(p) in between, the first derivative first
crosses the abscissa from above and then again from below. Hence, g(p) first
has a local maximum and then a local minimum. As g(1/2) is positive, the local
maximum must be in the positive domain, and because g(1) = 0 and g′(1)> 0,
the graph crosses the abscissa from below at p = 1 and hence the local minimum
is in the negative domain. This implies that there must be a zero in between. It
can be shown that this root lies at
p¨ =
65
148
+
1
148
√
3
−941−9176
(
2
8561+9
√
916593
)1/3
+74×22/3(8561+9
√
916593)
1/3
+
1
2
[
− 941
8214
+
62
111
(
2
8561+9
√
916593
)1/3
− 1
111
(
1
2
(
8561+9
√
916593
))1/3
+
29241
√
3
−941−9176(2/(8561+9
√
916593))
1/3
+74×22/3(8561+9
√
916593)
1/3
2738
]
,
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which is≈ 0.81216. Therefore, w2 is smaller than w for 1/2< p< p¨ and there are
levels of w between w2 and w for which not searching is the unique equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 2.5. Rearranging (2.7) and (2.8) gives
c
w
≤ p−3p2+5p3−3p4 (2.25)
and
c
w
≤ p− 5
2
p2+3p3− 3
2
p4, (2.26)
respectively. (2.7) is the relevant constraint if the RHS of (2.25) is smaller than
the RHS of (2.26) or p2g(p) ≥ 0 where g(p) = 1/2− 2p+(3/2)p2. The first
derivative g′(p) =−2+3p crosses the abscissa once from below and hence, g(p)
is convex. It is easy to verify that g(p) has roots at p∗ = 1/3 and p= 1 and hence
is positive for values of p below p∗ and negative for values above. Thus, (2.7) is
binding for small p while (2.8) is relevant for large p and the lemma follows.
Proof of Proposition 2.1. We have to show that w > w for all p. For 0 < p < p˜,
the relevant comparison is
w =
c
p−5p2+16p3−28p4+26p5−10p6 ≥
c
p−3p2+5p3−3p4 = w
or 2− 11p+ 25p2 − 26p3 + 10p4 ≥ 0. Define the LHS as g(p). The third
derivative g′′′(p) =−156+240p is increasing and negative in the relevant range
as g′′′(p˜)< 0. This implies that g′′(p) = 50−156p+120p2 is decreasing, and it
is positive as its value at p˜ is positive. Hence, g′(p) =−11+50p−78p2+40p3
is increasing, and from g′(p˜) < 0 we know that it is negative. Due to this fact,
g(p) is decreasing, and as g(p˜)> 0, it is positive and the condition above holds.
For p˜ < p < 1/3, the relevant comparison is
w =
c
p−4p2+ 283 p3−13p4+10p5− 103 p6
≥ c
p−3p2+5p3−3p4 = w
or 3− 13p+ 30p2 − 30p3 + 10p4 ≥ 0. Define the LHS as g(p). The third
derivative g′′′(p)=−180+240p is increasing and negative in the range of interest
as g′′′(1/3)< 0. Hence, g′′(p) = 60−180p+120p2 is decreasing and positive
as g′′(1/3)> 0. The slope of g′(p) =−13+60p−90p2+40p3 thus is positive,
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and the first derivative is negative because g′(1/3)< 0. From this we know that
g(p) is decreasing. As g(1/3)> 0, the LHS is positive throughout the range of
interest and the above condition is satisfied.
For 1/3 < p < 1, the relevant comparison is
w =
c
p−4p2+ 283 p3−13p4+10p5− 103 p6
≥ c
p− 52 p2+3p3− 32 p4
= w
or 9− 38p+ 69p2 − 60p3 + 20p4 ≥ 0. Define the LHS as g(p). The third
derivative g′′′(p) = −360+ 480p is increasing and crosses the abscissa once
from below as g′′′(1/3)< 0 and g′′′(1)> 0. Hence g′′(p) = 138−360p+240p2
is convex and has a local minimum at p = 3/4. As its value is positive at
the local minimum it is positive throughout the range of interest. Therefore,
g′(p) = −38+138p−180p2+80p3 is increasing and negative as g′(1/3) < 0
and g′(1) = 0. That being the case, the LHS decreases in p and is positive as
g(1/3)> 0 and g(1) = 0. The above condition holds and the proof concludes.
Proof of Proposition 2.2. First, we show that w is smaller than w˜ for p < 1/3.
For 0 < p < p˙ where the relevant upper bound is w, we check whether
w =
c
p−3p2+5p3−3p4 ≤
c
p−5p2+16p3−28p4+26p5−10p6 = w
or 2− 11p+ 25p2− 26p3 + 10p4 ≥ 0. Define the LHS as g(p). Observe that
g′′′(p) =−156+240p is increasing and negative throughout the relevant range,
which means that g′′(p) = 50−156p+120p2 is decreasing. As g′′(p˙)> 0, the
second derivative is positive, which implies a positive slope for g′(p) =−11+
50p− 78p2 + 40p3. As g′(p˙) < 0 we know that the first derivative is negative
and by that we know that g(p) is decreasing. The fact that g(p˙)> 0 implies that
the LHS is positive throughout the relevant range and that the conditions above
holds.
For p˙ < p < 1/3, the relevant upper bound for the wage is w1 and hence, the
relevant comparison is
w =
c
p−3p2+5p3−3p4 ≤
c
3p2−6p3+3p4 = w1
or 1− 6p+ 11p2− 6p3 ≥ 0. Define the LHS as g(p). The second derivative
g′′(p) = 22−36p is decreasing and positive for p = 1/3 and thus positive in the
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relevant range so that g′(p) = −6+ 22p− 18p2 is increasing. As g′(1/3) < 0,
the first derivative is negative which implies a negative slope of g(p). Together
with the facts that g(p˙)> 0 and g(1/3) = 0 we know that g(p) is positive in the
relevant range and the condition above holds.
Next we show that for values of p above 1/3, w is never below w˜. First, for
1/3 < p < 1/2, the relevant comparison is
w =
c
p− 52 p2+3p3− 32 p4
≥ c
3p2−6p3+3p4 = w1
or −2+11p−18p2+9p3 ≥ 0. Define the LHS as g(p). The second derivative
g′′(p) =−36+54p is increasing and negative for p = 1/2 and thus negative in
the relevant range, implying a negative slope of g′(p) = 11− 36p+ 27p2. As
g′(1/3)> 0 and g′(1/2)< 0, there must be one root of the first derivative in the
relevant range. This implies that g(p) is concave and has a local maximum in that
range, and because g(1/3) = 0 and g(1/2)> 0, it is positive throughout the range
and the condition above holds. Second, for 1/2 < p < 1, the relevant comparison
is
w =
c
p− 52 p2+3p3− 32 p4
≥ c
3p2− 152 p3+ 152 p4−3p5
= w2
or −2+ 11p− 21p2 + 18p3− 6p4 ≥ 0. Define the LHS as g(p). The third
derivative g′′′(p) = 108−144p is decreasing and crosses the abscissa once be-
cause g′′′(1/2) > 0 and g′′′(1) < 0. This implies that g′′(p) = −42+ 108p−
72p2 is concave and has a local maximum at p = 108/144 in that range. As
g′′(108/144)< 0, the second derivative is negative throughout. The first deriva-
tive g′(p) = 11−42p+54p2−24p3 hence is decreasing in the relevant range.
As g′(1/2)> 0 and g′(1)< 0 the first derivative has one root and g(p) is concave
and has a local maximum. From g(1/2)> 0 and g(1) = 0 we can infer that g(p)
is positive in the relevant range and the condition above holds.
The second part of the proof follows from the earlier analysis. For 1/2 < p <
p¨, w2 < w from Lemma 2.4 and w < w from Proposition 2.1. Hence, whenever
w > max{w2,w} it is below w and the unique equilibrium exists for this range of
p.
49
2. SEARCHING FOR EVIDENCE: LESS CAN BE MORE
Proof of Proposition 2.3. There are three cases. For 0 < p < 1/3, the losses in
Situation 1 L1 are larger than the losses in Situation 2 L2 if
L1 = 9p3−21p4+18p5−6p6 ≥ p−5p2+14p3−22p4+18p5−6p6 = L2
or −1+ 5p− 5p2 + p3 ≥ 0. Define the LHS as g(p). The second derivative
g′′(p) = −10+ 6p is increasing and negative throughout the relevant range as
g′′(1/3) < 0. Hence g′(p) = 5− 10p+ 3p2 is decreasing, and it is positive
because g′(1/3)> 0. It follows that g(p) has a positive slope. As g(0)< 0 but
g(1/3)> 0 it crosses the abscissa once from below in the range of interest. It can
be shown that this root lies at p = 2−√3, and hence the condition above holds
for values of p larger than that.
For 1/3 < p < 2/3, the relevant comparison is
L1 = 3p−15p2+30p3−30p4+18p5−6p6
≥ p−5p2+14p3−22p4+18p5−6p6 = L2
or 1− 5p+ 8p2− 4p3 ≥ 0. Define the LHS as g(p). The second derivative
g′′(p) = 16− 24p is decreasing and positive as g′′(2/3) = 0. Thus, g′(p) =
−5+ 16p− 12p2 is increasing and crosses the abscissa once from below as
g′(1/3)< 0 and g′(2/3)> 0. It can be shown that g′(1/2) = 0. From this we can
infer that g(p) is convex and has a local minimum. Its value at the local minimum
is zero, so the condition above weakly holds in the relevant range of p.
Lastly, for 2/3 < p < 1, the relevant condition is
L1 = 3p−9p2+15p3−21p4+18p5−6p6
≥ p−5p2+14p3−22p4+18p5−6p6 = L2
or 2−4p+ p2+ p3 ≥ 0. Define the LHS as g(p). The second derivative g′′(p) =
2+6p is increasing and positive throughout the whole range of interest, implying
a positive slope for g′(p) = −4+2p+3p2. As g′(2/3) < 0 and g′(1) > 0, the
first derivative crosses the abscissa once from below. From this we can infer that
g(p) is convex and has a local minimum. We know that this local minimum is
negative as g(2/3)> 0, g(1) = 0, and g′(1)> 0, and therefore, g(p) crosses the
abscissa once from above. It can be shown that this root lies at p =
√
3−1, and
the condition above holds for values of p smaller than that.
50
Chapter Three
Conflicting tasks and moral hazard:
theory and experimental evidence
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In real-world agency problems, it is often the case that principals have to delegate
not just one but several tasks. In this chapter we focus on situations in which
two different tasks to be delegated may be in direct conflict with each other;
i.e., providing effort in one task may have a negative side effect on the success
probability of the other task.1 In such situations, job design becomes a major
issue. In particular, it might be the case that implementing effort in both tasks
may be facilitated by hiring two different agents each in charge of one task
instead of letting one agent be responsible for both tasks. In the present chapter
we investigate these incentive problems in a theoretical model and provide first
experimental evidence that also in the laboratory, where fairness and reciprocity
considerations matter, agents are indeed reluctant to perform different tasks when
they are in conflict with each other.
To fix ideas, consider a merchant (principal) who wants to sell two products
which may be imperfect substitutes. The merchant may hire either one or two
sales representatives (agents) who can exert effort to promote the products. The
effort decisions are assumed to be non-contractible, but the wages can depend
on which products are sold. The agents are risk-neutral and have no wealth, so
1Examples of conflicting tasks abound in the real world. For instance, franchise companies
that decide to open a new branch store in close proximity to their existing stores have to investigate
carefully to which extent the opening of the new store will affect sales in the existing stores and
whether overall company sales will increase. Moreover, when producers of consumer goods have
related and competing products in their portfolio, they always have to consider that an advertising
campaign for one product may cannibalize the sales levels of their related products.
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that the wages must be non-negative. There are no technological (dis-)economies
of scope, so that in the absence of incentive problems, the principal would be
indifferent between hiring one or two agents.
Suppose first that the merchant has only one sales representative in charge of
both products. If the products are imperfect substitutes, then promotion effort in
one task increases the probability of sale of the promoted product, but at the same
time it lowers the probability of sale of the other product (i.e., there is conflict
between the tasks). In contrast, if there is no relation between the products,
promotion of one product has no effect on the probability of sale of the other
product. We consider a symmetric situation such that in theory, when the products
are unrelated (so that there is no conflict), the principal induces either effort in
both tasks or no effort at all. However, when there is conflict between the tasks,
then it may be optimal for the principal to induce the agent to invest effort in
only one task. Intuitively, if there is conflict between the two tasks, a single sales
representative is very reluctant to exert effort in both tasks, because he knows that
promotion effort does not only increase the probability of sale of the promoted
product, but at the same time it also lowers the probability of sale of the other
product he is supposed to sell. This makes it very expensive for the principal to
induce two efforts.
Suppose next that there are two (identical) sales representatives, each of them
responsible for promoting one product. Due to symmetry, in theory the principal
induces either effort in both tasks or no effort at all, regardless of whether or not
there is conflict.
In general, if there is conflict, it depends on the parameter constellation
whether the principal’s expected profit is larger with one or with two agents. Yet,
if there is no conflict, then the principal’s expected profit is unambiguously larger
when only one agent is in charge of both tasks. Intuitively, when the tasks are
not in conflict with each other, the rent that the principal leaves to the agent to
motivate him to work on one task can also be used to motivate him to work on
the other task.
In order to find an answer to our research question whether the theoretical
incentive problem of inducing a single agent to simultaneously exert efforts in
conflicting tasks is empirically relevant, we conducted a laboratory experiment
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with 474 subjects. There are two treatments with conflict; one where the principal
has only a single agent and another one where she has two agents. We have chosen
a parameter constellation such that according to standard theory, a merchant who
has only one sales representative would induce him to invest effort in only one
task, while a merchant with two sales representatives would induce each one
to promote his respective product. Moreover, there are two treatments without
conflict, one with a single agent and another one with two agents. The theoretical
prediction for our parameter constellation is that in the absence of conflict, a
merchant would always induce two efforts, regardless of whether she has only
one or two sales representatives to perform these tasks.
One central finding of our experiment is that in the one-agent treatment
with conflict, two efforts are chosen significantly less often than in the other
three treatments. Hence, our experimental data provides strong support for the
empirical relevance of the theoretically predicted incentive problem to motivate
a single agent to provide efforts in conflicting tasks. However, even in the
presence of conflict, a relevant fraction of agents still exerts two efforts. This
happens mostly when a principal’s wage offer is very generous. Thus, fairness
and reciprocity may mitigate the incentive problem. Moreover, in contrast to the
theoretical prediction, in the presence of conflict, the principals’ average profit is
slightly larger in the one-agent treatment than in the two-agent treatment. Two
facts contribute to this result. First, the fraction of two efforts in the one-agent
treatment with conflict is larger than theoretically predicted, and second, in the
two-agent treatment, in sum the principal offers the agents more than in the one-
agent treatment. Yet, with regard to the no-conflict treatments, we find significant
support for the theoretical prediction that the principals’ profits are larger in the
case of one agent than in the case of two agents.
Since the seminal work of Holmström and Milgrom (1991), multi-task
principal-agent problems have played a prominent role in the contract theoretic
literature.2 However, most of these papers have focused on effort substitution and
the trade-off between insurance and incentives when agents are risk-averse. More
recently, many authors have studied moral hazard models with risk-neutral but
2For surveys, see e.g. Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (2000), Laffont and Martimort (2002,
ch. 5), and Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, ch. 6).
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wealth-constrained agents.3 In the latter framework, several authors have shown
that a principal can save agency costs if she lets one agent be in charge of several
tasks (see e.g. Hirao, 1993, Che and Yoo, 2001, Laux, 2001, and Mylovanov and
Schmitz, 2008).4 The potential benefits of separating tasks in sequential agency
problems have been discussed by Hirao (1993), Schmitz (2005), and Khalil, Kim,
and Shin (2006). The fact that conflicts between different tasks may explain
why they are delegated to different agents (“advocates”) has first been studied by
Dewatripont and Tirole (1999). They analyze the optimality of organizing the
judicial system in an incomplete contracting framework. This chapter is most
closely related to a complete contracting variant of their model which is discussed
in Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, Section 6.2.2). To the best of our knowledge,
only a few experiments on multi-task principal-agent problems have been con-
ducted so far. In particular, Fehr and Schmidt (2004) study a problem where one
task is contractible and they focus on the pros and cons of piece-rate versus bonus
contracts. Brüggen and Moers (2007) investigate the role of financial and social
incentives in multi-task settings where agents choose an effort level and an effort
allocation.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The theoretical model
which is based on Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) is analyzed in Section 3.2 and
serves as a motivation for our experimental study. The experimental design is
introduced in Section 3.3 and qualitative hypotheses are derived in Section 3.4.
The experimental results are presented and discussed in Sections 3.5 and 3.6.
Finally, concluding remarks follow in Section 3.7. All proofs are relegated to
Appendix A.
3.2 THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Consider a principal who wants to sell a single unit of a product 1 and a single
unit of a product 2. The sales level for a given product i ∈ {1,2} is denoted by
qi ∈ {0,1} . If product i is sold, the principal obtains revenue R > 0. We consider
3See e.g. Innes (1990), Pitchford (1998), and Tirole (2001).
4See also Dana (1993) and Gilbert and Riordan (1995) who have found related results in
other frameworks.
54
3.2. The theoretical framework
two different scenarios. In the first scenario the principal employs a single agent
to sell products 1 and 2, while she employs two agents in the other scenario. All
parties are risk-neutral. An agent has no wealth and his reservation utility is
zero. If there is only a single agent, he can exert effort ai ∈ {0,1} to promote
product i ∈ {1,2} . In case that there are two agents, agent A can promote product
1 and agent B can promote product 2; i.e., A chooses a1 ∈ {0,1} and B chooses
a2 ∈ {0,1} . The effort levels are non-contractible.
Effort to promote product i increases the probability of sale of product i
but (weakly) lowers the probability of sale of product j 6= i. In other words,
there may be a direct conflict between the effort tasks when the products are
imperfect substitutes. Formally, let the probability of sale of product i be given
by Pr(qi = 1) = α +ρai− γa j. The base rate of sale of product i is α > 0. If
product i is promoted (i.e., ai = 1), the probability of sale of product i increases
by ρ > 0. If the other product j 6= i is promoted (i.e., a j = 1) and the products
are imperfect substitutes, the probability of sale of product i decreases by γ > 0.
When the products are unrelated (γ = 0), effort to promote one product has no
effect on the probability of sale of the other product.
Throughout we assume that γ ≤ α ≤ 1−ρ to ensure that 0≤ α+ρai−γa j ≤
1 for any combinations of effort decisions a1 and a2. An agent has to incur effort
costs ψ if he promotes a product i. Hence, product i generates an expected
net surplus of (α + ρai− γa j)R− aiψ. Due to the symmetry of the model it
is either efficient to promote both or no products. We assume (ρ − γ) > ψ/R
such that (α+ρ− γ)R− ψ > αR which implies that the expected total surplus
is maximized when both products are promoted (i.e., a1 = a2 = 1). Hence, if
effort were verifiable, the principal would always implement two efforts. Yet,
since in our setup effort is not contractible, to induce an agent to exert effort the
principal can offer a wage scheme wq1q2 := w(q1,q2) that is contingent only on
which products have been sold.
One-agent scenario. Given that the principal has only one agent, she has to
decide whether to induce promotion effort in both tasks, in only one task, or in
no task.
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Let us first consider the case where the principal wishes to induce effort in
both tasks. The principal’s problem is to minimize the expected compensation
E
[
wq1q2 | a1 = a2 = 1
]
she has to pay to her agent subject to the constraints
wq1q2 ≥ 0,
E
[
wq1q2 | a1 = a2 = 1
]−2ψ ≥ E [wq1q2 | a1 = 1,a2 = 0]−ψ, (IC 1)
E
[
wq1q2 | a1 = a2 = 1
]−2ψ ≥ E [wq1q2 | a1 = 0,a2 = 1]−ψ, (IC 2)
E
[
wq1q2 | a1 = a2 = 1
]−2ψ ≥ E [wq1q2 | a1 = a2 = 0] , (IC 3)
E
[
wq1q2 | a1 = a2 = 1
]−2ψ ≥ 0. (PC)
The first two incentive compatibility constraints ensure that the agent prefers
exerting two efforts to exerting only one effort and the third one ensures that the
agent prefers exerting two efforts to exerting no effort. The last constraint ensures
that the agent participates.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose the principal wants to induce a1 = a2 = 1. Then she sets
w11 =
2ψ
(α+ρ−γ)2−α2 and w10 = w01 = w00 = 0. Given this wage scheme, the
principal’s expected profit is Πhh = (α+ρ− γ)2(2R−w11)+2(α+ρ− γ)(1−
α−ρ+ γ)R.
Suppose next the principal wants to induce effort in only one task. Let us
assume w.l.o.g. that the principal wants to induce effort with regard to product
1; i.e., the principal wishes to implement a1 = 1,a2 = 0. In this case the princi-
pal’s problem is to minimize E
[
wq1q2 | a1 = 1,a2 = 0
]
subject to the constraints
wq1q2 ≥ 0,
E
[
wq1q2 | a1 = 1,a2 = 0
]−ψ ≥ E [wq1q2 | a1 = a2 = 1]−2ψ, (IC 1)
E
[
wq1q2 | a1 = 1,a2 = 0
]−ψ ≥ E [wq1q2 | a1 = 0,a2 = 1]−ψ, (IC 2)
E
[
wq1q2 | a1 = 1,a2 = 0
]−ψ ≥ E [wq1q2 | a1 = a2 = 0] , (IC 3)
E
[
wq1q2 | a1 = 1,a2 = 0
]−ψ ≥ 0. (PC)
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Lemma 3.2. Suppose the principal wants to induce a1 = 1 and a2 = 0.5 Then
it is optimal for her to set w10 =
ψ
αγ+ρ(1−α+γ) and w11 = w01 = w00 = 0. Given
this wage scheme, the principal’s expected profit is Πhl = (α+ρ)(α− γ)2R+
(α+ρ)(1−α+ γ)(R−w10)+(1−α−ρ)(α− γ)R.
Observe that if there is conflict and the principal wants the agent to promote
product 1 only, then it is strictly optimal to pay the agent no wage in case that
also product 2 is sold. The reason is that effort in task 1 reduces the probability
of sale of product 2 and hence the sale of this product can be seen as a signal that
the agent may not have promoted product 1. In contrast, if there is no conflict,
a wage scheme with w11 = 0 is not the only solution. This is because then the
sale of product 2 provides no signal for the effort level in task 1. Therefore,
a positive wage w11 can be optimal as long as it does not induce the agent to
promote product 2 as well. Specifically, it is easy to show that if γ = 0, then
any wage scheme 0 ≤ w11 ≤ 1+ρρ(α+ρ)ψ,w10 ≥ 0,w01 = w00 = 0 which satisfies
αw11+(1−α)w10 = ψρ is optimal.
Finally the principal could induce no effort at all. It is immediate to see that for
this case the optimal wage scheme is simply given by w11 =w10 =w01 =w00 = 0.
Then the principal’s expected profit is Πll = 2αR.
The preceding discussion immediately implies the following result.
Proposition 3.1. (i) If R > ψ(α+ρ−γ)
2
[(α+ρ−γ)2−α2](ρ−γ) and R >
2ψ(α+ρ−γ)2
[(α+ρ−γ)2−α2](ρ−γ) −
(α+ρ)(1−α+γ)ψ
[αγ+ρ(1−α+γ)](ρ−γ) , then the principal induces effort in both tasks.
(ii) If (α+ρ)(1−α+γ)ψ[αγ+ρ(1−α+γ)](ρ−γ) < R <
2ψ(α+ρ−γ)2
[(α+ρ−γ)2−α2](ρ−γ) −
(α+ρ)(1−α+γ)ψ
[αγ+ρ(1−α+γ)](ρ−γ) ,
then the principal induces effort in only one task.
(iii) Otherwise the principal induces no effort.
It is obvious that the principal will induce promotion for both products if
the return is sufficiently large. However for intermediate values of R, if there is
conflict, the principal may prefer to induce effort in only one task. The reason is
as follows. If the adverse effects of promotion efforts increase, the sale of two
products provides weaker evidence that the agent has chosen to exert effort in
5Note that due to the symmetry of the problem the principal’s expected profit is the same if
she implements a1 = 0 and a2 = 1.
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both tasks, while the sale of only one product provides stronger evidence that
the agent has exerted effort to promote this product. As a consequence, if the
conflict between tasks increases, it becomes more expensive for the principal to
induce the agent to promote both products, while it becomes less expensive to
implement effort in only one task.
In contrast, if γ is sufficiently small (in particular, if there is no conflict), the
principal will never implement effort in only one task; i.e., the condition in part
(ii) cannot be satisfied.
Two-agent scenario. Given that the principal can employ two agents, she has
to decide whether to induce both agents to exert effort, whether to provide only
one agent with incentives or whether she prefers to induce no efforts at all. The
principal will now offer a wage schedule wkq1q2 := w
k(q1,q2) with k ∈ {A,B} to
the agents. This means she will offer each agent one wage for each possible
combination of q1 and q2.
Let us first assume the principal wishes to induce agent A to exert effort to pro-
mote product 1 and agent B to exert effort to promote product 2. The principal’s
problem is to minimize the sum of the expected compensation E
[
wAq1q2 +w
B
q1q2 |
a1 = a2 = 1
]
she has to pay to the agents subject to the constraints wkq1q2 ≥ 0,
E
[
wAq1q2 | a1 = a2 = 1
]
−ψ ≥ E
[
wAq1q2 | a1 = 0,a2 = 1
]
, (IC A)
E
[
wBq1q2 | a1 = a2 = 1
]−ψ ≥ E [wBq1q2 | a1 = 1,a2 = 0] , (IC B)
E
[
wAq1q2 | a1 = a2 = 1
]
−ψ ≥ 0, (PC A)
E
[
wBq1q2 | a1 = a2 = 1
]−ψ ≥ 0. (PC B)
The two incentive compatibility constraints ensure that each agent prefers to
exert effort to promote his product and the participation constraints ensure that
both agents will accept the offered wage scheme.
Lemma 3.3. Suppose the principal wants to induce a1 = a2 = 1. Then she sets
wA10 = w
B
01 =
ψ
(α+ρ−γ)(1−α−ρ+γ)−(α−γ)(1−α−ρ) and w
k
11 = w
k
00 = w
A
01 = w
B
10 = 0.
Given this wage scheme, the principal’s expected profit isΠABhh = (α+ρ−γ)22R+
2(α+ρ− γ)(1−α−ρ+ γ)(R−wA10).
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Observe that if there is conflict, then the principal pays an agent a positive
wage if and only if the agent was successful in selling his product while the
other agent failed. The reason is that in the case of conflict, the failure of an
agent to sell his product can be seen as an indication that the other agent has
promoted his product, since promotion decreases the probability of sale of the
competing agent’s product. In contrast, if there is no conflict, a wage scheme
with wk11 = 0 is not the only one that can be optimal. This is because in the
case of no conflict, the success or failure of one agent indicates nothing about
the other agent’s effort decision. In particular, if γ = 0, then any wage scheme
with wk00 = w
A
01 = w
B
10 = 0 such that (1−α − ρ)wA10 + (α + ρ)wA11 = ψρ and
(1−α−ρ)wB01+(α+ρ)wB11 = ψρ is optimal.
Suppose next the principal wants to induce effort in only one task. Let us
assume w.l.o.g. that the principal wants to induce effort with regard to product
1; i.e., the principal wishes to implement a1 = 1,a2 = 0. It is obvious that in
this case the principal will set wBq1q2 = 0 for all possible combinations of q1 and
q2 such that agent B will not exert effort. Hence, the principal’s problem is to
minimize E
[
wAq1q2 | a1 = 1,a2 = 0
]
subject to the constraints wAq1q2 ≥ 0,
E
[
wAq1q2 | a1 = 1,a2 = 0
]
−ψ ≥ E
[
wAq1q2 | a1 = a2 = 0
]
, (IC A)
E
[
wAq1q2 | a1 = 1,a2 = 0
]
−ψ ≥ 0. (PC A)
Lemma 3.4. Suppose the principal wants to induce a1 = 1 and a2 = 0. Then it
is optimal for her to set wA10 =
ψ
αγ+ρ(1−α+γ) and w
A
11 = w
A
01 = w
A
00 = w
B
q1q2 = 0.
Given this wage scheme, the principal’s expected profit is ΠABhl = (α+ρ)(α−
γ)2R+(α+ρ)(1−α+ γ)(R−wA10)+(1−α−ρ)(α− γ)R.
Also with two agents the principal could induce no efforts at all and as in the
one-agent case this yields an expected profit of ΠABll = 2αR.
It is now straightforward to show that the following result holds.
Proposition 3.2. (i) If R > ψ(α+ρ−γ)(1−α−ρ+γ)[ρ(1−α−ρ)+γ(α+ρ−γ)](ρ−γ) , then the principal induces
effort in both tasks.
(ii) Otherwise the principal induces no effort.
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Note that if the principal has two agents, then she will never induce only one
agent to exert effort. This is obvious in the absence of conflict, because then there
is no interaction between the agents, and hence she induces both agents to choose
the effort level that she would implement if there were only one agent in charge
of one task. If there is conflict, consider a situation where the principal prefers
inducing only one effort to inducing no efforts. In such a situation, the principal
can always increase her profit further by inducing two efforts. The reason is that if
only one agent is induced to exert effort, then even if he deviates, the probability
of sale of his product is still relatively large, which makes it expensive for the
principal to induce effort. In contrast, if both agents are induced to exert effort,
then if an agent chooses low effort, the probability of sale of his product is small
due to the adverse effect of the other agent’s promotion effort, which makes it
less expensive for the principal to induce effort.
Proposition 3.1 and Proposition 3.2 imply the following result.
Proposition 3.3. There exists a unique γˆ ∈ (0,min{α,ρ}) such that Πhh(γˆ) =
ΠABhh (γˆ).
(i) Consider the case γ ≤ γˆ. If R > ψ(α+ρ−γ)2
[(α+ρ−γ)2−α2](ρ−γ) , then it is optimal for
the principal to have one agent and to induce effort in both tasks.
(ii) Next consider γ > γˆ . If R > ψ(α+ρ−γ)(1−α−ρ+γ)[ρ(1−α−ρ)+γ(α+ρ−γ)](ρ−γ) , then it is optimal
for the principal to have two agents and to induce effort in both tasks.
(iii) Otherwise it is optimal to induce no efforts and it makes no difference
whether the principal has one or two agents.
Observe that if the conflict between the tasks is weak (γ ≤ γˆ), then the
principal prefers to employ one agent, provided that the return R is sufficiently
large such that she wants to induce effort in both tasks.6 This observation
generalizes the well-known result that in the absence of conflict, a principal
who wants to delegate several tasks may prefer to assign them to a single agent,
because this gives her the possibility to save rents. Specifically, if there are two
agents each in charge of one task, then even when there is only one success, the
6Note that it is never optimal to hire only one agent and implement only one effort, since this
yields the same expected profit as hiring two agents and implementing only one effort, which
cannot be optimal according to Proposition 3.2.
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principal has to leave a rent to the successful agent. In contrast, if there is only
one agent in charge of both tasks, the principal has to leave a rent to the agent
only if he was successful in both tasks.
Now consider the case where the conflict is strong (γ > γˆ). In this case,
inducing two efforts is less expensive for the principal when she hires two agents.
Intuitively, consider the limiting case where γ approaches α , so that if only one
product is promoted, the probability of sale of the other product approaches zero.
This means that in the two-agent case, an agent will almost never sell his product
if he shirks, provided that the other agent exerts effort. Hence, the agents’ rents
tend to zero. In contrast, in the one-agent case, when the agent exerts no effort
at all, both products will still be sold with probability α2. This implies that the
principal has to deter the agent from doing so by leaving him a non-negligible
rent.
3.3 DESIGN
Our experiment consists of four different treatments. Each treatment was run
in four sessions. Each session had 30 participants, except for one session with
28 subjects and one session with 26 subjects (due to no-shows). No subject was
allowed to participate in more than one session. In total, 474 subjects participated
in the experiment. All subjects were students of the University of Cologne from a
wide variety of fields of study. The computerized experiment was programmed
and conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and subjects were recruited using
ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). A session lasted between 30 and 40 minutes. Subjects
were paid on average 11.03e.7
In order to give subjects a monetary incentive to take their decisions seriously
and to ensure a large number of independent observations, each session consisted
of only one round; i.e., there were no repetitions and this was known to the
subjects. In each session there were subjects in the role of principals (merchants)
and other subjects in the role of agents (sales representatives). Each principal
could sell one single unit of a product 1 and one single unit of a product 2 via
7The average payment includes the show-up fee which was 4e.
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a single agent in the one-agent treatments and via two agents in the two-agent
treatments. If a product was sold, the principal obtained a revenue of R = 15e.
All interactions were anonymous; i.e., the participants did not know the identity
of the subject(s) they were playing with. At the beginning of each session, written
instructions were handed out to the subjects. Then they were given 20 minutes to
read the instructions and afterwards all participants had to answer some questions
to check that they had understood the instructions.
One-agent treatments. In each session, half of the participants are randomly
assigned to the role of principals and the others to the role of agents. Each
principal is randomly matched with one agent. There are two stages. In the first
stage, each principal offers her agent a wage scheme that can be contingent on
which products the agent has sold. In particular, the principal sets w11, w10 and
w01. For w11 the principal could choose any number between 0 and 30, while
for w10 and w01, any numbers between 0 and 15 could be chosen.8 Since the
principal obtains no revenue in the case that no product is sold, the wage w00 is
set to zero. In the second stage each agent learns the wage scheme his principal
has set. Then the agent can exert promotion effort for each of the two products. In
particular, the agent can decide whether to promote no product, only one product,
or both products. If the agent promotes a product, he has to incur promotion
costs ψ = 2e. The principal cannot observe the effort decision of her agent. The
effect of promotion effort is as follows. If no product is promoted, then each
product is sold with a probability of α = 0.4. If only one product is promoted,
the probability of sale of this product increases by ρ = 0.5, while the probability
of sale of the other product decreases by γ. If both products are promoted, then
each product is sold with probability α+ρ− γ = 0.9− γ. There is one treatment
with γ = 0.3, which implies that there is conflict between the two promotion
tasks. In another treatment we have γ = 0, such that there is no conflict between
the two tasks. Once the agent has taken the effort decisions with regard to both
8All wages could be specified with up to one decimal place. In the experiment, to avoid
unlimited losses, the feasible wage offers had to be bounded from above. The stated upper bounds
are the ones that arise naturally if also the principal is subject to limited liability. It is easy to
show that given the parameter constellations in the experiment, the principal’s limited liability
constraint will never affect the equilibrium payoffs obtained in Section 3.2.
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tasks, the probabilities of sale of the two products are fixed. According to these
probabilities the computer decides randomly, whether no, exactly one, or both
products are sold. Depending on the wage scheme and on which products are
sold, the principal’s profit is 15e(q1 + q2)−wq1q2 . The agent’s profit is given
by wq1q2 − 2e(a1 + a2) and it depends on the wage scheme, on the number of
products sold and on the effort decisions regarding both tasks.
Two-agent treatments. In each session, one third of the participants are randomly
assigned to the role of principals, another third of the participants are randomly
assigned to the role of agents A, and the others are assigned to the role of agents
B. Each principal is randomly matched with one agent A and one agent B. The
principal pays both agents according to a wage scheme that can be contingent on
which products have been sold.
There are two stages. In the first stage, each principal offers her agents A
and B a wage scheme that can be contingent on which products are sold. In
particular, each principal sets non-negative wages wA11,w
A
10, and w
A
01 for agent
A and wB11,w
B
10, and w
B
01 for agent B. For the same reasons as explained above,
the wages wA00 and w
B
00 are set to zero, while w
A
11 +w
B
11 (resp., w
A
10 +w
B
10 and
wA01+w
B
01) had to be weakly smaller than 30 (resp., 15). In the second stage, each
agent learns the wage scheme which the principal has designed. In particular, each
agent does not only learn his wage scheme, but he also learns the other agent’s
wage scheme. Then agent A can decide whether or not to promote product 1
and agent B can decide whether or not to promote product 2. Each agent has to
incur promotion costs ψ = 2e if he decides to promote his product. The effect of
promotion effort is exactly as in the one-agent treatments. There are again two
treatments, one with conflict (where γ = 0.3) and another one without conflict
(γ = 0). When both agents have taken their effort decision, the probabilities of
sale of the two products are fixed. According to these probabilities the computer
decides randomly, whether no, exactly one, or both products are sold. Depending
on the wage scheme and on how many products have been sold, the principal’s
profit is 15e(q1 + q2)−wAq1q2− wBq1q2 . The agents’ profits wAq1q2 − 2ea1 and
wBq1q2−2ea2 depend on the wage scheme, on the number of products that have
been sold, and on their respective effort decision.
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3.4 QUALITATIVE HYPOTHESES
One agent - Conflict (γ = 0.3). According to Proposition 3.1 and Lemma 3.2,
under standard theory assumptions, the agent would be induced to exert only
one effort. He would get a wage of 3.51e if only the product he is supposed to
promote is sold, and zero otherwise. As a result, the expected wage payment
would be 2.84e and the principal’s expected profit would be Πhl ≈ 12.16e.
With regard to their structures, we did not expect the wage schemes observed
in the experiment to be very close to the theoretical prediction. Taking into
consideration the results from many previous experiments,9 we anticipated that
in the laboratory, principals will leave the agents more of the surplus than what
in theory would be necessary to induce effort. Specifically, we expected that in
our experiment, the principals would set the wages such that an agent obtains a
substantial fraction of the revenue if at least one product is sold.10 This implies
that an agent who has exerted effort would not make a loss if at least one product
is sold. Yet, we thought that even these more generous wage offers would not
induce the majority of agents to exert two efforts. The reason is that agents may
be very reluctant to exert two costly efforts because of the adverse effect that
effort in one task has on the success probability of the other task. Hence, we
hypothesized that indeed many agents would exert only one effort and that there
would also be a non-negligible fraction of agents exerting no effort at all.
One agent - No conflict (γ = 0). As we can see from Proposition 3.1 and
Lemma 3.1, according to theory the agent would be induced to exert two efforts.
The theoretically predicted wage scheme is such that he would get a wage of
6.15e if both products are sold and nothing otherwise, leading to an expected
wage payment of 4.98e and to an expected profit of Πhh ≈ 22.02e for the
principal. For similar reasons as explained above, we expected the wage offers
in the experiment to be larger than in theory. In the absence of conflict, exerting
effort in one task has no adverse effect on the agent’s prospects to be successful
9For recent surveys on fairness and other-regarding preferences in experiments, see e.g.
Camerer (2003) and Fehr and Schmidt (2006).
10See also Keser and Willinger (2007) who investigate how principals set wages when con-
fronted with a moral hazard problem.
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in the other task. This means, provided that an offer is generous, the probability
to sell both products and thus to obtain a relevant share of the revenue of 30e
becomes very likely if the agent exerts two efforts. Hence, in this treatment we
actually hypothesized the wage offers to be very effective in inducing two efforts.
Two agents - Conflict (γ = 0.3). According to Proposition 3.2 and Lemma 3.3,
the theoretical prediction is that both agents would be induced to exert effort.
Moreover, an agent would get a wage of 8.70e whenever only his product is
sold and zero otherwise, such that the expected wage payment is 4.17e and the
principal’s expected profit is ΠABhh ≈ 13.83e. While we thought again that the
wages in the laboratory would be larger, we hypothesized that in line with theory,
the vast majority of agents would indeed exert effort. The reason is that in this
treatment, the agents might be very inclined to exert effort, since it increases
the probability of sale of their own product, while the adverse side effect has an
impact only on the probability of sale of the other agent’s product. Moreover, if
an agent believes that the other agent will exert effort, then his own probability of
success would be very low if he shirked.
Two agents - No conflict (γ = 0). As we can see from Proposition 3.2 and
Lemma 3.3, according to theory, both agents will exert effort. Any wage
scheme with wk00 =w
A
01 =w
B
10 = 0e such that 0.1w
A
10+0.9w
A
11 = 4e and 0.1w
B
01+
0.9wB11 = 4e would be optimal, yielding an expected wage payment of 7.20e.
The principal’s expected profit would be ΠABhh ≈ 19.80e. We expected again that
in the experiment the offered wages would be larger and that most agents would
indeed exert effort. If an offer is generous, the agent’s prospect to get a relevant
fraction of the revenue increases considerably if he exerts effort.
The preceding discussion leads us to the following qualitative hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1. In the one-agent treatment with conflict, the relative frequency of
two efforts will be much lower than in the other three treatments.
Hypothesis 2. (i) In the absence of conflict, the principals’ average profit will be
larger in the one-agent treatment than in the two-agent treatment. (ii) If there is
conflict, the principals’ average profit will be larger in the two-agent treatment
than in the one-agent treatment.
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Percentage p-value
of two efforts
One agent - Conflict vs. Two agents - Conflict 36.7% 75% 0.000
One agent - Conflict vs. One agent - No conflict 36.7% 87.7% 0.000
One agent - Conflict vs. Two agents - No conflict 36.7% 70% 0.002
One agent - No conflict vs. Two agents - Conflict 87.7% 75% 0.174
Two agents - Conflict vs. Two agents - No conflict 75% 70% 0.803
One agent - No conflict vs. Two agents - No conflict 87.7% 70% 0.039
Table 3.1: Significance levels for pairwise comparisons of the shares of two
efforts between the treatments. The table reports p-values according to two-sided
Fisher exact tests.
3.5 DATA ANALYSIS
3.5.1 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Figure 3.1 shows the frequencies of zero, one, and two efforts per treatment.11
The figure concisely illustrates the central finding of our experiment. It is striking
that in the one-agent treatment with conflict, two efforts were chosen considerably
less often than in the other three treatments. Note that in the other three treatments,
two efforts were chosen in the vast majority of the cases, while zero efforts were
hardly ever observed. In contrast, in the one-agent case with conflict, two efforts
were chosen less often than one effort, and zero efforts were observed in quite a
relevant number of cases.
As can be seen in Table 3.1, it is highly significant that in the one-agent
treatment with conflict, two efforts were chosen less often than in the other
treatments, which provides strong support for Hypothesis 1.
The principals’ average profits in the four treatments are shown in Figure 3.2.
Observe that in the absence of conflict, the principals’ average profit was notably
larger if they had only one agent instead of two. The difference is highly signifi-
11In the one-agent treatments, the average numbers of efforts are 1.13 (conflict) and 1.81 (no
conflict). In the two-agent treatments, the average numbers of efforts are 1.73 (conflict) and 1.65
(no conflict).
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Figure 3.1: Effort levels per treatment (n denotes the number of principal-agent(s)
groups per treatment). In the two-agent treatments, 86.3% (resp., 82.5%) of the
agents exerted effort if there was conflict (resp., no conflict).
cant (see Table 3.2). In line with Hypothesis 2(i), this finding provides empirical
support for the well-known result that if there is no conflict, then delegation
of several tasks to a single agent is profitable, since it gives the principal the
possibility to save agency costs. Next observe that, contrary to the theoretical pre-
diction, in the treatments with conflict the principals’ average profit was slightly
larger if only one agent instead of two was assigned to them. The difference is
not statistically significant, though. Note also that the theoretically predicted
difference between the expected profits is very small, which made it quite difficult
to find support for Hypothesis 2(ii).
Finally, the average wage payments that were made to the agents in the four
treatments are displayed in Table 3.3. As anticipated, the average payments were
larger than the expected wage payments according to standard theory. Yet, the
relative order of the magnitudes is exactly as predicted by theory. In particular,
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Figure 3.2: The principals’ average profits. Recall that the theoretically predicted
expected profits are 12.16e, 13.83e, 22.02e, and 19.80e, respectively.
Principals’ p-value n1 n2 U
average
profit (in e)
One agent - Conflict vs. Two agents - Conflict 7.50 7.20 0.713 60 40 1147.5
One agent - Conflict vs. One agent - No conflict 7.50 14.30 0.000 60 57 503
One agent - Conflict vs. Two agents - No conflict 7.50 10.70 0.006 60 40 813
One agent - No conflict vs. Two agents - Conflict 14.30 7.20 0.000 57 40 270
Two agents - Conflict vs. Two agents - No conflict 7.20 10.70 0.007 40 40 518.5
One agent - No conflict vs. Two agents - No conflict 14.30 10.70 0.000 57 40 629.5
Table 3.2: Significance levels for pairwise comparisons of the principals’ profits
between the treatments. The table reports p-values according to two-sided Mann-
Whitney-U tests.
the average wage payment in the one-agent treatment with conflict is the smallest
one, which is in line with the fact that the average number of efforts and thus also
the average number of products a principal sold were smallest in this treatment.
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One agent - Two agents - One agent - Two agents -
Conflict Conflict No conflict No conflict
Average wage payment 7.20 8.60 11.80 12.90
Theoretical prediction 2.84 4.17 4.98 7.20
Table 3.3: Average wage payments in Euro.
3.5.2 INDIVIDUAL WAGE OFFERS AND RESULTING EFFORTS
One-agent treatments. First of all, it is noteworthy that nearly all wage offers
are symmetric.12 Let us now have a closer look at the symmetric wage offers
which for both treatments are illustrated in Figure 3.3. For each offer, the figure
also shows the resulting effort choices and the optimal effort choice according
to standard theory. The three principles of contract design identified by Keser
and Willinger (2000, 2007) are very useful to give an excellent description of the
observed wage offers in our experiment. In both treatments, the wage for an agent
is always strictly larger when he sells two products than when he sells only one
product. This means that principals apply the principle of appropriateness which
requires that the payment in case of a high gain is not lower than the payment
in case of a low gain. Moreover, most of the principals offer wage schemes that
ensure non-negative payoffs to the agent in case that at least one product is sold.
For our experiment, this principle of loss avoidance means that principals are
reluctant to make wage offers smaller than 4e.13
In the treatment with (without) conflict, 85.7% (79.2%) of the wage offers
are such that w10, w01, and w11 are (weakly) larger than 4e. Finally, nearly all
wages offers are such that the profit of the principal equals at least 50% of the net
surplus. For our experiment, this requires w10 and w01 to be smaller than 9.50e
12In the treatment with conflict, only 4 out of 60 offers were asymmetric, and in the treat-
ment without conflict, 4 out of 57 offers were asymmetric. Specifically, the wage offers
(w10,w01,w11) were (8.5,0,0), (8.5,6.5,18.5), (13,6,6), and (4,2,9) in the treatment with con-
flict, and (9,5,13), (7,8,14), (10,12,29), and (4,7.5,7.5) in the treatment without conflict.
13Observe that principals were not able to fully insure agents against losses, since w00 was set
equal to 0e. Note, however, that this design is natural for our experiment, since in case that no
product is sold, the principal obtains no revenue which she could share with the agent.
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Figure 3.3: Symmetric wage schemes and resulting effort decisions in the one-
agent treatments. The actually observed effort decisions are indicated by different
colors, while the theoretically optimal effort decisions for given wage offers are
indicated by different symbols. The size of the symbols represents the number of
observations. The solid line indicates the fair-offers area. The dashed lines divide
the panels into three parts where 0, I, or II efforts are optimal given symmetric
offers.
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and w11 to be smaller than 17e.14 In the treatment with (without) conflict, 94.6%
(98.1%) of the wage offers are in line with this principle of sharing power. The
figure illustrates that the combination of these three principles characterizes a
relatively small subset of all possible wage schemes. It is remarkable that in the
treatment with (without) conflict, 82.1% (77.4%) of the symmetric wage schemes
satisfy all three principles and thus belong to this small subset of possible wage
schemes. In the wording of Keser and Willinger (2000), we will refer to this
subset of offers as the “fair-offers area.”
Now consider the treatment with conflict. Figure 3.3 makes it obvious that
if principals intended to make offers in the fair-offers area, then (according to
standard contract-theoretic reasoning) it was hardly possible to induce one effort
and it was even impossible to induce two efforts. Indeed, taking into account
all offers in the fair-offers area, no effort was the best response in 45 out of 46
cases.15 However, contrary to standard-theoretic reasoning, only six of these 45
agents exerted no effort at all, while 21 agents exerted one effort and 18 agents
exerted even two efforts. Hence, we observe that principals make generous wage
offers that theoretically do not generate incentives to exert effort, but the vast
majority of agents responds to such offers with one or even two efforts. Given
offers in the fair-offers area, agents might actually decide to exert effort because
they do not risk making a loss and they regard the offer as generous since in case
of success, they receive a relevant share of the net surplus. Agents might thus
reciprocate the principals’ generous offers by effort levels above the theoretical
predictions.16 It is also interesting to compare offers in the fair-offers area that
led to one effort with those that led to two efforts. Strikingly, when two efforts
were chosen, the difference between w11 and w10 = w01 is 8.74e, while it is
only 6.60e when one effort was chosen (p = 0.001, U = 94, n1 = 20, n2 = 22,
two-sided Mann-Whitney-U test). It seems that the stronger principals rewarded
the sale of two products compared to the sale of one product, the more inclined
14In case one product is sold, the net surplus is minimally 11e such that the principal does not
want to leave more than 5.50e + 4e to the agent. Similarly, the principal offers not more than
(30e−4e)/2+4e when two products are sold.
15There was only one offer for which it was the agent’s best response to exert one effort.
Indeed, in this case the agent exerted one effort.
16Although the agents did not face fixed wages, note that the situation is related to the gift
exchange settings studied by Akerlof (1982) and Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993).
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were agents to choose two efforts. To sum up, in the fair-offers area, agents
rewarded the principals for relatively generous offers by exerting one or even
two efforts, while the few low wage offers outside of the fair-offers area were
reciprocated with no effort.
Next consider the treatment with one agent and no conflict. Figure 3.3
illustrates that all 41 offers in the fair-offers area (77.4% of all 57 offers) were
such that it would have been the agent’s best response to exert two efforts. Indeed,
36 out of 41 agents that received an offer belonging to the fair-offers area decided
to exert two efforts. This result is robust also when we take into account all 57
offers. It was then optimal to exert two efforts in 54 cases, and 48 agents actually
decided to do so. In this treatment, it was relatively easy to make offers that
belong to the fair-offers area and at the same time create incentives to exert two
efforts. The analysis of our data shows that indeed, in the absence of conflict,
the majority of principals made such generous and also incentive-compatible
offers. The fact that the vast majority of agents exerted two efforts is not very
surprising. As can be seen in Table 3.4 in Appendix B, in the absence of conflict,
exerting two efforts led to an appreciable profit with a probability of 81% while
the probability of making a loss was only 1%. Hence, the majority of agents
seemed to perceive this strategy as promising and almost riskless and preferred it
to other strategies.
Two-agent treatments. Again we observe that nearly all wage offers are sym-
metric.17 Let us first explain Figure 3.4 which shows the symmetric wage offers.
Generally, a wage scheme consists of six single wages but since the figure is
restricted to symmetric offers, a wage offer is fully characterized by only three
wages w11 :=wA11 =w
B
11, w1 :=w
A
10 =w
B
01, and w0 :=w
A
01 =w
B
10. A pair (w11,w1)
appears in a darker shade while each corresponding pair (w11,w0) is plotted in
a lighter shade; so each single wage scheme is represented by two points in the
figure. Furthermore, a single offer is shown as a circle if – according to standard
17While in the treatment without conflict all wage offers are symmetric, there are
four asymmetric wage offers in the treatment with conflict, namely, the asymmetric of-
fers (wA10,w
A
01,w
A
11,w
B
01,w
B
10,w
B
11) are (1,1.5,2,1.5,1,2), (5,4,10,6,4,10), (4,2,7,4,0,7), and
(0,0,0,5,0,5).
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theory – both agents had a dominant strategy to exert effort, while it is shown as
a triangle if both agents had a dominant strategy not to exert effort.
Cases in which agents had no dominant strategy (indicated by a square) are
observed very rarely. The figure illustrates that for exerting effort to be a dominant
strategy, the difference between w1 and w0 had to be relatively large.18
Let us now analyze the symmetric wage offers in the treatment with conflict.
The principals made wage offers such that for 52.8% of the agent pairs, it was
a dominant strategy to exert effort, while for 36.1%, it was a dominant strategy
not to exert effort. The remaining 11.1% of offers were such that there existed no
dominant strategy. How did the agents react to these offers? The large majority
of agents exerted effort regardless of whether this was a dominant strategy or
not. Specifically, 35 out of 38 agents with the dominant strategy to exert effort
actually promoted their product.19 Moreover, when it was the optimal strategy
not to provide effort, 23 out of 26 agents still decided to promote their product.20
How may the agents’ behavior be explained? Observe that wage offers for which
exerting effort was a dominant strategy were characterized by w0 being very small
or 0e. Hence, an agent facing such an offer may have been very reluctant not to
exert effort if he feared that the other agent might exert effort. The reason is that
if an agent exerts no effort, the probability of sale of the own product becomes
very small (10%, see Table 3.5 in Appendix B) given that the other agent exerts
effort. Hence, with a probability of 90%, the shirking agent’s gain would be
0e or very small. In contrast, exerting effort might be considered an attractive
strategy since the probability of selling the own product and thereby making a
reasonable profit increases regardless of the other agent’s decision. Next observe
that nearly all wage offers for which not exerting effort was a dominant strategy
were characterized by w0 equal to 2e or even larger. This observation may help
to explain why most of the agents exerted effort even if the dominant strategy
18This becomes apparent by the fact that the vertical distance between the dark and light
circles (indicating a dominant strategy to exert effort) is relatively large, while the vertical distance
between the dark and light triangles (indicating a dominant strategy not to exert effort) is relatively
small.
19This led to two efforts in 84.2% and to one effort in 15.8% of the principal-agent triads.
20This led to two efforts in 76.9% and to one effort in 23.1% of the principal-agent triads. With
regard to the eight agents that had no dominant strategy, we observe four agents that promoted
their product.
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Figure 3.4: Symmetric wage schemes and resulting effort decisions in the two-
agent treatments. Symmetric offers are fully characterized by three wages w11 :=
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B
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number of observations.
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was not to exert effort. By promoting their product, agents could reciprocate
these generous wage offers that insured them against making losses and at the
same time, they further increased their chance to obtain a reasonable share of the
revenue.
Taking a look at the treatment without conflict, wage offers were such that
82.5% of the agent pairs had the dominant strategy to promote their product,
12.5% had the dominant strategy not to promote their product, and the remaining
5% had no dominant strategy. A telling number of 60 agents (out of 66) with a
dominant strategy to provide effort actually promoted their product. There were
only ten agents with a dominant strategy not to promote their product, and seven
of them decided not to exert effort. Also in this treatment, the decision to exert
effort seemed to be an attractive strategy, because it promised a reasonable profit,
the probability of a loss was very small, and the agents could again reward the
principal for making fair wage offers.21
3.6 DISCUSSION
In theoretical principal-agent models, inducing a single agent to invest effort in
two conflicting tasks is difficult for the principal, because the agent anticipates that
exerting effort in one task directly undermines the probability of success regarding
the other task. This has led us to formulate Hypothesis 1 according to which in the
one-agent treatment with conflict, the relative frequency of two efforts should be
much lower than in the other treatments. Indeed, our experimental results provide
strong support for this hypothesis: in the one-agent treatment with conflict, only
36.7% of the agents chose two efforts while in all other treatments, two efforts
were observed in at least 70% of the cases. This shows that the theoretically
predicted incentive problem is of high relevance in the laboratory. Nevertheless,
a relevant share of agents decides to exert two efforts even in the presence of
conflict. Our analysis in Section 3.5.2 has shown that agents that chose two
21As can be seen in Figure 3.4, in this treatment w0 is more often equal to zero than in the
treatment with conflict. This might be due to the fact that in the absence of conflict, an agent’s
probability of not selling his product was very small when he exerted effort.
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efforts were those who were offered very generous wage schemes. While offers
that led to two efforts were mostly very generous offers in the fair-offers area,
they did not satisfy the incentive constraints for choosing two efforts. This means
that in the experiment, agents often reciprocated generous offers by exerting two
efforts although their best reply according to the incentive constraints would have
been different. To sum up, incentive problems due to conflicting tasks are also
prevalent in the lab, but the strength of this problem seems to be weaker when
principals try to trigger reciprocity by very fair and generous offers.
The observation that in the lab, the incentive problem seems not to be as strong
as in theory can help to explain why we cannot find support for Hypothesis 2(ii).
For our parameter constellation, theory predicts that in the presence of conflict,
the principal’s expected profit is larger when she employs two agents instead of
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one. The fact that this result is not supported by our data can be attributed to
two reasons. Given the parameter constellation of our experiment and conflicting
tasks, in theory the principal will never induce two efforts with one agent, while
in the experiment, two efforts are observed in 36.7% of the cases. Moreover, as
illustrated in Figure 3.5, when two agents are assigned to the principal, in sum
she pays the agents more and thus gives up a larger share of the total surplus.22 In
fact, when there are two agents, due to fairness considerations the principal tends
to give up considerably more than half of the net surplus while if she has only
one agent, she tends to keep at least half of the net surplus for herself. These two
facts may explain why in contrast to the theoretical prediction, in the treatments
with conflict the principal is better off with one agent than with two agents.
3.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS
While multi-task principal-agent models have attracted considerable attention by
contract theorists in recent years, there is scarce experimental evidence on the
problems involved. In this chapter we focus on incentive problems that arise when
tasks are in direct conflict with each other. In theory, inducing a single agent to
invest effort in two conflicting tasks is difficult for the principal, because the agent
anticipates that exerting effort in one task directly undermines the probability of
success regarding the other task.
Our experimental results provide strong support for the relevance of this
incentive problem. Subjects in the experiment were indeed reluctant to invest
simultaneously in two different tasks that are in conflict with each other. While
efforts in both conflicting tasks were observed significantly more often when the
tasks were assigned to two different agents, some principals even succeeded in
inducing a single agent to exert efforts in both tasks by making very generous
wage offers. In contrast, if the tasks were unrelated, two efforts were observed in
the vast majority of cases, regardless of whether a single agent or two different
agents were in charge of the tasks.
22Note that in the two-agent treatments, for any state of nature (one or two products sold), the
sum of the wages offered to the agents is on average larger than the respective wage offered to a
single agent. The differences are statistically significant on the 5% level according to one-sided
Mann-Whitney-U tests.
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It might be a promising avenue for future research to conduct experiments in
which principals can choose how many agents they want to employ to perform
different tasks that may be in conflict with each other. It would then be interesting
to see whether agents perceive a principal’s choice to employ two agents when
the tasks are conflicting as an unfriendly act. An agent may be demotivated if
he knows that the principal intentionally employs another agent whose effort
frustrates his own effort. Moreover, it would be interesting to investigate whether
our results remain robust when agents face real effort tasks.23
23Note that Brüggen and Strobel (2007) investigate experimentally real effort and chosen
effort where participants choose increasingly costly effort levels. They find that the results support
equivalence between real and chosen effort.
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3.8 APPENDIX A: PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 3.1. First observe that given that the wages cannot be neg-
ative, the agent’s participation constraint is redundant as it is implied by (IC
3). It is immediate to verify that given the symmetry of the problem, it is
optimal for the principal to set w10 = w01 = w1. Then it is straightforward to
show that w00 must be equal to zero. Thus, the reduced problem is to minimize
E
[
wq1q2 | a1 = a2 = 1
]
= (α+ρ−γ)2w11+2(α+ρ−γ)(1−α−ρ+γ)w1 sub-
ject to the constraints w11 ≥ 0,w1 ≥ 0,
(α+ρ− γ)2w11+2(α+ρ− γ)(1−α−ρ+ γ)w1−2ψ ≥ (IC 1)
(α+ρ)(α− γ)w11+(α+ρ)(1−α+ γ)w1+
(α− γ)(1−α−ρ)w1−ψ,
(α+ρ− γ)2w11+2(α+ρ− γ)(1−α−ρ+ γ)w1−2ψ ≥ (IC 3)
α2w11+2α(1−α)w1.
Now it is easy to see that w1 = 0 is optimal. To show this, consider a wage scheme
w11,w1 > 0. Then the LHS of the two incentive constraints are unchanged if
we change this wage scheme such that ∆w1 =−∆w11 α+ρ−γ2(1−α−ρ+γ) < 0. But now
the RHS of both incentive constraints are relaxed which enables the principal to
reduce the expected compensation by reducing w1. She can do so until w1 = 0.
Then it turns out that (IC 3) is binding which implies w11 =
2ψ
(α+ρ−γ)2−α2 .
Proof of Lemma 3.2. In analogy to Lemma 3.1, it turns out that the par-
ticipation constraint is redundant and that w00 = 0 is optimal. In what fol-
lows, we can ignore (IC 2). Let us verify that w01 = 0 is optimal. Consider a
wage scheme with w11,w10,w01 > 0. If we change this wage scheme such that
∆w01 =−∆w10 (α+ρ)(1−α+γ)(1−α−ρ)(α−γ) < 0, the LHS of the two remaining incentive con-
straints are unchanged, while both RHS are relaxed. So the principal can increase
her expected profit by lowering w01 until w01 = 0. In the same way it is straight-
forward to show that it is optimal to set w11 = 0. To see this, consider a wage
scheme with w11 > 0,w10. Then the LHS of the two incentive constraints remain
unchanged if we change this wage scheme such that ∆w11 =−∆w10 1−α+γα−γ < 0.
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Given this new wage scheme, the RHS of the two incentive constraints are relaxed
which implies that the principal can increase her expected profit by lowering w11.
She can do so until w11 = 0. It is then immediate to see that the claimed solution
satisfies all the constraints.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Observe that given the wages cannot be negative, each
agent’s participation constraint is redundant as it is implied by the agent’s incen-
tive compatibility constraint. It is straightforward to show that wA00 = w
B
00 = 0.
Moreover it is immediate to verify that given the symmetry of the problem, we
can solve the problem for one agent and the other agent will receive the same in-
centive scheme; i.e., wA11 = w
B
11, w
A
10 = w
B
01, and w
A
01 = w
B
10. Let us w.l.o.g. derive
the optimal incentive scheme for agent A. The reduced problem is to minimize
(α+ρ− γ)2wA11+(α+ρ− γ)(1−α−ρ+ γ)(wA10+wA01) subject to wAq1q2 ≥ 0
and
(α+ρ− γ)2wA11+(α+ρ− γ)(1−α−ρ+ γ)(wA10+wA01)−ψ ≥ (IC A)
(α− γ)(α+ρ)wA11+(α− γ)(1−α−ρ)wA10+(α+ρ)(1−α+ γ)wA01.
It is immediate to verify that in the optimal incentive scheme wA01 = 0 must
hold. To see this consider a wage scheme wA11,w
A
10,w
A
01 > 0. The LHS of the incen-
tive constraint remains unchanged if we change this wage scheme in the following
way: ∆wA01 = −∆wA10 < 0. But this relaxes the RHS of the incentive constraint
and hence enables us to lower the expected compensation by reducing wA01 until
wA01 = 0. In the next step we can show that w
A
11 = 0 is optimal. To see this consider
a wage scheme wA11 > 0,w
A
10. The LHS of the incentive constraint remains un-
changed if we change this wage scheme such that ∆wA11 =−∆wA10 1−α−ρ+γα+ρ−γ < 0.
This relaxes the RHS of the incentive constraint and thus makes it possible
to lower the expected compensation by reducing wA11. This can be done until
wA11 = 0. Then the result follows immediately.
Proof of Lemma 3.4. In analogy to Lemma 3.3, the participation constraint
is redundant and wA00 = 0. To verify that w
A
01 = 0 is optimal, consider a wage
scheme with wA11,w
A
10,w
A
01 > 0. If we change this wage scheme such that ∆w
A
01 =
−∆wA10 (α+ρ)(1−α+γ)(1−α−ρ)(α−γ) < 0, the LHS of the incentive constraint remains unchanged,
while the RHS of the incentive constraint is relaxed. So the principal can increase
her expected profit by lowering wA01 until w
A
01 = 0. Next, let us show that w
A
11 =
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0. To see this, consider a wage scheme with wA11 > 0,w
A
10. The LHS of the
incentive constraint remains unchanged if we change this wage scheme such
that ∆wA11 = −∆wA10 1−α+γα−γ < 0. Given this new wage scheme, the RHS of the
incentive constraint is relaxed which means that the principal can increase her
expected profit by lowering wA11. She can do so until w
A
11 = 0. The lemma follows
immediately.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. We have to show that it cannot be optimal for the
principal to induce only one effort. To show this, assume the contrary. This
means the two conditions ΠABhl >Π
AB
hh and Π
AB
hl >Π
AB
ll must be satisfied. The for-
mer condition can be rewritten as R < 2ψ(α+ρ−γ)(1−α−ρ+γ)[(α+ρ−γ)(1−α−ρ+γ)−(α−γ)(1−α−ρ)](ρ−γ) −
ψ(α+ρ)(1−α+γ)
[αγ+ρ(1−α+γ)](ρ−γ) and the latter can be rewritten as R >
ψ(α+ρ)(1−α+γ)
[αγ+ρ(1−α+γ)](ρ−γ) .
This implies that the RHS of the former condition must be larger than the RHS
of the latter, which is equivalent to (1−α)2+α2+α(ρ− γ)+(1−α−ρ)γ <
(1−α)ρ. But this inequality cannot hold under our assumptions. Hence, the two
conditions ΠABhl >Π
AB
hh and Π
AB
hl >Π
AB
ll cannot be satisfied simultaneously. Then
the proposition follows immediately.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. If the principal implements ai = 1 and a j 6=i = 0 in the
one-agent scenario, then she would prefer to have two agents and to implement
a1 = a2 = 1. To see this, suppose it is optimal for the principal to implement ai = 1
and a j 6=i = 0 in the one-agent scenario. Then Πhl > Πll holds. But this means
that in the two-agent scenario ΠABhl > Π
AB
ll must be satisfied, since Πhl = Π
AB
hl
and Πll = ΠABll . But we know from Proposition 3.2 that if Π
AB
hl > Π
AB
ll , then
ΠABhh >Π
AB
hl =Πhl.
It remains to be shown that there exists a unique γˆ ∈ (0,min{α,ρ}) such
that Πhh(γˆ) = ΠABhh (γˆ). Observe that Πhh−ΠABhh > 0 if γ = 0 and Πhh−ΠABhh <
0 if γ = min{α,ρ} . Moreover, the condition Πhh−ΠABhh > 0 is equivalent to
f (·) := γ(3αρ + ρ2 +α2− ρ − 2α)+ γ2(1−α − ρ)+ ρα − ρα2− ρ2α > 0.
The derivative of f (·) with respect to γ is given by d f (·)dγ = (2γ −α − ρ)(1−
α −ρ)− (1−ρ)α < 0. Hence, a simple intermediate value argument implies
that there exists a unique γˆ ∈ (0,min{α,ρ}) such that Πhh(γˆ) = ΠABhh (γˆ). The
remainder of the proposition follows immediately from Proposition 3.1 and
Proposition 3.2.
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3.9 APPENDIX B: PROBABILITIES OF SALE
No effort Effort in task 1 Effort in task 2 Efforts in both tasks
No product sold 36% 6% 6% 1%
Only product A sold 24% 54% 4% 9%
Only product B sold 24% 4% 54% 9%
Both products sold 16% 36% 36% 81%
Table 3.4: Probabilities of sale in the no-conflict treatments.
No effort Effort in task 1 Effort in task 2 Efforts in both tasks
No product sold 36% 9% 9% 16%
Only product A sold 24% 81% 1% 24%
Only product B sold 24% 1% 81% 24%
Both products sold 16% 9% 9% 36%
Table 3.5: Probabilities of sale in the conflict treatments.
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 Supplementary material 
 
The following instructions and comprehension questions were handed out to the participants in the treatment 
with one agent and conflict ( ): 
 
Experimental instructions 
 
In this experiment, you can earn money. Your payoff depends on your decisions and on other 
participants’ decisions. 
 
During the whole experiment communication is not allowed. If you have a question, please 
raise your hand out of the cabin. All decisions are anonymous; i.e., no participant ever learns 
the identity of a person who has made a particular decision. The payment is conducted 
anonymously, too; i.e., no participant learns what the payoff of another participant is. 
 
In this experiment, you will either be a merchant or a sales representative with equal 
probability. Each merchant is matched with exactly one sales representative. As soon as the 
experiment starts, you will learn whether you have been assigned to the role of a merchant or 
to the role of a sales representative. 
 
The merchant can sell exactly one unit of a product A and exactly one unit of a product B via 
his sales representative. Product A and product B are similar. The merchant receives a 
revenue of 15 Euro for each product sold. He can pay his sales representative a wage 
depending on the number of products sold. 
(Suppose that the costs the merchant had to incur when purchasing the products are not 
relevant in this experiment. Furthermore, the merchant does not have to bear any 
stockkeeping costs if product A or product B is not sold.) 
 
The sales representative can promote each product A and B individually. If the sales 
representative does not promote any product, the probability of sale of each product is 40%. If 
the sales representative promotes a product, the probability of sale of this product increases by 
50 percentage points while the probability of sale of the other product decreases by 30 
percentage points. The sales representative can either promote no product, or promote exactly 
one product, or promote both products. Depending on the number of products promoted, the 
probabilities of sale read as follows: 
 
- If the sales representative does not promote any product, then each product will be 
sold with a probability of 40%. 
- If the sales representative promotes only product A, then product A will be sold with a 
probability of 40% + 50% = 90%, and product B will be sold with a probability of 
40% - 30% = 10%. 
- If the sales representative promotes only product B, then product B will be sold with a 
probability of 40% + 50% = 90%, and product A will be sold with a probability of 
40% - 30% = 10%. 
- If the sales representative promotes both products, then product A and product B will 
be sold with a probability of 40% + 50% - 30% = 60% each. 
 
As the products are similar, promotion for one product does not only have a positive effect on 
the probability of sale of the promoted product, but it has also a negative effect on the 
probability of sale of the other product. 
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  No promotion for product B Promotion for product B 
No promotion for product A 40%, 40% 10%, 90% 
Promotion for product A 90%, 10% 60%, 60% 
In each cell, the first number denotes the probability of sale of product A, while the second number denotes the 
probability of sale of product B. 
 
If the sales representative promotes a product, he has to incur promotion costs of 2 Euro; i.e. 
promoting both products causes promotion costs PC = 2 Euro + 2 Euro = 4 Euro, while 
promoting one product causes promotion costs PC = 2 Euro. If he promotes no product, he 
has to incur no promotion costs (PC = 0). 
 
The merchant cannot observe whether his sales representative decides to promote a 
product or not. Thus, the merchant cannot condition his wage offer on the sales 
representative’s promotion decision but only on the number of products sold. 
 
In detail, the experiment proceeds as follows: 
 
The experiment consists of only a single period.  
This period consists of two stages. 
 
Stage 1 – Merchant decides on wage offers 
 
The merchant offers his sales representative wages depending on the number of 
products sold. There are four possible cases. For each case, the merchant can specify one 
wage: 
1. Neither product A nor product B are sold  wage w00 
2. Only product A but not product B is sold  wage w10 
3. Only product B but not product A is sold  wage w01 
4. Both products A and B are sold  wage w11 
As the merchant obtains no revenue in case 1, the wage w00 is fixed at 0 Euro. In the cases 2, 
3, and 4, the merchant has to set the wages w10, w01, and w11 (see Figure 1 on the last page).  
(All wages can be specified with up to one decimal place. Please use points instead of 
commas as decimal separators.) 
 
 
Stage 2 – Sales representative decides on promotion 
 
The sales representative learns his merchant’s wage offers w00 = 0, w10, w01, and w11. He can 
decide whether to promote no product, only product A, only product B, or whether to 
promote both products A and B (see Figure 2 on the last page). 
 
Once the sales representative has decided on his promotion effort, the probabilities of sale of 
the products are determined (as described above). According to these probabilities, the 
computer decides randomly whether no, exactly one, or both products are sold. 
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 Diagram of the experiment: 
 
 
The profits are as follows: 
 
Sale of merchant’s profit sales rep.’s profit 
no product 0 - w00 = 0 w00 - PC = 0 - PC 
only product A 15 - w10 w10 - PC 
only product B 15 - w01 w01- PC 
product A and product B 30 - w11 w11 - PC 
 
 
Your payoff: 
In addition to the (possibly negative) profit realized in the experiment you get 4 Euro and the 
resulting amount is paid out to you in cash.  
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Figure 1: Stage 1 – Merchant decides on wage offers 
 
Figure 2: Stage 2 – Sales representative decides on promotion effort 
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 Comprehension questions 
 
Question 1: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1. Promoting a product increases the probability of sale of this product and decreases the 
probability of sale of the other product. 
2. Promoting a product increases the probability of sale of this product and increases the 
probability of sale of the other product. 
3. Promoting a product decreases the probability of sale of this product and increases the 
probability of sale of the other product. 
4. Promoting a product increases the probability of sale of this product and has no effect on the 
probability of sale of the other product. 
 
Question 2: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1. The merchant offers his sales representative exactly one wage. 
2. The merchant can offer his sales representative different wages depending on the number of 
products sold. 
3. The sales representative can demand a wage from the merchant. 
 
Question 3: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1. Suppose you are the sales representative. Once you have decided on your promotion effort, 
you know exactly how many products will be sold. 
2. Suppose you are the sales representative. Once  you have decided on your promotion effort, 
the probabilities of sale depend on the magnitude of the wages. 
3. Suppose you are the sales representative. Once  you have decided on your promotion effort, 
you know the probabilites of sale of both products. 
 
Question 4: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1. The merchant can condition his wages on whether the sales representative has promoted the 
products. 
2. The merchant can offer wages conditional on the number of products sold. 
3. The merchant can offer wages conditional on the probabilities of sale of the products. 
4. The sales representative sets the wages. 
 
Question 5: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1. Wage w10 is paid if no product is sold. 
2. Wage w10 is paid if only product A but not product B is sold. 
3. Wage w10 is paid if both products are sold. 
4. Wage w10 is paid if only product B but not product A is sold. 
 
Question 6: 
What is the probability that only product B is sold when the sales representative promotes only 
product A? 
 
Question 7: 
What is the probability that wage w10 is paid when the sales representative promotes both products? 
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 The following instructions and comprehension questions were handed out to the participants in the treatment 
with one agent and without conflict ( ): 
 
Experimental instructions  
 
In this experiment, you can earn money. Your payoff depends on your decisions and on other 
participants’ decisions. 
 
During the whole experiment communication is not allowed. If you have a question, please 
raise your hand out of the cabin. All decisions are anonymous; i.e., no participant ever learns 
the identity of a person who has made a particular decision. The payment is conducted 
anonymously, too; i.e., no participant learns what the payoff of another participant is.  
 
In this experiment, you will either be a merchant or a sales representative with equal 
probability. Each merchant is matched with exactly one sales representative. As soon as the 
experiment starts, you will learn whether you have been assigned to the role of a merchant or 
to the role of a sales representative. 
 
The merchant can sell exactly one unit of a product A and exactly one unit of a product B via 
his sales representative. The merchant receives a revenue of 15 Euro for each product sold. He 
can pay his sales representative a wage depending on the number of products sold.  
(Suppose that the costs the merchant had to incur when purchasing the products are not 
relevant in this experiment. Furthermore, the merchant does not have to bear any 
stockkeeping costs if product A or product B is not sold.) 
 
The sales representative can promote each product A and B individually. If the sales 
representative does not promote any product, the probability of sale of each product is 40%. If 
the sales representative promotes a product, the probability of sale of this product increases by 
50 percentage points. The sales representative can either promote no product, or promote 
exactly one product, or promote both products. Depending on the number of products 
promoted, the probabilities of sale read as follows: 
 
- If the sales representative does not promote any product, then each product will be 
sold with a probability of 40%. 
- If the sales representative promotes only product A, then product A will be sold with a 
probability of 40% + 50% = 90%, while product B still will be sold with a probability 
of 40%. 
- If the sales representative promotes only product B, then product B will be sold with a 
probability of 40% + 50% = 90%, while product A still will be sold with a probability 
of 40%. 
- If the sales representative promotes both products, then product A and product B will 
be sold with a probability of 40% + 50% = 90% each. 
 
 Probability of sale of the product 
No promotion for a product 40% 
Promotion for a product 90% 
 
If a sales representative promotes a product, he has to incur promotion costs of 2 Euro, i.e. 
promoting both products causes promotion costs PC = 2 Euro + 2 Euro = 4 Euro, while 
promoting one product causes promotion costs PC = 2 Euro. If he promotes no product, he 
has to incur no promotion costs (PC = 0). 
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 The merchant cannot observe whether his sales representative decides to promote a 
product or not. Thus, the merchant cannot condition his wage offer on the sales 
representative’s promotion decision but only on the number of products sold. 
 
In detail, the experiment proceeds as follows: 
 
The experiment consists of only a single period.  
This period consists of two stages. 
 
Stage 1 – Merchant decides on wage offers 
 
The merchant offers his sales representative wages depending on the number of 
products sold. There are four possible cases. For each case, the merchant can specify one 
wage: 
1. Neither product A nor product B are sold  wage w00 
2. Only product A but not product B is sold  wage w10 
3. Only product B but not product A is sold  wage w01 
4. Both products A and B are sold  wage w11 
As the merchant obtains no revenue in case 1, the wage w00 is fixed at 0 Euro. In the cases 2, 
3, and 4, the merchant has to set the wages w10, w01, and w11 (see Figure 1 on the last page).  
(All wages can be specified with up to one decimal place. Please use points instead of 
commas as decimal separators.) 
 
 
Stage 2 – Sales representative decides on promotion  
 
The sales representative learns his merchant’s wage offers w00 = 0, w10, w01, and w11. He can 
decide whether to promote no product, only product A, only product B, or whether to 
promote both products A and B (see Figure 2 on the last page). 
 
Once the sales representative has decided on his promotion effort, the probabilities of sale of 
the products are determined (as described above). According to these probabilities, the 
computer decides randomly whether no, exactly one, or both products are sold. 
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 Diagram of the experiment: 
 
 
The profits are specified as follows: 
 
Sale of merchant's profit sales rep.'s profit 
no product 0 - w00 = 0 w00 - PC = 0 - PC 
only product A 15 - w10 w10 -  PC 
only product B 15 - w01 w01- PC 
product A and product B 30 - w11 w11 -  PC 
 
 
Your payoff: 
In addition to the (possibly negative) profit realized in the experiment you get 4 Euro and the 
resulting amount is paid out to you in cash.  
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 Figure 1: Stage 1 – Merchant decides on wage offers 
 
Figure 2: Stage 2  – Sales representative decides on promotion  
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 Comprehension questions 
 
Question 1: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1. Promoting a product increases the probability of sale of this product. 
2. Promoting a product decreases the probability of sale of this product. 
3. Promoting a product has no effect on the probability of sale of this product. 
 
Question 2: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1. The merchant offers his sales representative exactly one wage. 
2. The merchant can offer his sales representative different wages depending on the number of 
products sold. 
3. The sales representative can demand a wage from the merchant. 
 
Question 3: 
Which of the following statements is true. 
1. Suppose you are the sales representative. Once you have decided on your promotion effort, 
you know exactly how many products will be sold. 
2. Suppose you are the sales representative. Once you have decided on your promotion effort, the 
probabilities of sale depend on the magnitude of the wages. 
3. Suppose you are the sales representative. Once you have decided on your promotion effort, 
you know the probabilities of sale. 
 
Question 4: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1. The merchant can condition his wages on whether the sales representative has promoted the 
products. 
2. The merchant can offer wages conditional on the number of products sold. 
3. The merchant can offer wages conditional on the probabilities of sale of the products. 
4. The sales representative sets the wages. 
 
Question 5: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1. Wage w10 is paid if no product is sold. 
2. Wage w10 is paid if only product A but not product B is sold. 
3. Wage w10 is paid if both products are sold. 
4. Wage w10 is paid if only product B but not product A is sold. 
 
Question 6: 
What is the probability that only product B is sold when the sales representative promotes only 
product A? 
 
Question 7: 
What is the probability that wage w10 is paid when the sales representative promotes both products? 
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 The following instructions and comprehension questions were handed out to the participants in the treatment 
with two agents and conflict ( ): 
 
Experimental instructions 
 
In this experiment, you can earn money. Your payoff depends on your decisions and on other 
participants’ decisions. 
 
During the whole experiment communication is not allowed. If you have a question, please 
raise your hand out of the cabin. All decisions are anonymous; i.e., no participant ever learns 
the identity of a person who has made a particular decision. The payment is conducted 
anonymously, too; i.e., no participant learns what the payoff of another participant is. 
 
 
In this experiment, you will either be a merchant with a probability of one-third or a sales 
representative with a probability of two-thirds. Every merchant is matched with two sales 
representatives (sales representative A and sales representative B). As soon as the experiment 
starts, you will learn whether you have been assigned to the role of a merchant or to the role 
of a sales representative. 
 
The merchant can sell exactly one unit of a product A via sales representative A and exactly 
one unit of a product B via sales representative B. Product A and product B are similar. The 
merchant receives a revenue of 15 Euro for each product sold. He can pay his sales 
representatives wages depending on the number of products sold. 
(Suppose that the costs the merchant had to incur when purchasing the products are not 
relevant in this experiment. Furthermore, the merchant does not have to bear any 
stockkeeping costs if product A or product B is not sold.) 
 
Each sales representative (sales representative A and sales representative B, respectively) can 
decide whether he wants to promote his product (product A and product B, respectively). If no 
sales representative promotes his product, the probability of sale of each product is 40%. If a 
sales representative promotes his product, the probability of sale of his product increases by 
50 percentage points while the probability of sale of the other sales representative’s product 
decreases by 30 percentage points. Each sales representative can decide whether to promote 
his product or not. The resulting probabilities of sale depend on whether no sales 
representative, one sales representative, or both sales representatives promote their 
respective product: 
 
- If no sales representative promotes his product, then each product will be sold with a 
probability of 40%. 
- If sales representative A promotes his product and sales representative B does not 
promote his product, then product A will be sold with a probability of 40% + 50% = 
90%, and product B will be sold with a probability of 40% - 30% = 10%. 
- If sales representative B promotes his product and sales representative A does not 
promote his product, then product B will be sold with a probability of 40% + 50% = 
90%, and product A will be sold with a probability of 40% - 30% = 10%. 
- If both sales representatives promote their respective product, then product A and 
product B will be sold with a probability of 40% + 50% - 30% = 60% each. 
 
As the products are similar, promotion effort for one product does not only have a positive 
effect on the probability of sale of the promoted product, but it has also a negative effect on 
the probability of sale of the other product. 
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   Sales representative B 
  does not promote product 
B 
promotes product 
B 
does not promote 
product A 
40%, 40% 10%, 90% Sales 
representative A promotes product A 90%, 10% 60%, 60% 
 In each cell, the first number denotes the probability of sale of product A, while the 
second number denotes the probability of sale of product B. 
 
If a sales representative promotes his product, he has to incur promotion costs PC = 2 Euro. If 
a sales representative does not promote his product, he does not have to incur promotion costs 
(PC = 0 Euro). 
 
The merchant cannot observe whether his sales representatives decide to promote their 
products or not. Thus, the merchant cannot condition his wage offers on the sales 
representatives’ promotion decisions but only on the number of products sold. A sales 
representative also cannot observe the promotion decision of the other sales 
representative. 
 
In detail, the experiment proceeds as follows: 
 
The experiment consists of only a single period.  
This period consists of two stages. 
 
Stage 1 – Merchant decides on wage offers 
 
The merchant offers his sales representatives wages depending on the number of 
products sold. There are four possible cases. For each case, the merchant can specify one 
wage: 
1. neither product A nor product B are sold  
 wage  for sales representative A and  for sales representative B 
2. only product A but not product B is sold 
 wage for sales representative A and  for sales representative B 
3. only product B but not product A is sold 
 wage  for sales representative A and  for sales representative B 
4. both products A and B are sold  
 wage  for sales representative A and  for sales representative B 
As the merchant obtains no revenue in case 1, the wages  and  are fixed at 0 Euro. In 
the cases 2, 3, and 4, the merchant has to set the wages  and ,  and ,  and 
 for his sales representatives A and B (see Figure 1 on the last page).  
(All wages can be specified with up to one decimal place. Please use points instead of 
commas as decimal separators.) 
 
Stage 2 – Sales representatives A and B decide on promotion 
 
The sales representatives A and B learn every wage offer the merchant has made in stage 1. 
Thus, a sales representative knows the wages he may receive as well as the wages that the 
merchant may pay to the other sales representative.  
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 Each sales representative then can decide whether to promote his product or not (see 
Figure 2 on the last page). 
 
Once the sales representatives have decided on their promotion effort, the probabilities of sale 
of the products are determined (as described above). According to these probabilities, the 
computer decides randomly whether no, exactly one, or both products are sold. 
 
Diagram of the experiment: 
 
The profits are as follows: 
 
Sale of merchant’s 
profit 
sales rep. A’s profit sales rep. B’s profit 
no product    
only product A    
only product B    
product A and product B    
 
Your payoff: 
In addition to the (possibly negative) profit realized in the experiment you get 4 Euro and the 
resulting amount is paid out to you in cash.  
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 Figure 1: Stage 1 – Merchant decides on wage offers 
 
Figure 2: Stage 2 – Sales representatives A and B decide on promotion 
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 Comprehension questions 
 
Question 1: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1. Promoting a product increases the probability of sale of this product and decreases the 
probability of sale of the other product. 
2. Promoting a product increases the probability of sale of this product and increases the 
probability of sale of the other product. 
3. Promoting a product decreases the probability of sale of this product and increases the 
probability of sale of the other product. 
4. Promoting a product increases the probability of sale of this product and has no effect on the 
probability of sale of the other product. 
 
Question 2: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
1. The merchant offers his sales representatives exactly one wage. 
2. The merchant can offer his sales representatives different wages depending on the number of 
products sold. 
3. The sales representatives can demand a wage from the merchant. 
 
Question 3: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1. Suppose you are a sales representative. Once you have decided on your promotion effort, you 
know exactly how many products will be sold. 
2. Suppose you are a sales representative. Once you have decided on your promotion effort, the 
probabilities of sale depend on the magnitude of the wages. 
3. Suppose you are a sales representative. Once you have decided on your promotion effort, the 
probabilities of sale depend on the promotion effort decision of the other sales representative. 
 
Question 4: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1. The merchant can condition his wages on whether the sales representatives have promoted the 
products. 
2. The merchant can offer wages conditional on the number of products sold. 
3. The merchant can offer wages conditional on the probabilities of sale of the products. 
4. The sales representatives set the wages. 
 
Question 5: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1. Wage  is paid if no product is sold. 
2. Wage  is paid to sales representative A if only product A but not product B is sold. 
3. Wage  is paid to sales representative B if both products are sold. 
4. Wage  is paid to sales representative B if only product B but not product A is sold. 
 
Question 6: 
What is the probability that only product B is sold when sales representative A promotes product A 
but sales representative B does not promote product B? 
 
Question 7: 
What is the probability that wage  is paid if both sales representatives promote their respective 
product? 
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 The following instructions and comprehension questions were handed out to the participants in the treatment 
with two agents and without conflict ( ): 
 
Experimental instructions 
 
In this experiment, you can earn money. Your payoff depends on your decisions and on other 
participants’ decisions. 
 
During the whole experiment communication is not allowed. If you have a question, please 
raise your hand out of the cabin. All decisions are anonymous; i.e., no participant ever learns 
the identity of a person who has made a particular decision. The payment is conducted 
anonymously, too; i.e., no participant learns what the payoff of another participant is. 
 
In this experiment, you will either be a merchant with a probability of one-third or a sales 
representative with a probability of two-thirds. Every merchant is matched with two sales 
representatives (sales representative A and sales representative B). As soon as the experiment 
starts, you will learn whether you have been assigned to the role of a merchant or to the role 
of a sales representative. 
 
The merchant can sell exactly one unit of a product A via sales representative A and exactly 
one unit of a product B via sales representative B. The merchant receives a revenue of 15 
Euro for each product sold. He can pay his sales representatives wages depending on the 
number of products sold. 
(Suppose that the costs the merchant had to incur when purchasing the products are not 
relevant in this experiment. Furthermore, the merchant does not have to bear any 
stockkeeping costs if product A or product B is not sold.) 
 
Each sales representative (sales representative A and sales representative B, respectively) can 
decide whether he wants to promote his product (product A and product B, respectively). If no 
sales representative promotes his product, the probability of sale of each product is 40%. If a 
sales representative promotes his product, the probability of sale of his product increases by 
50 percentage points. Each sales representative can decide whether to promote his product or 
not. The resulting probabilities of sale depend on whether no sales representative, one sales 
representative, or both sales representatives promote their respective product. 
 
- If no sales representative promotes his product, then each product will be sold with a 
probability of 40%. 
- If sales representative A promotes his product and sales representative B does not 
promote his product, then product A will be sold with a probability of 40% + 50% = 
90%, and product B still will be sold with a probability of 40%. 
- If sales representative B promotes his product and sales representative A does not 
promote his product, then product B will be sold with a probability of 40% + 50% = 
90%, and product A still will be sold with a probability of 40%. 
- If both sales representatives promote their respective product, then product A and 
product B will be sold with a probability of 40% + 50% = 90% each. 
 
 
Sales representative A Probability of sale of product A 
does not promote product A 40% 
promotes product A 90% 
 
3.10. Appendix C: Instructions
99
 Sales representative B Probability of sale of product B 
does not promote product B 40% 
promotes product B 90% 
 
If a sales representative promotes his product, he has to incur promotion costs PC = 2 Euro. If 
a sales representative does not promote his product, he does not have to incur promotion costs 
(PC = 0 Euro). 
 
The merchant cannot observe whether his sales representatives decide to promote their 
products or not. Thus, the merchant cannot condition his wage offers on the sales 
representatives’ promotion decisions but only on the number of products sold. A sales 
representative also cannot observe the promotion decision of the other sales 
representative. 
 
In detail, the experiment proceeds as follows: 
 
The experiment consists of only a single period.  
This period consists of two stages. 
 
Stage 1 – Merchant decides on wage offers 
 
The merchant offers his sales representatives wages depending on the number of 
products sold. There are four possible cases. For each case, the merchant can specify one 
wage: 
1. neither product A nor product B are sold  
 wage  for sales representative A and  for sales representative B 
2. only product A but not product B is sold 
 wage for sales representative A and  for sales representative B 
3. only product B but not product A is sold 
 wage  for sales representative A and  for sales representative B 
4. both products A and B are sold  
 wage  for sales representative A and  for sales representative B 
As the merchant obtains no revenue in case 1, the wages  and  are fixed at 0 Euro. In 
the cases 2, 3, and 4, the merchant has to set the wages  and ,  and ,  and 
 for his sales representatives A and B (see Figure 1 on the last page).  
(All wages can be specified with up to one decimal place. Please use points instead of 
commas as decimal separators.) 
 
Stage 2 – Sales representatives A and B decide on promotion  
 
The sales representatives A and B learn every wage offer the merchant has made in stage 1. 
Thus, a sales representative knows the wages he may receive as well as the wages that the 
merchant may pay to the other sales representative.  
Each sales representative then can decide whether to promote his product or not (see 
Figure 2 on the last page). 
 
Once the sales representatives have decided on their promotion effort, the probabilities of sale 
of the products are determined (as described above). According to these probabilities, the 
computer decides randomly whether no, exactly one, or both products are sold. 
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 Diagram of the experiment: 
Sales representative B
Merchant
Wage?
Promotion?
Stage 1
Stage 2
Sales representative A
Promotion?
Promotion 
for A
Promotion 
for A
Promotion 
for B
Promotion 
for B
Probabilities of sale of the 
respective product A: 40% B: 40%A: 90% B: 40% A: 40% B: 90%A: 90% B: 90%
90% x 40% = 36% 40% x 40% = 16%product A and product B 90% x 90% = 81% 40% x 90% = 36%
10% x 90% = 9%only product B 10% x 40% = 4% 60% x 40% = 24% 60% x 90% = 54%
90% x 10% = 9%90% x 60% = 54% 40% x 60% = 24% 40% x 10% = 4%only product A
60% x 60% = 36%no product 60% x 10% = 6%10% x 60% = 6% 10% x 10% = 1%
Sale of
!"#$%&!#"
$%&!""$ !"# $%&!#" $%&!"" $
 
 
The profits are as follows: 
 
Sale of merchant’s 
profit 
sales rep. A’s profit sales rep. B’s profit 
no product    
only product A    
only product B    
product A and product B    
 
 
 
 
Your payoff: 
In addition to the (possibly negative) profit realized in the experiment you get 4 Euro and the 
resulting amount is paid out to you in cash. 
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 Figure 1: Stage 1 – Merchant decides on wage offers 
 
Figure 2: Stage 2 – Sales representatives A and B decide on promotion  
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 Comprehension questions 
 
Question 1: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
1. Promoting a product increases the probability of sale of this product. 
2. Promoting a product decreases the probability of sale of this product. 
3. Promoting a product has no effect on the probability of sale of this product. 
 
Question 2: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1. The merchant offers his sales representatives exactly one wage. 
2. The merchant can offer his sales representatives different wages depending on the number of 
products sold. 
3. The sales representatives can demand a wage from the merchant. 
 
Question 3: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1. Suppose you are a sales representative. Once you have decided on your promotion effort, your 
product will be sold with certainty. 
2. Suppose you are a sales representative. Once you have decided on your promotion effort, the 
probabilities of sale depend on the magnitude of the wages. 
3. Suppose you are a sales representative. Once you have decided on your promotion effort, you 
know the probability of sale of your product. 
 
Question 4: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1. The merchant can condition his wages on whether the sales representatives have promoted the 
products. 
2. The merchant can offer wages conditional on the number of products sold. 
3. The merchant can offer wages conditional on the probabilities of sale of the products. 
4. The sales representatives set the wages. 
 
Question 5: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1. Wage  is paid if no product is sold. 
2. Wage  is paid to sales representative A if only product A but not product B is sold. 
3. Wage  is paid to sales representative B if both products are sold. 
4. Wage  is paid to sales representative B if only product B but not product A is sold. 
 
Question 6: 
What is the probability that only product B is sold when sales representative A promotes product A 
but sales representative B does not promote product B? 
 
Question 7: 
What is the probability that wage  is paid if both sales representatives promote their respective 
product? 
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Chapter Four
Public-private partnerships versus
traditional procurement: An
experimental investigation
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, governments in a growing number of countries initiated
public-private partnerships to let the private sector take over the responsibility
for building an infrastructure and subsequently operating it to provide public
goods or services. In industrialized countries as well as in emerging economies,
public-private partnerships have been set up for large-scale projects in various
sectors such as public transportation, health care, and education.1
A key characteristic of public-private partnerships is that the two tasks of
building a facility and subsequently operating it are bundled and delegated to a
single private contractor, while under traditional procurement, separate contrac-
tors are in charge of these two tasks.2 An argument often put forward in favor of
public-private partnerships is that when the same private contractor is responsible
for construction as well as operation of a public facility, then he will be inclined
1See Grimsey and Lewis (2004), Yescombe (2007), OECD (2008), and Asian Development
Bank (2008). According to Henckel and McKibbin (2010, p. 5), public-private partnerships “have
increased sevenfold in developing countries from 1990-92 to 2006-08 and sixfold in Europe
during the same period.”
2See e.g. Grimsey and Lewis (2004, pp. 129, 222). See also Iossa et al. (2007, p. 17), who
argue that the “bundling of project phases into a single contract is the main characteristic of PPP
contracts.”
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to invest more during the construction phase in order to reduce the costs incurred
in the subsequent operating stage.3
Hart (2003) demonstrates that the incomplete contracting approach offers a
very useful framework to theoretically investigate the pros and cons of public-
private partnerships compared to traditional procurement. In his model, there are
two stages. In the first stage, a public infrastructure is built, while in the second
stage, the infrastructure is operated to provide a public service. In the first stage,
the builder can make investments that reduce the operating costs in the second
stage. In line with the above-mentioned argument, Hart (2003) finds that given a
public-private partnership, the private contractor has strong incentives to make
investments, since they reduce the operating costs that he will have to incur in
the operating stage. In contrast, under traditional procurement, the builder has no
incentives to invest in cutting the operating costs, since another private party will
have to bear these costs.
Whether a public-private partnership or traditional procurement is preferable
depends on the effects that the cost-reducing investments have on the service
quality. In particular, Hart (2003) assumes that two different kinds of investments
can be made. Investment i not only reduces the operating costs, but it also
increases the service quality. In contrast, while investment e also reduces the
operating costs, it does so at the expense of a reduced service quality. Hence,
investment i is socially desirable, while investment e might be socially undesirable
if the negative side effect on the service quality is sufficiently strong.
In line with Hart (2003), we consider a situation in which in a first-best world
(i.e., if the investments were contractible), a high level of investment i, but a
low level of investment e would be chosen. In a second-best world (i.e., if the
investments are non-contractible), we are then confronted with the following
trade-off. In a public-private partnership, high levels of both kinds of investments
are induced. Hence, there is overinvestment with regard to e, while the first-best
level of investment i is chosen. In contrast, under traditional procurement, there
3See Yescombe (2007, p. 21). Moreover, Grimsey and Lewis (2004, p. 92) argue that a
public-private partnership provides the private contractor with incentives “to plan beyond the
bounds of the construction phase and incorporate features that will facilitate operations.”
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are no incentives to make high investments. Thus, there is underinvestment
regarding i, while the first-best level of investment e is chosen.
It is an important research question to investigate whether the trade-off identi-
fied by Hart (2003) is of empirical relevance. As a first step in that direction, we
have conducted a large-scale public procurement experiment in the laboratory.
Specifically, we conducted two main treatments, a public-private partnership
(PPP) treatment and a traditional procurement (TP) treatment. We have imple-
mented a parameter constellation where encouraging the desirable investment i is
more important than preventing the undesirable investment e, so that according
to the theoretical analysis, a public-private partnership is preferable to traditional
procurement. The experimental data largely corroborates the theoretical analysis.
In the PPP treatment, subjects chose the high levels of both kinds of investments
significantly more often than in the TP treatment. As a consequence, also the
total surplus generated in the PPP treatment was significantly larger than the total
surplus in the TP treatment.
However, modelling the private contractor in a public-private partnership as a
single decision maker might be seen as an analytical shortcut. In practice, different
skills are needed in the building and operating stages. Thus, it is important to
take a closer look at different subcontracting arrangements. For this reason, we
have conducted two further treatments. In one treatment (Sub I), the builder
is the main contractor and subcontracts with an operator. As has already been
pointed out by Hart (2003), in theory this setting induces the same investment
behavior as the simple PPP setting (since the main contractor must reimburse the
subcontractor for his operating costs, the main contractor internalizes these costs).
In another treatment (Sub II), the operator is the main contractor and subcontracts
with a builder. In theory, this setting leads to the same investment behavior as
traditional procurement (since the subcontractor disregards the operating costs,
he has no incentives to invest). Also in the subcontracting treatments, it turns out
that the observed behavior in the laboratory is mostly in line with the theoretical
predictions.
In recent years, the theoretical literature on public-private partnerships has
grown steadily. Building on Hart (2003), several contributions have investigated
the implications of bundling the building and operating stages in public procure-
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ment projects.4 Bennett and Iossa (2006a,b) and Chen and Chiu (2010) explore
how different ownership structures interact with the choice between a public-
private partnership and traditional procurement.5 Martimort and Pouyet (2008)
analyze a model that includes both traditional agency problems and property
rights and they find that the most relevant question is not who owns the assets, but
instead whether the tasks are bundled or not. Iossa and Martimort (2009, forth-
coming) discuss extensions and applications of this framework. Also focusing on
the externalities between the tasks of building and operating a public project, Li
and Yu (2010) investigate whether these tasks should be auctioned off separately
or bundled. Valéro (forthcoming) studies which effect the strength of the institu-
tional framework (i.e., the government’s commitment power) may have on the
bundling decision. Hoppe and Schmitz (2013) study how the decision to bundle
the building and operating stages affects the incentives to gather information
about future costs of adapting the service provision to changing circumstances.
While public-private partnerships have received growing attention in the
theoretical literature, so far empirical research is scarce.6 In particular, to the best
of our knowledge, our study is the first experimental contribution that compares
the performance of public-private partnerships and traditional procurement in the
laboratory.7
4While most papers in this literature consider incomplete contracts, Bentz, Grout, and Halonen
(2004) study related questions in a complete contracting framework. On the pros and cons of
bundling sequential tasks when complete contracts can be written, see also Schmitz (2005).
5Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) have developed the leading model to study the effects of
public and private ownership on investment incentives, building on the property rights approach
based on incomplete contracting (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995).
See also Hoppe and Schmitz (2010), who extend their framework by considering a richer set of
contractual arrangements. Moreover, Besely and Ghatak (2001), Francesconi and Muthoo (2006),
and Halonen-Akatwijuka and Pafilis (2009) build on the property rights approach to analyze
whether non-governmental organizations should own public goods.
6For empirical studies on public-private partnerships, see Chong et al. (2006a,b) on water
distribution, de Brux and Desrieux (2010) on the car park sector, and Blanc-Brude and Jensen
(2010) on school contracts.
7However, there are some laboratory experiments on procurement contracting that focus
on quite different aspects. Cox et al. (1996) examine fixed-price and cost-sharing contracts in
frameworks with moral hazard and adverse selection. Güth et al. (2006) study the efficiency
and profitability of different procurement auctions. Bigoni et al. (2010) investigate the effects of
explicit incentives framed as either bonuses or penalties in procurement contracts.
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The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, public-
private partnerships and traditional procurement are compared, while in Sec-
tion 4.3, different ways of subcontracting are considered. Each of these two
sections consists of subsections in which we describe the theoretical framework,
present the experimental design, derive predictions, and report the results. Con-
cluding remarks follow in Section 4.4.
4.2 PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS VS. TRADITIONAL
PROCUREMENT
4.2.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In this section, to motivate our experimental study, we present the theoretical
framework based on Hart (2003) as a starting point. We consider a government
agency who wants a certain public good or service to be provided. For this
purpose, two tasks have to be performed: a suitable infrastructure has to be
built and subsequently, it has to be operated. We study two different modes of
provision. In case of a public-private partnership, the two tasks are bundled;
i.e., the government agency contracts with a single party (a consortium) to build
the infrastructure and to subsequently operate it. In contrast, under traditional
procurement the two tasks are separated; i.e., the government agency contracts
with one party to build the infrastructure and with another party to operate it.
We assume that only incomplete contracts can be written. In particular, the
party in charge of building the infrastructure can make two kinds of observable
but non-contractible investments, i ∈ {il, ih} and e ∈ {el,eh}, that affect the
characteristics of the infrastructure and thus the nature of the service to be
provided. The government agency’s benefit is given by
B(i,e) = B0+β (i)−b(e),
while the operating costs are given by
C(i,e) =C0− γ(i)− c(e).
The investments are measured by their costs; i.e., the total investment costs equal
i+ e. The quality-enhancing investment i increases the government agency’s
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benefit from service provision and at the same time it reduces the operating costs.
In contrast, while investment e also reduces the operating costs, it does so at the
expense of a reduced service quality.
In a first-best world, i.e. if the investments were contractible, the government
agency would implement the investment levels that maximize the total surplus
B(i,e)−C(i,e)− i− e
= B0+β (i)−b(e)−C0+ γ(i)+ c(e)− i− e.
In the first-best benchmark solution, the high investment level would be chosen
whenever the additional gains generated outweigh the additional investment costs.
In particular, iFB = ih whenever β (ih)+γ(ih)− [β (il)+γ(il)]≥ ih− il . Similarly,
eFB = eh whenever c(eh)−b(eh)− [c(el)−b(el)]≥ eh− el . In accordance with
Hart (2003), we assume that only in case of the quality-improving investment i it
is socially desirable to choose the high investment level. Specifically, we make
the following assumption.
Assumption 1. (i) γ(ih)− γ(il)≥ ih− il.
(ii) c(eh)− c(el)− [b(eh)−b(el)]< eh− el < c(eh)− c(el).
Assumption 1(i) says that the additional reduction of the operating costs alone
already outweighs the additional investment costs when the high investment level
ih instead of the low investment level il is chosen. Since moreover this investment
increases the benefit, it is clearly first-best to choose i = ih. Assumption 1(ii)
says that while the reduction of the operating costs does outweigh the additional
investments costs of choosing eh instead of el , the negative side effect on the
service quality is so strong that from a social perspective it is optimal to choose
e = el . As a consequence, the total surplus in the first-best solution is B(ih,el)−
C(ih,el)− ih− el .
We now return to the second-best world in which the investments are non-
contractible. Note that since we assume throughout that the investment levels are
observable, the party in charge of operating the facility knows its operating costs
regardless of the governance structure.
Consider first a public-private partnership (bundling). We assume that there
is a competitive supply of private consortia that could build the infrastructure
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and subsequently operate it. They submit offers to the government agency who
then decides with whom to contract. The consortium that is awarded the contract
will choose the investment levels i and e that maximize its payoff P0−C(i,e)−
i− e = P0−C0 + γ(i)+ c(e)− i− e, where P0 is the price that the government
agency pays to the consortium. Since by assumption γ(ih)− γ(il)≥ ih− il and
c(eh)−c(el)≥ eh−el , the consortium will invest iPPP = ih and ePPP = eh. Hence,
anticipating their investment behavior in case of being awarded the contract,
in a competitive market the consortia submit offers equal to their total costs
C(ih,eh)+ ih+ eh. This means, the government agency will make the payment
P0 = C(ih,eh)+ ih + eh to the consortium that is awarded the contract and the
government agency’s payoff is B(ih,eh)−C(ih,eh)− ih− eh.
Now consider traditional procurement (unbundling). In this case the govern-
ment agency initially contracts with one private party to build the infrastructure
and subsequently, it contracts with another private party that will operate it. If
there is a competitive supply of operators, they will make offers in which they
demand to be reimbursed for their operating costs, given the investment levels
that were chosen. Hence, the government pays P1 =C(i,e) to the chosen operator.
The builder who is awarded the construction contract chooses the investment
levels i and e to maximize his payoff P0− i−e, where P0 is the payment from the
government agency to the builder. Hence, he will choose iT P = il and eT P = el .
Anticipating this, the builders will submit offers equal to il + el . The government
agency’s payoff is thus B(il,el)−C(il,el)− il− el .
The following proposition summarizes the main insights of the theoretical
analysis.
Proposition 4.1. The investment levels given a public-private partnership and
given traditional procurement can be ranked as follows.
iT P = il < iPPP = iFB = ih.
eT P = eFB = el < ePPP = eh.
Intuitively, the trade-off between the two governance structures is as follows.
In case of a public-private partnership, in the building stage the consortium antici-
pates that it will have to bear the operating costs in the subsequent stage. Hence,
the consortium not only chooses the high investment level of i, which is socially
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C(i,e) e = 0 e = 4
i = 0 24 12
i = 4 12 0
B(i,e) e = 0 e = 4
i = 0 48 36
i = 4 60 48
Table 4.1: The operating costs and the government agency’s benefit depending on
the investment levels.
desirable, but it also chooses the high investment level of the quality-reducing
investment e, which is socially undesirable. This is because the consortium is
interested in cutting the operating costs, while it does not internalize the negative
impact that the investment e has on the government agency’s benefit.
In contrast, under traditional procurement, the builder who is in charge of the
investments internalizes neither the operating costs nor the government agency’s
benefit, as he gets a fixed payment P0 independent of the investment levels that
he chooses. As a consequence, by choosing iT P = il , he underinvests in the
socially desirable investment, while he chooses the first-best level eT P = el of the
quality-reducing investment.
While the government agency’s payoff is always below the first-best level,
which one of the two governance structures is optimal depends on the relative
impacts of the non-contractible investments.
4.2.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
In each treatment of our experiment, a government agency wants a public in-
frastructure to be built and subsequently to be managed. The party in charge of
building can decide how much it wants to invest during the construction stage.
Specifically, the building party makes the investment decisions i ∈ {il, ih} and
e ∈ {el,eh}, where il = el = 0 and ih = eh = 4. The investments influence the
operating costs and the government agency’s benefit. Depending on the invest-
ment decisions, the operating costs are C(i,e) = C0− γ(i)− c(e) and the gov-
ernment agency’s benefit is B(i,e) = B0+β (i)−b(e), where C0 = 24, B0 = 48,
β (i) = γ(i) = 3i, and b(e) = c(e) = 3e. Table 4.1 summarizes the operating costs
and the government agency’s benefit.
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Figure 4.1: The sequences of events in the PPP treatment and the TP treatment.
Hence, taking into account the investment costs i+ e, the first-best outcome
is achieved if i = iFB = 4 and e = eFB = 0 are chosen, so that the first-best total
surplus is 44.
We now describe the two main treatments of our experiment. Figure 4.1 1
summarizes the sequences of events in the two treatments.
Public-private partnership (PPP) treatment. In this treatment, always four sub-
jects interact within a group. One subject is in the role of a principal (representing
the government agency) and each of the three other subjects is in the role of a
private contractor (each one representing a consortium). There are three stages.
In the first stage, each of the private contractors submits an offer at which he
is willing to build the infrastructure and to operate it.8 In the second stage the
principal learns the submitted offers and he selects one of the private contrac-
tors. The two contractors who are not selected make zero profits. In the third
stage, the selected contractor chooses investment levels i and e. Depending on
the investment decisions, the principal’s payoff is B(i,e)−P0 and the selected
contractor’s payoff is P0−C(i,e)− i− e, where P0 is the price offer made by the
selected contractor.
8Throughout, offers had to be integers and the upper bounds for the offers were chosen large
enough such that for any combination of investment decisions the parties could have shared the
net surplus equally. For instance, in the PPP treatment, the private contractors could make offers
in the range from 0 to 38.
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Traditional procurement (TP) treatment. In this treatment, always seven subjects
play within a group. One subject is in the role of a principal (representing the
government agency), three subjects are in the role of builders, and the other
three subjects are in the role of operators. There are five stages. In the first
stage, each builder submits an offer to build the infrastructure. In the second
stage the principal learns the submitted offers and he selects one of the builders.
The two builders who are not selected make zero profits. In the third stage, the
selected builder makes the investments i and e. His payoff is P0− i− e, where
P0 is the price offer he made in the first stage. In stage 4, the three operators
learn the selected builder’s investment decisions and thus they know the operating
costs. Then each operator submits an offer at which he is willing to operate the
infrastructure. In stage 5, the principal learns the selected builder’s investment
decisions and the operators’ submitted offers. He then selects an operator. The
other operators make zero profits. The principal’s payoff is B(i,e)−P0−P1,
where P1 is the selected operator’s price offer. The selected operator’s payoff is
P1−C(i,e).
Subjects, payments, and procedures. In total, 176 subjects participated in these
two main treatments. Moreover, 224 subjects participated in two additional treat-
ments which will be described in Section 4.3. All 400 subjects were students
of the University of Cologne from a wide variety of fields of study. The com-
puterized experiment was programmed and conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007), and subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
For the PPP treatment, we conducted two sessions with 32 subjects per session.
In each session, there were 8 groups consisting of 4 players (one principal and
three contractors). For the TP treatment, we conducted four session with 28
subjects per session. In each session, there were 4 groups consisting of 7 players
(one principal, three builders, three operators).9 In every treatment, the sessions
consisted of 20 rounds. Each subject kept its role and stayed in the same group
over all rounds, so that we have 16 independent observations per treatment. All
9In the two subcontracting treatments described in Section 4.3, we also conducted four
sessions with 28 subjects per session. In each session, there were 4 groups consisting of 7 players
(one principal, three builders, three operators), so that we also have 16 groups per subcontracting
treatment.
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interactions were anonymous; i.e., no subject knew the identities of the other
group members. At the beginning of each session, written instructions were
handed out to the participants. No subject was allowed to participate in more than
one session.
We made use of an experimental currency unit (ECU). To prevent the occur-
rence of losses, each subject was given an initial endowment of 75 ECU.10 After
each round, a subject’s payoff was added to his account. The final balance was
paid out to them in cash (1 ECU = 0.07 Euro). A session lasted between 70 and
90 minutes. Subjects were paid on average 13.19 Euro.
4.2.3 PREDICTIONS
Under standard contract-theoretic assumptions (in particular, if it is commonly
known that all players are rational and have self-interested preferences), the
predictions are as follows.
In the PPP treatment, the selected private contractor will minimize his total
costs C(i,e)+ i+ e by choosing the high levels of both investments, i = 4 and
e = 4, so that his total costs are 8. Since in a subgame-perfect equilibrium, the
principal will choose a contractor making the smallest price offer, at least two
contractors will make the price offer 8. This implies that the principal obtains the
total surplus, which then is 40.11
In the TP treatment, since the principal will choose the operator offering the
smallest price, at least two operators will make price offers equal to the operating
costs C(i,e). The selected builder will maximize his payoff P0− i−e by choosing
the low investments i = 0 and e = 0. Anticipating that the principal will choose a
builder making the smallest price offer, at least two builders will offer the price 0.
Hence, the principal obtains the total surplus, which now is 24 only.12
10If in any round a subject’s balance became negative, we would have excluded the whole
group from our data analysis. Yet, no subject ever had a negative balance.
11More precisely, note that since 1 ECU is the smallest monetary unit, the price paid to a
contractor may also be 9. If the other two contractors make this offer, the best response is to also
offer 9. In this case, the selected contractor’s payoff is 1 and the principal’s payoff is 39.
12Note again that due to the smallest monetary unit, there are further equilibria that differ
slightly from the standard equilibrium prediction. E.g., all operators may offer 25 and all builders
may offer 1, so that the selected contractors each make a profit of 1 and the principal’s payoff is
22.
115
4. PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS VERSUS TRADITIONAL PROCUREMENT
Since the games we are interested in consist of several stages and involve
several players, we wanted the subjects to have a chance to learn how to play the
games, so that we implemented a repeated game design. However, a potential
drawback of this design could be the well-known fact that in repeated games,
subjects often manage to establish cooperation. Hence, we are particularly
interested in the final round, which corresponds most closely to the one-shot
interaction modelled in the theoretical framework that motivated our study.
Numerous experimental studies have shown that subjects’ behavior in the
laboratory often violates perfect rationality and pure self-interest.13 On the
other hand, previous work has shown that competitive forces, which are central
ingredients of our setting, can be quite strong also in laboratory settings.14 Thus,
our main research question is whether the contract-theoretic reasoning as outlined
above can be useful to organize the experimental data. Guided by the theoretical
analysis, we make the following qualitative predictions.
Prediction 1. In the PPP treatment, the high levels of both investments will be
chosen more often than in the TP treatment.
If Prediction 1 is corroborated by the data, then this offers support for the
fundamental trade-off identified by Hart’s (2003) analysis. More specifically,
given the parameters that we have chosen for the experiment, the total surplus
is larger if both kinds of investments (i.e., desirable and undesirable) are made
than if no investments are made. The theoretical analysis thus suggests that
the principal will be better off given a public-private partnership (since due to
competition he will be able to extract the total surplus). The following prediction
hypothesizes that this finding is also reflected in the data, which is a somewhat
more ambitious test of the relevance of the theory.
Prediction 2. The principals’ payoffs will be larger in the PPP treatment than in
the TP treatment.
13For surveys, see e.g. Camerer (2003) or Fehr and Schmidt (2006).
14Specifically, we decided to model competition using three players, since Dufwenberg and
Gneezy (2000) showed that price competition works quite well in experimental markets with
three sellers.
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all rounds final round
PPP TP PPP TP
no investments 0.3% 49.1% 0.0% 93.8%
only investment i 4.7% 48.4% 6.3% 6.3%
only investment e 0.9% 1.9% 0.0% 0.0%
both investments 94.1% 0.6% 93.8% 6.3%
investment i 98.8% 49.1% 100.0% 6.3%
investment e 95.0% 2.5% 93.8% 0.0%
principals’ payoff 34.86 24.88 37.00 16.63
selected contractors’ payoff 5.09 3.25
selected builders’ payoff 6.97 8.13
selected operators’ payoff 1.86 0.50
total surplus 39.95 33.71 40.25 25.25
Table 4.2: The first four rows summarize the relative frequencies of the investment
decisions in which no investment, only one investment, or both investments were
chosen. The following two rows show the relative frequencies of all cases in
which investment i and investment e, respectively, were chosen. The final rows
show the parties’ average payoffs and the average total surplus.
4.2.4 RESULTS
In this section, we describe and analyze the results of our two main treatments.
Table 4.2 shows the key findings summarized over all rounds and for the last
round.
Let us first consider the investment behavior. Recall that in the PPP treatment,
the private contractor builds the infrastructure and subsequently operates it, so
that the profit-maximizing decision is to make both investments. In contrast, in
the TP treatment the builder who takes the investment decisions is not in charge
of operation, so that according to standard theory, he will not invest at all.
In both treatments, the subjects’ last-round investment behavior is remarkably
close to the standard contract-theoretic predictions. In the PPP treatment, 15 of
the 16 selected builders chose the high levels of both kinds of investment (while
one selected builder chose the high level of the quality-improving investment
only). In contrast, in the TP treatment, 15 of the 16 selected builders chose the
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Figure 4.2: The relative frequencies with which the high levels of the investments
i and e were chosen.
low levels of both investments (while one selected builder chose the high level of
the quality-improving investment only).
Let us now take all 20 rounds into consideration. For each round, Figure 4.2
illustrates the relative frequencies with which the high levels of the quality-
improving investment i and the quality-reducing investment e were chosen. For
each investment i and e, we have 320 investment decisions per treatment. In the
PPP treatment, the investment behavior was very close to the theoretical prediction
over all 20 rounds. Altogether, the high level of the desirable investment i
was chosen in 99% of the 320 cases, while the high level of the undesirable
investment e was chosen in 95%. In the TP treatment, the high level of the
desirable investment i was chosen in 49.1% and the high level of the undesirable
investment e was chosen in 2.5% of all cases. The investment behavior regarding
e is again very close to the standard prediction. Even though in rounds 1 to 19,
the high level of the quality-improving investment i is chosen more often than
predicted, we do find strong evidence in support of Prediction 1. Not only in the
last round, but also taking averages per group over all 20 rounds, the subjects’
behavior with regard to both kinds of investments differs significantly between
the treatments.15
15Between treatments and for each investment, we compare the distributions of average
investment levels. An average investment level refers to one single group and describes the
relative frequency of high investment levels over all rounds within this group. The p-values of
two-sided Mann-Whitney U tests with regard to the investments e and i are both smaller than
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Figure 4.3: The average total surplus and the average payoffs of the principals,
the selected private contractors (in PPP), and the selected builders and operators
(in TP). The dashed lines represent the theoretically predicted total surplus levels
(40 in PPP and 24 in TP).
For each round, Figure 4.3 shows the average total surplus resulting from the
described investment behavior. In the PPP treatment, the average surplus is larger
than in the TP treatment in every round except round 13 (where the surplus is the
same in both treatments).16 Hence, as predicted, the public-private partnership
was the welfare-maximizing governance structure, even though in rounds 1 to 19,
the total surplus in the TP treatment was noticeably larger than predicted (due
to the fact that in almost half of the cases, the first-best investment decisions
were taken). In the final round, the surplus in both treatments is very close to the
respective theoretical prediction.
In the PPP treatment, the total surplus is the sum of the principal’s and the
selected private contractor’s payoffs. In the TP treatment, the total surplus is the
0.001. Moreover, we have also compared the individual investment decisions between treatments
in each single round. According to χ2 tests, the p-values regarding investment e are smaller than
0.001 in every round, while with regard to investment i, they are smaller than 0.02 in 18 rounds
(in rounds 10 and 13, we still have p < 0.08).
16Over all rounds, the surplus differs significantly between the two treatments. Comparing the
distributions of the average surplus per group over all rounds, the p-value is 0.002 according to a
two-sided Mann-Whitney U test.
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Figure 4.4: The average offers made by all private contractors (in PPP) and by all
builders (in TP) as well as the average offers selected by the principals.
sum of the principal’s, the selected builder’s, and the selected operator’s payoffs.
In both treatments, the principals obtain by far the largest share of the total surplus.
Hence, competition seemed to work quite well. As a consequence, we find strong
support for Prediction 2. Over all rounds, the principals’ average payoff in the
PPP treatment was 34.86, while it was only 24.89 in the TP treatment. Taking
averages per group over all 20 rounds, the difference between the distributions of
the principals’ payoffs is highly significant.17
Let us now take a closer look at how the different parties’ payoffs developed
over time. In the PPP treatment, the private contractors’ average profits decreased
over the early rounds, while they were small and quite stable in the later rounds.
In the TP treatment, the builders’ average profits were small and almost constant,
while the operators’ profits were even smaller.
In the PPP treatment, the principals’ payoffs increased over the early rounds,
while in the TP treatment the principals’ payoffs exhibited an increasing trend
from the second to the 13th round. The reasons for these growing payoffs differ
between the treatments. In the PPP treatment, increases of principals’ payoffs
cannot be driven by changing investment behavior (since the average investment
levels and thus the total surplus were almost constant over all rounds). Instead,
17The p-value of a two-sided Mann-Whitney U test is smaller than 0.001. Comparing the
individual profits in each round, the p-values are smaller than 0.04 in 18 of the 20 rounds
(p = 0.213 in round 1 and p = 0.125 in round 13).
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the principals’ increasing payoffs resulted from the fact that on average, during
the first rounds, payments from the principals to the private contractors decreased.
This fact is illustrated in the left panel of Figure 4.4, which shows the averages
per round of all private contractors’ offers and of the selected offers. Note that in
every round, the average selected offer is smaller than the average of all offers
that were made. In the TP treatment, the principals’ growing payoffs are also due
to decreasing payments to the builders in the first few rounds (see the right panel
of Figure 4.4), while they are mainly driven by increasing investment levels of
the quality-enhancing investment i in later rounds (see Figure 4.2).
We will now explore the behavior within the individual groups in greater
detail. For each of the 16 groups in the PPP treatment, Figure 4.5 shows all three
private contractors’ offers, as illustrated by the three colored curves. In each
round, the offer actually selected by the principal is indicated by a symbol, whose
shape reflects the selected contractor’s investment decisions.
Most principals selected the lowest offer right from the beginning,18 which
created competition between the private contractors, so that in most groups
we observe decreasing offers over the early rounds (cf. also the left panel of
Figure 4.4). As already pointed out, the vast majority of private contractors chose
the high levels of both investments, which becomes apparent from inspection of
Figure 4.5. Indeed, in most cases making both investments was the only way
for the contractors to avoid losses. Recall that the private contractors’ total costs
were 8 if they made both investments, while their total costs were 16 if they made
the first-best investment decisions (by choosing investment i only). 75% of the
selected offers were smaller than 16, so that in these cases making the first-best
investment decisions would have led to a loss for the contractors. As a matter of
fact, competition was so strong that most contractors could make only very small
profits even if they chose the high levels of both investments.19
For each of the 16 groups in the TP treatment, Figure 4.6 shows all builders’
offers, the offers selected by the principal, and the selected builders’ investment
decisions. Figure 4.6 is particularly helpful to better understand the builders’
investment behavior. Recall that in the TP treatment, the average level of the
18Over all rounds, the lowest offer was chosen in more than 80% of the cases.
19In the last five rounds, 65% of the selected offers were smaller than or equal to 10.
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the selected contractors’ investment decisions for each of the 16 groups in the
PPP treatment.
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quality-improving investment i increases during the first rounds, remains rela-
tively high in the following rounds, and then falls steeply close to zero in the
last round (see also Figure 4.2). Why do builders in rounds 1 to 19 often choose
first-best investment levels, although in a given round, this reduces their monetary
payoff? Actually, the strategic situation resembles a gift-exchange game (Akerlof,
1982). In gift-exchange experiments, it is often observed that principals pay
relatively generous wages and agents tend to reciprocate principals’ behavior by
exerting high effort, which they would not do according to standard theory.20 In
our TP treatment, principals could select relatively large offers, thereby paying
the builder a generous fixed wage. Builders could then reward principals for
doing so by making first-best investment decisions. Indeed, in some groups we
observe behavior which is in line with the gift-exchange argument. In these
groups, principals persistently preferred not to select the lowest offer. As a matter
of fact, in later rounds, average selected offers were larger than the average of all
offers (see also the right panel of Figure 4.4). Moreover, selected builders often
reciprocated relatively large payments by choosing first-best investments.21 How-
ever, the builders’ reciprocal behavior was motivated by strategic considerations,
since in the final round all builders but one decided not to invest at all.
Figure 4.7 illustrates all operators’ offers and the offers selected by the prin-
cipals. Note that the operating costs are determined by the builders’ previous
investment decisions which are again indicated by the different shapes of the
symbols. Recall that if no high investment levels were chosen, the operating costs
were 24, if only one of the two investment levels was high, the operating costs
were 12, while they were 0 otherwise. Most of the operators’ offers were only
slightly above their respective operating costs and, over all rounds, principals
20See e.g. Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993, 1998) and Fehr and Falk (1999).
21Specifically, the first-best investment decisions were taken in 48.4% of all cases, while no
investments were made in 49.1%. If the principal did not select the builder making the smallest
offer (which happened in 63.4% of the cases), then the first-best decisions were taken in 66% of
these instances, while in only 31.5% of these instances no investments were made. Note also that
our experimental design was such that on the principals’ screens the offers were displayed in a
random order, so that they did not know which offer was made by which builder. However, it
seems that, by making similar offers over several rounds, in some groups builders managed to
establish a reputation for choosing first-best investments when their offers are accepted.
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Figure 4.6: The offers made by the three builders, the principal’s choices, and
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treatment.
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selected the lowest operating offers in 93.12% of the cases. This indicates that
competition for being awarded the operating contract worked very well.
4.3 SUBCONTRACTING
So far, we have assumed that in case of a public-private partnership, the govern-
ment agency contracts with a single private contractor (representing a consortium),
who is then responsible for both, infrastructure construction and operation. How-
ever, in practice different skills are required for the two different tasks, so that
subcontracting is characteristic for a consortium. Hence, we have conducted two
further treatments that capture the two ways of subcontracting that are possible
in our public-private partnership setting. Either the government agency selects a
builder as main contractor, who then subcontracts with an operator, or it selects
an operator as main contractor, who then subcontracts with a builder.
4.3.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Keeping the assumptions regarding the available technology unchanged (see
Section 4.2.1), we now consider two variants of public-private partnerships in
which either the task of building the public facility or the task of operating it is
delegated to a subcontractor.
The builder as main contractor and the operator as subcontractor (Sub I). We
assume that there is a competitive supply of builders as main contractors who
could build the infrastructure and who would then subcontract operation. They
submit offers to the government agency who chooses a main contractor. The
main contractor who is awarded the contract will build the infrastructure and
choose the investment levels i and e. Assuming that there is a competitive supply
of operators, they will submit offers in which they demand to be reimbursed for
their operating costs, given the investment levels. Thus, the main contractor pays
P1 =C(i,e) to the chosen operator. The main contractor chooses the investment
levels i and e that maximize his payoff P0−P1− i−e= P0−C(i,e)− i−e, where
P0 is the price that the government agency pays to the main contractor. Given
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Figure 4.7: The offers made by the three operators and the principal’s choices,
given the selected builders’ investment decisions for each of the 16 groups in the
TP treatment.
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Assumption 1, the main contractor thus chooses iI = ih and eI = eh. Anticipating
their investment behavior in case of being awarded the contract and the price they
will have to pay to a subcontractor, the main contractors submit offers equal to
their total costs P1+ ih+ eh =C(ih,eh)+ ih+ eh. Therefore, the payment from
the government agency to the main contractor is given by P0 =C(ih,eh)+ ih+ eh.
The government agency’s payoff is B(ih,eh)−C(ih,eh)− ih− eh.
The operator as main contractor and the builder as subcontractor (Sub II). In
this case, the government agency initially contracts with a main contractor who
will subcontract the construction of the infrastructure and who will then operate
it. The payoff of the builder who will be chosen as the subcontractor is P1− i− e,
where P1 is the payment from the main contractor to the subcontractor. Hence, the
selected builder will choose iII = il and eII = el . Given competition, the builders
will submit offers equal to their investment costs il + el . Anticipating that the low
investment levels will be chosen, in a competitive market the main contractors will
submit offers equal to their total costs C(il,el)+P1 =C(il,el)+ il + el. Hence,
the government agency pays P0 =C(il,el)+ il + el to the operator who is chosen
as main contractor. The government agency’s payoff is thus B(il,el)−C(il,el)−
il− el .
Proposition 4.2. The investment levels given subcontracting can be ranked as
follows.
iII = il < iI = iFB = ih.
eII = eFB = el < eI = eh.
Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 reveal that when operation is subcontracted, then
the investment incentives are the same as in a public-private partnership without
subcontracting, iI = iPPP, eI = ePPP. In contrast, when the facility construction
is subcontracted, then the investment incentives are as in the case of traditional
procurement, iII = iT P, eII = eT P. This is because when the builder is the main
contractor, then he anticipates in the building stage that he will have to reimburse
the subcontractor for his operating costs in the subsequent stage. Hence, just as
in the case of a public-private partnership without subcontracting, the builder
is interested in cutting the operating costs, while he does not internalize the
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Figure 4.8: The sequences of events in the Sub I treatment and the Sub II
treatment.
investments’ impact on the government agency’s benefit, so that he chooses the
high investment levels ih and eh. In contrast, when the operator is the main
contractor, then the builder as subcontractor who is in charge of the investments
obtains a fixed payment independent of the investment levels that he chooses.
Hence, just as under traditional procurement, he neither internalizes the operating
costs nor the government agency’s benefit, so that he chooses the low investment
levels il and el .
As a consequence, the government agency is indifferent between a public-
private partnership without subcontracting and a public-private partnership in
which operation is subcontracted. Similarly, it is indifferent between traditional
procurement and a public-private partnership in which facility construction is
subcontracted.
4.3.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
In our two subcontracting treatments, we consider the same parameter constella-
tion as in the two main treatments (see Section 4.2.2). The sequences of events
are illustrated in Figure 4.8.
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Treatment Sub I (the builder as main contractor and the operator as subcon-
tractor). In this treatment, always seven subjects interact within a group. One
subject is in the role of a principal (representing the government agency), three
subjects are in the role of main contractors, and the other three subjects are in
the role of subcontractors. There are five stages. In the first stage, each main
contractor submits an offer to build the infrastructure and subcontract operation.
In the second stage, the principal learns the submitted offers and he selects one
main contractor. The two main contractors who are not selected make zero profits.
In the third stage, the selected main contractor makes the investments i and e.
In stage 4, the three subcontractors learn the investment decisions and thus they
know the operating costs. Then each subcontractor makes an offer at which he
is willing to operate the infrastructure. In stage 5, the main contractor learns the
subcontractors’ offers and he selects an operator. The other subcontractors make
zero profits. The principal’s payoff is B(i,e)−P0, where P0 is the selected main
contractor’s price offer. The selected main contractor’s payoff is P0−P1− i− e,
where P1 is the selected subcontractor’s price offer. The selected subcontractor’s
payoff is P1−C(i,e).
Treatment Sub II (the operator as main contractor and the builder as subcon-
tractor). Again, always seven subjects play within a group. One subject is in
the role of a principal (representing the government agency), three subjects are
in the role of main contractors, and the other three subjects are in the role of
subcontractors. There are five stages. In the first stage, each main contractor
submits an offer to operate the facility and to subcontract the facility construction.
In the second stage, the principal learns the submitted offers and he selects a main
contractor. The two main contractors who are not selected make zero profits. In
the third stage, each subcontractor submits an offer at which he is willing to build
the infrastructure. In stage 4, the main contractor learns the subcontractors’ offers
and he selects a builder. The other subcontractors make zero profits. In stage 5,
the selected subcontractor makes the investment decisions i and e. The principal’s
payoff is B(i,e)−P0, where P0 is the selected main contractor’s price offer. The
selected main contractor’s payoff is P0−P1−C(i,e), where P1 is the selected
subcontractor’s price offer. The selected subcontractor’s payoff is P1− i− e.
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4.3.3 PREDICTIONS
We now derive predictions for the subcontracting treatments under standard
contract-theoretic assumptions. Consider first the Sub I treatment. Since in a
subgame-perfect equilibrium the main contractor (builder) will choose a subcon-
tractor (operator) making the smallest price offer, at least two subcontractors will
submit offers equal to their operating costs C(i,e). This implies that the selected
main contractor will minimize his total costs C(i,e)+ i+ e by choosing the high
levels of both investments, i = 4 and e = 4. Anticipating that the principal will
select a main contractor making the smallest price offer, at least two main con-
tractors will offer the price 8. Thus, the principal obtains the total surplus, which
then is 40.22
In the Sub II treatment, the selected subcontractor (builder) will maximize
his payoff P1− i− e by choosing the low investment levels i = 0 and e = 0.
Anticipating that the main contractor (operator) will choose a subcontractor
making the smallest offer, at least two subcontractors will offer the price 0.
Knowing that the principal will choose the lowest offer and that their operating
costs will be C(0,0) = 24, at least two main contractors submit offers equal to
24. The principal obtains the total surplus, which is 24.23
In analogy to the main treatments, we make the following qualitative predic-
tions.
Prediction 3. In the Sub I treatment, the high levels of both investments will be
chosen more often than in the Sub II treatment.
Prediction 4. The principals’ payoffs will be larger in the Sub I treatment than
in the Sub II treatment.
4.3.4 RESULTS
Table 4.3 displays the key results of the subcontracting treatments summarized
over all rounds and for the final round.
22Note again that taking into account that 1 ECU is the smallest monetary unit, there are
further equilibria. Yet, the principal’s payoff is always between 38 and 40.
23Due to the smallest monetary unit, there are further equilibria; yet, the principal’s payoff is
always between 22 and 24.
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all rounds final round
Sub I Sub II Sub I Sub II
no investments 3.4% 71.2% 0.0% 100.0%
only investment i 20.9% 14.4% 12.5% 0.0%
only investment e 10.6% 0.3% 12.5% 0.0%
both investments 65.0% 14.1% 75.0% 0.0%
investment i 85.9% 28.4% 87.5% 0.0%
investment e 75.6% 14.4% 87.5% 0.0%
principals’ payoff 31.02 22.55 31.06 21.56
selected main contractors’ payoff (builder) 4.98 6.06
selected subcontractors’ payoff (operator) 2.17 0.88
selected main contractors’ payoff (operator) 0.94 –2.63
selected subcontractors’ payoff (builder) 5.62 5.06
total surplus 38.16 29.11 38.00 24.00
Table 4.3: The first four rows summarize the relative frequencies of the investment
decisions in which no investment, only one investment, or both investments were
chosen. The following two rows show the relative frequencies of all cases in
which investment i and investment e, respectively, were chosen. The final rows
show the parties’ average payoffs and the average total surplus.
The investment behavior is again of central interest. In the Sub I treatment, the
subjects’ last-round investment behavior is very close to the theoretical prediction.
12 of the 16 main contractors (builders) made both investments, while 4 main
contractors made one of the two investments. Altogether, the high level of each
investment was chosen in 14 out of 16 cases. In the Sub II treatment, the last-
round investment levels are exactly as predicted; i.e., there were no investments
at all.
Looking at the investment behavior over all rounds (which is illustrated in
Figure 4.9), we again have 320 investment decisions for each investment i and e
per treatment. The high level of the investment i was chosen in 85.9% of the 320
cases in the Sub I treatment, while the investment e was chosen in 75.6%. The
respective relative frequencies for these investments in the Sub II treatment were
only 28.4% and 14.4%. Similar to our findings for the main treatments, these
results indicate that the theoretical analysis also provides empirically relevant
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Figure 4.9: The relative frequencies with which the high levels of the investments
i and e were chosen.
insights about the investment incentives in the subcontracting treatments. In
particular, Prediction 3 is corroborated by the data. Not only in the final round,
but also taking averages per group over all rounds, the subjects’ behavior with
regard to both investments differs significantly between the two subcontracting
treatments.24
For each round, Figure 4.10 shows the average total surplus as well as the
average payoffs of the principals and the selected contractors. The average total
surplus is larger in the Sub I treatment than in the Sub II treatment in every round
except round 1.25 In the final round, the total surplus is again very close to the
theoretical prediction. The principals again managed to obtain by far the largest
share of the total surplus. The average profits of the principals are larger in the
Sub I treatment (31.02) than in the Sub II treatment (22.55). Taking averages per
24Between treatments and for each investment, we compare the distributions of within-group
average investment frequencies. The p-values of two-sided Mann-Whitney U tests with regard
to the investments e and i are both smaller than 0.001. We have also compared the individual
investment levels between treatments in each single round. According to χ2 tests, the p-values
regarding investment e are smaller than 0.004 in 19 rounds (p = 0.014 in round 1), while with
regard to investment i, they are smaller than 0.005 in 18 rounds (p = 0.719 in round 1 and
p = 0.077 in round 5).
25Comparing the distributions of the average surplus per group over all rounds between the
two treatments, the p-value is smaller than 0.001 according to a two-sided Mann-Whitney U test.
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Figure 4.10: The average total surplus and the average payoffs of the principals
and the selected (main and sub-)contractors. The dashed lines represent the
theoretically predicted total surplus levels (40 in Sub I and 24 in Sub II).
group over all 20 rounds, the difference between the distributions of the principals’
payoffs is highly significant.26 Thus, we find strong support for Prediction 4.
Let us now look at how behavior in the two subcontracting treatments changed
over time. In analogy to Figures 4.5 to 4.7, Figures 4.12 to 4.15 show for each
group in both treatments the offers that were made, the offers that were selected,
and the investment decisions.
Consider the Sub I treatment. As can be seen in Figure 4.13, in the vast ma-
jority of cases (98.8%), the main contractors (builders) selected the subcontractor
who made the smallest offer. Hence, fierce competition between subcontractors
almost completely eroded their profits over time. While the principals sometimes
tried to select a main contractor not making the smallest offer, the majority of
main contractors did not reply by making the desirable investment i only (see
26The p-value of a two-sided Mann-Whitney U test is smaller than 0.001. Comparing the
individual payoffs in each round, the p-values are smaller than 0.01 in the last 15 rounds (p< 0.08
in rounds 2, 4, and 5, p = 0.777 in round 1, and p = 0.272 in round 3).
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Figure 4.11: The average offers made by the builders (the main contractors in
Sub I and the subcontractors in Sub II) and the average offers selected (by the
principals in Sub I and by the main contractors in Sub II).
Figure 4.12).27 The payments from the principals to the main contractors de-
creased over time (see the left panel of Figure 4.11), so that main contractors
decided more and more often to make both investments in order to minimize their
total costs. In the Sub II treatment, the principals selected the main contractor
(operator) making the smallest bid in 91.9% of the cases, which triggered strong
competitive pressures (see Figure 4.14). The main contractors sometimes tried not
to select the subcontractor making the smallest offer (see Figure 4.15 and cf. the
right panel of Figure 4.11). But if subcontractors reciprocated such offers, they
often did so by making both investments (which is good for the main contractor,
but not for the total surplus).28
27Specifically, the first-best investment decisions were taken in 21% of all cases, while both
investments were made in 65%. If the principal did not select the main contractor making
the smallest offer (which happened in 33.8% of the cases), then the first-best decisions were
taken in 37% of these instances, while the majority of main contractors (46.3%) still made both
investments.
28The subcontractors’ investment decisions were no investment in 71.3%, only investment
i in 14.4%, only investment e in 0.3%, and both investments in 14.1% of all cases. If the main
contractors did not select the subcontractor making the smallest offer (which happened in 63.1%
of the cases), then the subcontractors’ investment decisions were no investment in 39.8%, only
investment i in 23.7%, only investment e in 0.9%, and both investments in 35.6% of these
instances.
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Figure 4.12: The offers made by the three main contractors (builders), the princi-
pal’s choices, and the selected main contractors’ investment decisions for each of
the 16 groups in the Sub I treatment.
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contractors’ choices for each of the 16 groups in the Sub I treatment. Note that
the operating costs are determined by the investment decisions that were taken by
the main contractors. The colors of the symbols identify which main contractor
was selected by the principal (cf. Figure 4.12).
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Figure 4.14: The offers made by the three main contractors (operators) and the
principal’s choices for each of the 16 groups in the Sub II treatment. Note that
the shapes of the symbols refer to the investment decisions that will be taken by
the selected subcontractors (cf. Figure 4.15).
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Figure 4.15: The offers made by the three subcontractors (builders) and the main
contractors’ choices for each of the 16 groups in the Sub II treatment. The colors
of the symbols identify which main contractor was selected by the principal (cf.
Figure 4.14).
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4.4 CONCLUSION
Our two main treatments provide strong evidence for the fundamental trade-off
identified by Hart (2003). A public-private partnership induces very strong incen-
tives to invest in cost reductions, which is desirable if the investments are also
quality-enhancing, but may well be undesirable if the investments have a negative
side-effect on quality. In contrast, under traditional procurement incentives to
invest are weak, both with regard to desirable as well as undesirable investments.
In the experiment, we considered a parameter constellation where inducing the
desirable investment was relatively more important, such that a public-private
partnership would be preferable according to the theoretical analysis.
Indeed, in the experiment both kinds of investments were made much more
often in the PPP treatment (in line with Prediction 1) and the principal was better
off under this governance structure (in line with Prediction 2). While in the last
round, almost all investment decisions were as theoretically predicted, the only
noticeable deviation from the theoretical analysis was the fact that in the TP
treatment, in a relevant number of cases the payments from the principals to the
selected builders were relatively large, which was reciprocated by choosing high
levels of the desirable investment i.29
In addition, we have considered two subcontracting treatments. The invest-
ment behavior and the principals’ payoffs again differed between these two
treatments as suggested by the theoretical analysis (supporting Predictions 3 and
4). According to the theoretical analysis, moreover there should be no differences
between the PPP treatment and the Sub I treatment (where the builder is the
main contractor), and similarly, there should be no differences between the TP
treatment and the Sub II treatment (where the operator is the main contractor).
Figure 4.16 illustrates the average total surplus levels achieved in all four
treatments. Note that in the final period, as predicted, neither PPP and Sub I nor
TP and Sub II differ much from each other.
29It would be interesting to also conduct experiments with parameter constellations in which
traditional procurement would be optimal in theory. In the light of our results, we conjecture that
given such a parameter constellation, traditional procurement would then turn out to be optimal
also in the experiment.
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Figure 4.16: The average total surplus in the four treatments. Recall that the
first-best surplus is 44. The theoretically predicted surplus is 40 in PPP and Sub I,
while it is 24 in TP and Sub II.
In the somewhat more complex Sub I treatment, in the early rounds the
average surplus is smaller than in the PPP treatment. Yet, in practice there might
be no real choice between PPP and Sub I, since modelling the consortium as
a single decision maker might best be seen as an analytical shortcut. Hence,
Sub I may be considered to be the relevant alternative if (as in the parameter
constellation that we have chosen in our experiment) a high level of the quality-
reducing investment e is less harmful than underinvestment in i. Our experiment
hence illustrates that frictions within the consortium might make a public-private
partnership slightly less attractive than it appears when modelled as a monolithic
entity. This result might encourage further theoretical studies of public-private
partnerships to open the black box of contracting arrangements within the private
consortia.
Moreover, if it is more important to avoid overinvestment in e, our experiment
leads to another important insight. If the parties involved are interested in es-
tablishing reputations by acting in reciprocal ways, then traditional procurement
might be superior compared to a public-private arrangement with the operator
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as main contractor. The reason is that if the investing party reciprocates gener-
ous payments, then it tends to do so by taking the investment decisions that are
best for the main contractor in the Sub II treatment, while it takes the first-best
decisions in the TP treatment. This finding suggests that paying more attention
to reputation and reciprocal behavior might be an interesting avenue for future
theoretical research on the organization of public procurement.
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Supplementary material 
 
The following instructions were handed out to the participants in the PPP treatment: 
 
Experimental Instructions  
 
This experiment deals with procurement projects in the public sector.  
 
In this experiment always 4 subjects interact within a group. In each group there is a principal 
(representing the government) and three private contractors that could build and subsequently 
operate a public infrastructure (e.g., a school, a prison, or a hospital).  
 
At the beginning of the experiment you are randomly assigned either to the role of a principal 
or to the role of a private contractor. You will keep your role and stay within the same group 
throughout the whole experiment.  
 
The currency in the laboratory is called ECU (Experimental Currency Unit). 
Your initial endowment is 75 ECU.   
Throughout the whole experiment your current balance is displayed on your screen.  
 
The experiment consists of 20 rounds.  
 
In detail, the experiment proceeds as follows.  
 
Each round consists of three stages: 
 
 
Stage 1: 
Each of the three private contractors offers the principal a price P at which he is willing to 
build and operate the public infrastructure.   
 
 
Stage 2: 
The principal selects one of the three anonymized price offers P.   
 
The two private contractors whose price offers were not selected make zero profits in this 
round.  
 
 
Stage 3: 
The private contractor selected in stage 2 decides how much he wants to invest in building the 
public infrastructure. There are two kinds of investments: investment A und investment B, 
which cost him 4 ECU each. 
 
The investments affect the principal’s revenue and the private contractor’s operating costs 
(see the tables on the following page). 
 
Depending on the investment decisions, the total investment costs are: 
 
 no investment B investment B 
no investment A 0 ECU  4 ECU  
investment A 4 ECU  8 ECU  
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Depending on the investment decisions, the operating costs are: 
 
 no investment B investment B 
no investment A 24 ECU  12 ECU  
investment A 12 ECU  0 ECU  
 
 
The selected private contractor’s profit in this round equals his price offer P minus his 
operating and total investment costs:  
 
 no investment B investment B 
no investment A P – 24 ECU  P – 16 ECU  
investment A P – 16 ECU  P – 8 ECU 
 
 
The principal’s profit in this round equals his revenue minus the payment P to the selected 
private contractor:  
  
 no investment B investment B 
no investment A 48 ECU – P  36 ECU – P 
investment A 60 ECU – P 48 ECU – P 
 
 
 
Your payoff: 
After the last round your final balance will be paid out to you in cash (1 ECU = 0.07 Euro). 
In case that your final balance is negative you will receive no payoff.  
 
Please note: 
During the whole experiment communication is not allowed. If you have a question, please raise your 
hand out of the cabin. All decisions are anonymous; i.e., no participant ever learns the identity of a 
person who has made a particular decision. The payment is conducted anonymously, too; i.e., no 
participant learns what the payoff of another participant is. 
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The following instructions were handed out to the participants in the TP treatment: 
 
Experimental Instructions  
 
This experiment deals with procurement projects in the public sector.  
 
In this experiment always 7 subjects interact within a group. In each group there is a principal 
(representing the government), three builders that could build a public infrastructure (e.g., a 
school, a prison, or a hospital), and three operators that could subsequently operate this 
infrastructure.  
 
At the beginning of the experiment you are randomly assigned either to the role of a principal, 
to the role of a builder, or to the role of an operator. You will keep your role and stay within 
the same group throughout the whole experiment.  
 
The currency in the laboratory is called ECU (Experimental Currency Unit). 
Your initial endowment is 75 ECU.   
Throughout the whole experiment your current balance is displayed on your screen.  
 
The experiment consists of 20 rounds.  
 
In detail, the experiment proceeds as follows.  
 
Each round consists of five stages: 
 
 
Stage 1: 
Each of the three builders offers the principal a price P0 at which he is willing to build the 
public infrastructure. 
  
 
Stage 2: 
The principal selects one of the three anonymized price offers P0.   
 
The two builders whose price offers were not selected make zero profits in this round.  
 
 
Stage 3: 
The builder selected in stage 2 decides how much he wants to invest in building the public 
infrastructure. There are two kinds of investments: investment A und investment B, which 
cost him 4 ECU each. 
 
The investments affect the principal’s revenue and the operator’s operating costs (see the 
tables in stage 5). 
 
Depending on his investment decisions, the selected builder’s profit in this round is: 
 
 no investment B investment B 
no investment A P0 – 0 ECU P0 – 4 ECU 
investment A P0 – 4 ECU P0 – 8 ECU 
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Stage 4:  
The three potential operators learn the builder’s investment decisions and thus know the 
operating costs. 
  
Each of the three operators offers the principal a price P1, at which he is willing to operate the 
public infrastructure.  
 
 
Stage 5:  
The principal learns the builder’s investment decisions and selects one of the operators’ 
anonymized price offers P1. Then the selected operator operates the public infrastructure. The 
two other operators make zero profits in this round.  
 
The selected operator’s profit in this round equals his price offer P1 minus his operating costs: 
  
 no investment B investment B 
no investment A P1 – 24 ECU P1 – 12 ECU 
investment A P1 – 12 ECU P1 – 0 ECU 
 
 
The principal’s profit in this round equals his revenue minus the payment P0 to the selected 
builder and minus the payment P1 to the selected operator:  
 
 no investment B investment B 
no investment A 48 ECU – P0 – P1 36 ECU – P0 – P1 
investment A 60 ECU – P0 – P1 48 ECU – P0 – P1 
 
 
 
Your payoff: 
After the last round your final balance will be paid out to you in cash (1 ECU = 0.07 Euro). 
In case that your final balance is negative you will receive no payoff.  
 
Please note: 
During the whole experiment communication is not allowed. If you have a question, please raise your 
hand out of the cabin. All decisions are anonymous; i.e., no participant ever learns the identity of a 
person who has made a particular decision. The payment is conducted anonymously, too; i.e., no 
participant learns what the payoff of another participant is. 
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The following instructions were handed out to the participants in the Sub I treatment: 
 
Experimental Instructions  
 
This experiment deals with procurement projects in the public sector.  
 
In this experiment always 7 subjects interact within a group. In each group there is a principal 
(representing the government), three main contractors that could provide a public 
infrastructure (e.g., a school, a prison, or a hospital), and three subcontractors that could 
operate this infrastructure.  
 
At the beginning of the experiment you are randomly assigned either to the role of a principal, 
to the role of a main contractor, or to the role of a subcontractor. You will keep your role and 
stay within the same group throughout the whole experiment.  
 
The currency in the laboratory is called ECU (Experimental Currency Unit). 
Your initial endowment is 75 ECU.   
Throughout the whole experiment your current balance is displayed on your screen.  
 
The experiment consists of 20 rounds.  
 
In detail, the experiment proceeds as follows.  
 
Each round consists of five stages: 
 
Stage 1: 
Each of the three main contractors offers the principal a price P0 at which he is willing to 
provide the public infrastructure (i.e., to build it and to pay a subcontractor for subsequently 
operating it).   
 
 
Stage 2: 
The principal selects one of the three anonymized price offers P0.   
 
The two main contractors whose price offers were not selected make zero profits in this 
round. 
 
 
Stage 3: 
The main contractor selected in stage 2 decides how much he wants to invest in building the 
public infrastructure. There are two kinds of investments: investment A und investment B, 
which cost him 4 ECU each. 
 
The investments affect the principal’s revenue and the subcontractor’s operating costs. 
 
The principal’s profit in this round equals his revenue minus the payment P0 to the main 
contractor:  
 
 no investment B investment B 
no investment A 48 ECU – P0  36 ECU – P0  
investment A 60 ECU – P0  48 ECU – P0 
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The main contractor has to select and pay a subcontractor for operating the infrastructure. 
Depending on the main contractor’s investment decisions, the subcontractor’s operating costs 
are: 
 
 no investment B investment B 
no investment A 24 ECU  12 ECU  
investment A 12 ECU  0 ECU  
 
 
Stage 4: 
The potential subcontractors learn the main contractor’s investment decisions and thus know 
the operating costs. 
 
Each of the three subcontractors offers the selected main contractor a price P1 at which he is 
willing to operate the infrastructure. 
 
 
Stage 5:  
The main contractor selects one of the three anonymized price offers P1 and the selected 
subcontractor will then operate the public infrastructure. The two other subcontractors make 
zero profits in this round.  
 
The selected subcontractor’s profit in this round equals his price offer P1 minus the operating 
costs (which depend on the selected main contractor’s investment decisions in stage 3): 
  
 no investment B investment B 
no investment A P1 – 24 ECU P1 – 12 ECU 
investment A P1 – 12 ECU P1 – 0 ECU 
 
 
Depending on his investment decisions, the selected main contractor’s profit in this round is:  
 
 no investment B investment B 
no investment A P0 – P1 – 0 ECU P0 – P1 – 4 ECU 
investment A P0 – P1 – 4 ECU P0 – P1 – 8 ECU 
 
Your payoff: 
After the last round your final balance will be paid out to you in cash (1 ECU = 0.07 Euro). 
In case that your final balance is negative you will receive no payoff.  
 
Please note: 
During the whole experiment communication is not allowed. If you have a question, please raise your 
hand out of the cabin. All decisions are anonymous; i.e., no participant ever learns the identity of a 
person who has made a particular decision. The payment is conducted anonymously, too; i.e., no 
participant learns what the payoff of another participant is.  
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The following instructions were handed out to the participants in the Sub II treatment: 
 
Experimental Instructions  
 
This experiment deals with procurement projects in the public sector.  
 
In this experiment always 7 subjects interact within a group. In each group there is a principal 
(representing the government), three main contractors that could provide a public 
infrastructure (e.g., a school, a prison, or a hospital), and three subcontractors that could build 
this infrastructure.  
 
At the beginning of the experiment you are randomly assigned either to the role of a principal, 
to the role of a main contractor, or to the role of a subcontractor. You will keep your role and 
stay within the same group throughout the whole experiment.  
 
The currency in the laboratory is called ECU (Experimental Currency Unit). 
Your initial endowment is 75 ECU.   
Throughout the whole experiment your current balance is displayed on your screen.  
 
The experiment consists of 20 rounds.  
 
In detail, the experiment proceeds as follows.  
 
Each round consists of five stages: 
 
 
Stage 1: 
Each of the three main contractors offers the principal a price P0 at which he is willing to 
provide the public infrastructure (i.e., to pay a subcontractor for building the infrastructure 
and to subsequently operate it).   
 
 
Stage 2: 
The principal selects one of the three anonymized price offers P0.   
 
The two main contractors whose price offers were not selected make zero profits in this 
round.  
 
 
Stage 3: 
Each of the three subcontractors offers the selected main contractor a price P1 at which he is 
willing to build the public infrastructure.  
 
 
Stage 4:  
The main contractor selects one of the three anonymized price offers P1. The two other 
subcontractors make zero profits in this round.  
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Stage 5:  
The selected subcontractor decides how much he wants to invest in building the public 
infrastructure. There are two kinds of investments: investment A und investment B, which 
cost him 4 ECU each. 
 
Depending on his investment decisions, the selected subcontractor’s profit in this round is: 
 
 no investment B investment B 
no investment A P1 – 0 ECU P1 – 4 ECU 
investment A P1 – 4 ECU P1 – 8 ECU 
 
 
The investments affect the principal’s revenue and the main contractor’s operating costs. 
 
The principal’s profit in this round equals his revenue minus the payment P0 to the main 
contractor:  
  
 no investment B investment B 
no investment A 48 ECU – P0  36 ECU – P0  
investment A 60 ECU – P0  48 ECU – P0 
 
 
The main contractor’s profit in this round equals his price offer P0 minus the payment P1 to 
the subcontractor and minus the operating costs (which depend on the selected 
subcontractor’s investment decisions): 
  
 no investment B investment B 
no investment A P0 – P1 – 24 ECU P0 – P1 – 12 ECU 
investment A P0 – P1 – 12 ECU P0 – P1 – 0 ECU 
 
 
Your payoff: 
After the last round your final balance will be paid out to you in cash (1 ECU = 0.07 Euro). 
In case that your final balance is negative you will receive no payoff.  
 
Please note: 
During the whole experiment communication is not allowed. If you have a question, please raise your 
hand out of the cabin. All decisions are anonymous; i.e., no participant ever learns the identity of a 
person who has made a particular decision. The payment is conducted anonymously, too; i.e., no 
participant learns what the payoff of another participant is.  
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Chapter Five
Behavioral biases and cognitive
reflection
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Only recently, researchers have started to investigate the impact of cognitive abil-
ity on judgment and decision making. Frederick (2005) introduces the cognitive
reflection test (CRT) which is a simple, three-item test to measure a person’s
mode of reasoning and cognitive ability.1 Frederick (2005) shows that people
with high CRT scores are generally more patient and more willing to gamble
in the domain of gains.2 In a related study, Oechssler et al. (2009) replicate
the findings regarding time and risk preferences and in addition they study the
relationship between cognitive abilities and the conjunction fallacy, conservatism,
and anchoring.3 One central result is that individuals with low cognitive abilities
tend to be significantly more affected by behavioral biases.
In the present study, we investigate whether the incidence of further behavioral
biases is related to cognitive abilities. Specifically, we study the base rate fallacy,
overconfidence, and the endowment effect. Moreover, we replicate the finding of
Oechssler et al. (2009) related to the conservatism bias in order to investigate an
interesting question that was brought up in their paper. Are people that exhibit the
conservatism bias (i.e., overweight the base rate) less susceptible to the base rate
1The CRT has recently also been used to assess the decision making processes of professional
groups such as judges and financial planners, see Guthrie et al. (2007) and Nofsinger and Varma
(2007).
2Using other measures of cognitive ability, Brañas-Garza et al. (2008) and Slonim et al. (2007)
also study whether there are relations between cognitive abilities and risk or time preferences.
3See also Bergman et al. (2010), who analyze the anchoring effect and find that the amount
of anchoring decreases but does not vanish with higher cognitive ability.
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fallacy (i.e., to underweight the base rate)? We observe the contrary. In particular,
we find that individuals with lower cognitive abilities are significantly more likely
to exhibit both, the base rate fallacy and the conservatism fallacy. With regard to
overconfidence, we find that subjects with higher CRT scores have a significantly
more precise self-assessment. Finally, test scores do not affect the occurrence of
the endowment effect which is striking in both, low and high CRT groups.
5.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The experiment was conducted in July 2009.4 Using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004),
we recruited the participants from the subject pool of the Cologne Laboratory
for Economic Research. In total, 414 students from the University of Cologne
participated in the experiment. Following several socio-demographic questions
(concerning gender, age, field of study, and length of study), the subjects had
to fill in a questionnaire consisting of three questions building the CRT and
several questions related to the behavioral biases mentioned in the introduction.5
Participants were given 15 minutes to fill in the questionnaire and the experimenter
stopped the experiment after the time was over.6
Subjects were paid 0.40e for each CRT question they answered correctly.
Moreover, for the decision problems related to the base rate fallacy and con-
servatism, they received 0.40e if their answer did not deviate more than 15
percentage points from the correct answer. Regarding overconfidence, subjects
had to answer five general knowledge questions and they had to assess how
many of these they answered correctly. For each correct answer (including the
assessment question) they received 0.20e. Finally, with regard to the endowment
effect, subjects could receive additional 0.20e or, alternatively, take a highlighter
home. In total, subjects earned between 0e and 2.80e, and the average payoff
4It was run subsequent to an unrelated principal-agent experiment (see Hoppe and Kusterer,
2011b and Chapter 3 of this thesis). In this previous experiment, the participants earned 11.03e
on average including a show-up fee of 4e. The sessions lasted between 30 and 40 minutes.
5Subjects found a calculator, a pen, and a piece of paper in their cabin.
6Note that only three participants did not complete the questionnaire within the given time
limit so that our analysis is based on 411 completed questionnaires.
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was 1.24e. Moreover, 180 subjects left the lab with a brand new highlighter. The
experiment was programmed and conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
5.3 COGNITIVE REFLECTION TEST
To measure cognitive ability, we use the three-item cognitive reflection test (CRT)
that was introduced by Frederick (2005). The three questions are designed such
that they have an intuitive but wrong answer that comes to mind quickly and
a correct answer that is easy to understand when explained. Hence, the test is
supposed to measure a person’s ability to engage in cognitive reflection and thus
to resist reporting the spontaneous but wrong answer. In particular, the three
questions read as follows.
1. A bat and a ball together cost 110 cents. The bat costs 100 cents more than
the ball. How much does the ball cost? (spontaneous answer: 10 cents;
correct answer: 5 cents)
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it
take 100 machines to make 100 widgets? (spontaneous answer: 100 min;
correct answer: 5 min)
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size.
If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it
take for the patch to cover half of the lake? (spontaneous answer: 24 days;
correct answer: 47 days)
In our sample, 13% of the subjects answered none of the questions correctly,
24% knew the correct answer to one question, 27% to two questions, and 36%
answered all three questions correctly. On average, the subjects answered 1.84 of
the CRT questions correctly.7
7There is a strong gender difference: male subjects have an average score of 2.12, while female
subjects have an average score of 1.61 only. The difference is highly significant (p < 0.0001,
two-sided Mann-Whitney U test). This gender difference has also been found in other studies
using the CRT, e.g. Frederick (2005) and Oechssler et al. (2009).
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Question Correct Intuitive Other
Bat and ball 56.7% 39.9% 3.4%
Widgets 58.9% 28.2% 12.9%
Lily pads 68.9% 16.1% 15.1%
Table 5.1: Distribution of answers to the CRT questions.
Table 5.1 shows the distribution of the answers to the CRT questions. For
each question, the majority of the subjects gave the correct answer. Among the
subjects who did not submit the correct answer, the intuitive answer was given
most frequently.
5.4 RESULTS
The central results of our study are summarized in Tables 5.2 and 5.5. Depending
on their CRT score, we divide the participants in two groups. The “low” group
consists of individuals who answered zero or one of the questions correctly,
while the “high” group consists of participants that gave the correct answer to
two or three questions.8 We refer to subjects in the “high” group as the more
analytical decision takers, while we describe subjects in the “low” group as
relatively intuitive decision takers.
5.4.1 BASE RATE FALLACY
When people are asked to judge the probability of an event, they often have to
take into account information about the base rate probability and at the same
time, they have to consider specific evidence about the case at hand (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1982). In such a context, they exhibit the base rate fallacy if they
follow the representativeness heuristic and neglect the base rate probability.
8This categorization was used by Oechssler et al. (2009). We also considered the categoriza-
tion of Frederick (2005) who assigned subjects with zero correct answers to the “low” group and
those with three correct answers to the “high” group. However, with regard to our data this would
imply not to analyze more than 53 % of the observations. Note that the latter categorization would
not change our results qualitatively.
154
5.4. Results
CRT group
Category Item low high p-value
Base rate fallacy Avg. prob. stated (correct: 9%) 77.4% 61.5% p≈ 0.0002
Conservatism Avg. prob. stated for urn A 56.8% 60.1% p≈ 0.056
(correct: 97%)
Overconfidence % overconfident 60.7% 57.4% p≈ 0.056
% correct self-assessment 23.2% 32.4%
% underconfident 16.1% 10.2%
The p-values regarding the base rate fallacy and the conservatism bias result from two-
sided Mann-Whitney U tests, while the p-value regarding overconfidence is obtained
using a two-sided χ2 test.
Table 5.2: Behavioral biases by CRT group.
In analogy to the mammography problem in Eddy (1982), subjects in our
study faced the following problem: “In a city with 100 criminals and 100,000
innocent citizens there is a surveillance camera with an automatic face recognition
software. If the camera sees a known criminal, it will trigger the alarm with 99%
probability; if the camera sees an innocent citizen, it will trigger the alarm with a
probability of 1%. What is the probability that indeed a criminal was filmed when
the alarm is triggered?” The correct answer is ≈ 9%, but in both CRT groups, a
large fraction of the subjects stated a probability larger than 90%. These subjects
exhibit the base rate fallacy since they do not or barely consider the low base
rate of criminals in the population. However, compared to the low CRT group,
subjects in the high CRT group are considerably less susceptible to this bias and
state the correct probability more often (see Figure 5.1).9
It is also striking that the average CRT score of subjects who correctly take
into account the small base rate is considerably larger than the average CRT score
of subjects who exhibit the base rate fallacy (see Table 5.3).
9In the high CRT group, 19.1 % of the subjects choose 9 or 10 % as their answer, while in
the low CRT group, this answer is stated in only 9.7 % of the cases (p = 0.01, two-sided χ2 test).
Moreover, the average probability assessed by the subjects in the high CRT group equals 61.5%,
which is significantly smaller than 77.4%, the average probability assessed in the low CRT group.
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Figure 5.1: Distribution of probabilities stated for the base rate fallacy problem.
The dashed line indicates the correct answer.
Prob. stated Average CRT score n
0–10 % 2.16 115
11–90 % 1.74 76
91–100 % 1.72 220
Table 5.3: Average CRT scores for categorized answers to the base rate fallacy
problem.
5.4.2 CONSERVATISM BIAS
While people that exhibit the base rate fallacy underweight base rates, there are
also situations where base rates are overweighted relative to sample evidence. In
such situations, subjects are too conservative in adapting prior probabilities to
new evidence, and hence this fallacy is called conservatism bias. In order to test
whether the tendency to exhibit this fallacy is related to a person’s CRT score,
we confronted the subjects with the following problem that was first studied by
Edwards (1968): “There are two urns; each one contains ten balls. Urn A contains
7 red and 3 blue balls, while urn B contains 3 red and 7 blue balls. One urn is
randomly chosen by flipping a fair coin. 12 balls are now drawn from this urn
with replacement. The result is the following: 8 red and 4 blue balls were drawn.
What is the probability that the randomly drawn urn is urn A when observing this
result (8 red and 4 blue balls)?” The correct answer is 97 %, but many subjects
(34 % in the low CRT group and 28 % in the high CRT group) simply entered
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Figure 5.2: Distribution of probabilities stated for the conservatism problem. The
dashed line indicates the correct answer.
Prob. stated Average CRT score n
0–49 % 1.68 70
50 % 1.73 124
51–89 % 1.90 171
90–100 % 2.20 46
Table 5.4: Average CRT scores for categorized answers to the conservatism
problem.
the base rate of 50 % as their answer (see Figure 5.2). The average answer in the
low CRT group is 56.8 %, while it is 60.1 % in the high CRT group. The fact that
the intuitive decision takers’ average answer is closer to the base rate than the
analytical decision takers’ average answer shows that the former group is more
heavily affected by the conservatism fallacy than the latter group.
Again, it is remarkable that subjects whose answer is close to the correct one
have a larger CRT score on average (see Table 5.4). This indicates that more
reflection and analytical reasoning is helpful to prevent falling for the bias.
5.4.3 OVERWEIGHTING AND UNDERWEIGHTING OF BASE RATES
The results in Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 show that subjects with a low CRT score
are on the one hand more inclined to neglect base rates when facing a repre-
sentativeness problem, but on the other hand they also tend to overemphasize
157
5. BEHAVIORAL BIASES AND COGNITIVE REFLECTION
prior information when confronted with conservatism problems. In this context,
Oechssler et al. (2009) raise the question whether subjects who exhibit a con-
servatism bias (i. e., who overweight base rates) are less likely to neglect base
rates in representativeness problems. We cannot find evidence for this conjecture.
It turns out that subjects who neglect the base rate also tend to overemphasize
prior information stronger than subjects who are not susceptible to that bias.10 It
seems to be simply the framing of these problems which leads low CRT subjects
to focus more heavily on very salient pieces of information and not to process all
available information correctly.
5.4.4 OVERCONFIDENCE
We asked the subjects five questions related to general knowledge. After an-
swering the questions, they were also asked to estimate the number of general
knowledge questions they had answered correctly.11 Within each CRT group, we
divided the participants into three subgroups. Subjects were classified as being
overconfident (underconfident) when the estimated number of correct answers
was larger (smaller) than the actual number, and otherwise they were classified as
assessing the number of right answers correctly.
Compared to the low CRT group, relatively more subjects in the high CRT
group assessed their number of right answers correctly (see Table 5.2). The
difference is statistically significant. While the more intuitive decision takers are
10For this specific question, we restricted our analysis to a subset of subjects who, for each
bias, either clearly exhibited the bias or stated the correct answer. Concerning the base rate
neglect problem, subjects exhibit this fallacy when their answer is > 90 %, while they do not
if their answer is 9 % or 10 %. Concerning the conservatism problem, subjects overemphasize
prior information when their answer equals 50 %, while they do not if their answer is > 90 %.
There are 100 subjects who neglect the base rate of which 76 also overweight prior information,
while of the 30 subjects who do not neglect the base rate, only 18 overweight prior information
(two-sided χ2 test, p = 0.086).
11(1) What is the distance between earth and sun in astronomical units? a) 587; b) 1; c) 4553;
d) 14. (2) How many inhabitants does the Saarland (a German federal state) have? a) 2,132,000;
b) 1,670,000; c) 1,037,000; d) 890,000. (3) In which year did Albert Einstein die? a) 1955;
b) 1947; c) 1961; d) 1938. (4) Who is the author of “Wilhelm Tell”? a) Johann Wolfgang von
Goethe; b) Friedrich Schiller; c) Friedrich Hölderlin; d) Theodor Fontane. (5) Which metropolitan
area has the largest number of inhabitants? a) Shanghai; b) Istanbul; c) Los Angeles; d) Moscow.
(6) What do you think: how many of the preceding questions have you answered correctly?
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CRT group
low high p-value
Scenario 1 61.0 % 67.0 % p≈ 0.38
Scenario 2 20.6 % 24.2 % p≈ 0.55
The p-values result from a two-sided χ2 test.
Table 5.5: Endowment effect: Fraction of subjects buying the highlighter per
scenario and CRT group.
relatively less successful in assessing the right number of correct answers, there
is no clear tendency that they are more overconfident than the analytical decision
takers (in the low CRT group, the share of subjects being overconfident and also
the share of underconfident subjects is larger than in the high CRT group).
5.4.5 ENDOWMENT EFFECT
In experimental economics, it is often observed that subjects’ willingness to
pay differs substantially from their willingness to accept (see e.g. Horowitz and
McConnell, 2002). This phenomenon is often explained by the endowment
effect (Kahneman et al., 1991). In our experiment, half of the subjects found a
yellow ‘Stabilo Boss’ highlighter on the desk in their cabin (scenario 1) while
the other half of the subjects was given the opportunity to buy such a highlighter
from the experimenter when leaving the laboratory (scenario 2). At the end of
the questionnaire, subjects in scenario 1 faced the following decision: “From
now on, the yellow highlighter on your desk belongs to you. You can decide
between the following alternatives: (1) I take the highlighter home when leaving
the laboratory; (2) When the payment is conducted, I sell the highlighter to the
experimenter at a price of 0.20e. In case 2, 0.20e are added to your profit
realized in the experiment.” In contrast, subjects in scenario 2 saw a bowl with
highlighters when entering the lab and at the end of the questionnaire they were
confronted with the following decision: “When the payment is conducted, you
can buy a yellow ‘Stabilo Boss’ highlighter at a price of 0.20e. (1) I want to buy
a yellow highlighter; (2) I do not want to buy a yellow highlighter. In case 1, you
will receive 0.20e less.”
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Overall, we find very strong evidence for the endowment effect. When the
highlighter is in the cabin (scenario 1), 64.6% of the subjects decided to take
the highlighter home, while only 22.9% of the subjects decided to buy it when
the payment is conducted (scenario 2). This difference is highly significant
(p < 0.0001, two-sided χ2 test). However, higher cognitive ability does not
reduce the susceptibility to the endowment effect (see Table 5.5).12
To conclude, is subjects’ performance on the CRT a good predictor for their
susceptibility to behavioral biases? While we have found strong evidence that
this is indeed the case for the base rate fallacy and the conservatism bias, the
susceptibility to the endowment effect does not vary with the CRT score. Hence,
our results suggest that the CRT has strong predictive power only for biases
that may arise in problems for which there exists a correct solution and where
analytical skills are helpful to derive this solution.
12Note that the endowment effect is the stronger, the larger is the difference in buying decisions
between the two scenarios. In the high CRT group this difference is 42.8%, while it is 40.4% in
the low CRT group.
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